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Abstract 
 
Conspiracy theories are a prominent feature of contemporary culture, and can 
have far-reaching consequences for believers and disbelievers alike. Until recently, 
however, relatively little research has examined the psychological origins of 
conspiracist beliefs. A growing amount of research has now begun to reveal the 
personality, motivational, cognitive, and social factors associated with belief in 
conspiracy theories. The current thesis aims to contribute to this literature in two 
main ways.  
First, the existing literature is limited by the lack of a validated measurement 
device. Aiming to address this need, Chapter 2 details the creation of a novel 
measure of conspiracist ideation, the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale, from 
item selection (Study 1) through to psychometric validation (Studies 2, 3, and 4). 
This measure assesses generic conspiracist ideation, therefore offering greater 
practical utility and theoretical validity than existing measures which assess 
endorsement of conspiracy theories based on specific world events. 
Second, the literature may benefit from incorporating conspiracism into the 
wider theoretical framework of anomalistic psychology. Chapters 3 and 4 employ the 
newly created GCB to investigate the role of representativeness heuristics – 
according to which claims are judged plausible to the extent that they subjectively 
appear typical of events in general – in conspiracist ideation. Study 5a predicted that 
the proportionality bias would influence novel conspiracist attributions; however, the 
data did not support this hypothesis. Study 5b predicted that susceptibility to the 
conjunction fallacy would be associated with conspiracist ideation. This hypothesis 
was supported. Finally, Chapter 4 predicted that conspiracist ideation would be 
associated with biased attributions of intentionality. Support for this hypothesis was 
mixed; the findings suggest that an inferential bias towards attributions of 
intentionality predicts conspiracist ideation, but a perceptual bias does not. In sum, 
the findings suggest that conspiracist beliefs may be a product, in part, of certain 
representativeness biases.  
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
Overview 
According to conspiracy theorists, the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
, 
2001, were orchestrated not by members of al-Qaeda, but by the United States 
government (Stempel, Hargrove, & Stempel, 2007); Princess Diana‘s death was the 
result not of a tragic accident, but of a secret plot concocted by the British Monarchy 
(Gardiner & Thompson, 2012); and government-run water treatment programmes are 
designed not simply to provide potable drinking water, but to spike the water with 
chemicals intended to control or kill the general public (Williams, 2013). Why is it 
that people believe implausible and unsubstantiated claims such as these to be true? 
The aim of the present thesis is to advance the body of psychological research 
seeking answers to this question. 
One possible reason for the prevalence of belief in conspiracy theories is that 
the theories are true, and believers derive their opinions from rational and impartial 
evaluation of the evidence supporting the claims. Information presented as evidence 
supporting many of the most popular conspiracy theories is readily available. Many 
theories generate their own cottage industry of books, websites, speaking tours, and 
documentaries (see Byford, 2011). However, the same evidence is generally 
criticised by credentialed experts as being of poor quality; conspiracy theories are 
generally regarded by the relevant communities of legitimate epistemic authorities as 
being unverified and lacking credibility, at best, or conclusively disconfirmed by 
multiple lines of converging evidence, at worst (e.g. Dunbar & Reagan, 2006; 
Posner, 1994). Although perhaps outnumbered by proconspiracist sources, critical 
analyses of various conspiracy theories are nonetheless readily available in print, 
broadcast media, and online. 
Regardless of the ultimate evidential basis for or against any particular 
conspiracist claim, there are other indications that beliefs in conspiracy theories 
might not be simply the product of reasoned scrutiny of the facts. Conspiracy 
theories are often quick to arise following an event, becoming widely endorsed even 
before many of the facts can be ascertained and analysed (e.g. Birdwell & Littler, 
2011); indeed, the theories often actively foster the perception that the truth is 
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currently unknown (Popp, 2006). In addition, individuals who endorse one 
conspiracy theory tend to endorse many other ostensibly unrelated theories (Goertzel, 
1994; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Swami & Furnham, 2012; Swami 
et al., 2013; Wood & Douglas, 2013). Certain individuals will even endorse mutually 
contradictory conspiracy theories (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012) and entirely 
novel, fictitious theories made up by researchers (Swami et al., 2011). Moreover, 
conspiracy theories are inherently implausible, diverging from reality, as it is 
normally understood, in certain fundamental ways; these characteristics will be 
explored in greater detail in a later section of the current chapter (Towards a 
definition of ‘conspiracy theory’). 
These observations do not in themselves indicate that any particular 
conspiracy theory is necessarily false; in the context of psychological enquiry the 
veracity of any particular conspiracy theory is not at issue. However, the 
observations do suggest that conspiracist beliefs may be, at least in part, the product 
of factors other than impartial examination of the evidence. Whether or not any given 
conspiracy theory accurately describes reality, it appears likely that psychological 
factors influence the formation, maintenance, and transmission of conspiracist 
beliefs. 
Until recently, however, the phenomenon of conspiracy theorising attracted 
relatively little interest from psychologists. Between the late-1970s and 2007, only a 
sporadic trickle of studies on the psychology of conspiracy theories was published 
(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Bird & Bogart, 2003; Butler, 
Koopman, & Zimbardo, 1995; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; McCauley 
& Jacques, 1979; McHoskey, 1995; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster, & Kilburn, 1999; 
Simmons & Parsons, 2005). It is only within the last few years that conspiracist 
beliefs have begun to attract the sustained interest of a larger number of researchers; 
a greater number of studies have been published within the past five years alone than 
all earlier studies combined. This body of research has begun to reveal the role of 
personality, motivational, and cognitive factors, suggesting that psychology can 
provide important insights into conspiracism. However, despite the increasing 
number of publications, research on the topic remains somewhat unfocused. In 
particular, efforts to measure conspiracist ideation have been piecemeal, and the 
literature is lacking a firm theory-driven investigative approach.  
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The primary aim of the current thesis is to add to this growing literature in 
two specific ways. First, by drawing upon recent theoretical insights concerning the 
hierarchical structure of conspiracist beliefs (Wood et al., 2012; Wood & Douglas, 
2013), a series of studies will be reported with the aim of presenting a 
psychometrically valid and practically useful measure of individual differences in 
generic conspiracist ideation. Second, by taking the wider anomalistic psychology 
literature as a starting point (French & Stone, 2014), the thesis will explore the role 
of the representativeness heuristic (see Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002; LeBoeuf & 
Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Rogers, Davis, & 
Fisk, 2009; Rogers, Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2011) in endorsement of conspiracy theories. 
This heuristic, first explored by Kahneman and Tversky (1972; see also Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982), describes a cognitive shortcut whereby the plausibility of a 
hypothesis or outcome is evaluated in terms of whether its key characteristics 
subjectively appear similar to the parent population – that is, the category of events 
or explanations of which it is an exemplar – and how well it reflects the 
characteristics of the process by which it was generated. Thus, random processes are 
expected to produce random-seeming outcomes, and the products of a particular 
process are expected to be highly similar to one another. Since reality often fails to 
satisfy these representativeness assumptions, the heuristic can lead to systematically 
flawed judgements. This thesis explores the ideas that conspiracy theories may 
appear more representative to individuals prone to specific proportionality, 
conjunction, and intentionality biases. 
To justify these research aims, this opening chapter aims to present a broad 
introduction the phenomenon of conspiracism. The first section of this chapter (A 
brief introduction to conspiracy theories) will present a brief overview of the 
prevalence of conspiracy theories in contemporary culture, the historical roots of 
conspiracy theorising, and the behavioural consequences which conspiracist beliefs 
can entail, with the aim of establishing why it is that conspiracy theories are 
deserving of psychological study. The next section (Towards a working definition of 
‘conspiracy theory’) will address the absence of a satisfactory definition of the term 
‗conspiracy theory‘, and will attempt to articulate a comprehensive working 
definition. Having delineated the object of enquiry, the next section (Review of the 
psychological literature) will then review the relevant psychological literature to 
date. Existing findings will be organised into a coherent categorical framework and 
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limitations of this body of research will be discussed, serving to explain the rationale 
driving the present research aims. Finally, a succinct overview of the planned 
programme of research will be presented (Overview of research programme). 
 
A brief introduction to conspiracy theories 
 
The prevalence of conspiracy theories 
It is not difficult to evidence the current popularity of conspiracy theories. 
According to various opinion polls and academic surveys, a majority of the 
American public doubts that President John F. Kennedy was killed by a lone gunman 
(Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995), approximately one-third believes that the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, were the product of conspiracy within the 
US government (Stempel et al., 2007), and around one-quarter of Britons believe that 
Princess Diana was assassinated (Gardiner & Thompson, 2012). Conspiracy 
theorising is not limited to Britain and the US; substantial numbers of people around 
the world readily admit to believing various conspiracy theories (Bruder, Haffke, 
Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997; Stieger, Tran, & 
Swami, 2013; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami et al., 2011).  
Other popular theories, to name but a few, allege that the US or British 
governments are covering up evidence of extraterrestrial visitation (believed by 21% 
of Americans and 15% of Britons); that the 1969 Apollo moon landing was faked 
(supported by 7% of Americans and 15% of Britons); that anthropogenic climate 
change is a scientific fraud (endorsed by 37% of Americans); that the pharmaceutical 
industry promotes harmful products in pursuit of profits (believed by 20% of 
Americans); and that a nefarious secret society has for generations been manipulating 
world events from behind the scenes (believed by 28% of the American public) (see 
Gardiner & Thompson, 2012; McConnachie & Tudge, 2008; Whalen & Vankin, 
2004; Williams, 2013). From meteorological anomalies and natural disasters to mass 
shootings, bombings, and other terrorist activities, it is rare that a significant event in 
the world today does not generate at least a modicum of conspiracy theorising 
(Byford, 2011). 
The proliferation of conspiracy theorising in contemporary culture is reflected 
in (and reciprocally fuelled by) the widespread dissemination of conspiracist claims 
in popular media. In recent years, many books claiming to reveal nefarious 
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conspiracies have been published by mainstream publishers, achieving commercial 
success and appearing on nonfiction best seller lists around the world (see Byford, 
2011). On television, conspiracy theories are often presented sympathetically in a 
genre which has been called ‗speculative history‘ (Popp, 2006). In the realm of 
fiction, conspiratorial plots commonly feature in mainstream blockbusters such as 
The Da Vinci Code, the Bourne trilogy, Anonymous, and in television series such as 
The X-Files and Homeland. In addition, the internet abounds with websites, blogs, 
podcasts, forums, YouTube videos, and freely available feature-length documentaries 
espousing various conspiracy theories (Clarke, 2007; Wood, 2013). 
The sheer prevalence and visibility of conspiracy theories in contemporary 
culture may give the impression that conspiracy theorising is a distinctly modern 
phenomenon. Possibly adding to this perception is the fact that conspiracism has only 
garnered sustained critical scholarly attention since the mid-20
th
 century (Hofstadter, 
1964; Popper, 1952). Popular media coverage of conspiracy theories as a 
phenomenon in their own right, including routine opinion polls revealing the 
prevalence of conspiracist beliefs, blossomed in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bratich, 
2008; Byford, 2011). Despite the relative recency of this cultural preoccupation with 
conspiracism, however, conspiracy theorising is far from an exclusively modern 
pastime.  
On the contrary, allegations of conspiracy were abundant among the speeches 
and writings of ancient Athens and Rome, and throughout the Middle Ages (Byford, 
2011; Coward & Swann, 2004; Roisman, 2006). Conspiracy culture truly came of 
age, however, near the end of the 18
th
 century in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution (Hofstadter, 1964). Two books published in 1797 each claimed that the 
French Revolution was the result of a nefarious conspiracy perpetrated by a 
confluence of sinister secret societies – primarily the Illuminati (Barruel, 1797, and 
Robison, 1797, cited in Byford, 2011). The Bavarian Illuminati was a small, 
relatively obscure group that had formed in 1776 and disbanded just 10 years later – 
three years before the French Revolution had begun (Byford, 2011). Yet, according 
to the author of one of these seminal books, not only had the Illuminati orchestrated 
the French Revolution, but the group had been formed for ―the express purpose of 
rooting out all religious establishments, and overturning all the existing governments 
of Europe‖ (Robison, 1797, cited in Hofstadter, 2008, p. 11).  
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This signified a move from what had previously been theories about rather 
limited and petty conspiracies of self-interest, to altogether grander theories about 
more mysterious, subversive, and monolithic conspiracies said to be working 
towards less tangible, but more sinister, ends (Cubitt, 1989). In this new form 
conspiracy theories were able to explain everything that happened in the world as the 
product of an all-encompassing conspiracy determined to somehow undermine or 
overthrow a way of life (Byford, 2011). 
Throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries, and up to the present day, conspiracy 
theories have drawn upon these same narrative tropes and rhetorical styles (Byford, 
2011). Just as contemporary conspiracy theories allege a ‗New World Order‘ plot to 
usurp current governments, the founders of the United States feared British and 
French conspiracies to overthrow and enslave the new republic (Byford, 2011). 
Antivaccinationists in mid-19
th
 century England accused vaccination practitioners 
and advocates of conspiring to incite fear, increase their own status, ensure profits, 
and poison the people they claimed to be protecting (Durbach, 2005) – ideas that are 
mirrored in current conspiracist allegations directed against ‗Big Pharma‘ (Offit, 
2011; Wolfe & Sharp, 2002). In the early 20
th
 century, The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion – an anti-Semitic publication which generated interest around the world – 
claimed to reveal a Jewish plot of world domination akin to the Illuminati conspiracy 
theories popularised a century earlier (Aaronovitch, 2009). Likewise, currently 
popular conspiracist accounts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which theorists claim the 
Bush government purposefully failed to prevent, share the essential narrative of 
theories popularised in the 1940s accusing President Franklin D. Roosevelt of 
deliberately permitting the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which precipitated the 
US‘s involvement in the Second World War (Byford, 2011). 
This abridged history offers just a few examples of conspiracy theories which 
have been readily accepted by large numbers of people in various countries and at 
various times over the past few centuries. It is clear that grandiose tales of conspiracy 
have been a constant feature of human culture throughout history, and that 
conspiracy theories have maintained a distinct rhetorical and narrative style since the 
late 18
th
 century (Byford, 2011). The recent digital revolution may have hastened the 
formulation and spread of conspiracy theories, making them more easily available to 
a larger audience than ever before (Clarke, 2007; Wood, 2013). Yet the conspiracism 
of the 21
st
 century is not a uniquely modern phenomenon, but rather the natural 
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extension of a long conspiracist tradition. This tradition – the characteristic features 
of conspiracy theories – will be explored in greater detail later in this chapter 
(Towards a definition of ‘conspiracy theory’). First, however, it is necessary to 
explore the consequences of conspiracism.  
 
The consequences of conspiracy theories 
Conspiracy theories are sometimes regarded as a harmless diversion, or even 
a potentially beneficial safeguard against real conspiratorial activity going 
undiscovered (e.g. Clarke, 2002; Pigden, 2007). The notion that the investigative 
activity of conspiracy theorists serves to uncover real disreputable behaviour appears 
to be a dubious assertion; where genuine conspiracies have been uncovered in recent 
years, such as the Watergate or Iran-Contra scandals, it has been due to the efforts of 
conventional journalists and academics or whistle blowers, rather than obscure 
conspiracy theorists (e.g. Draper, 1992; Woodward & Bernstein, 1974). However, it 
is with the notion that conspiracy theories are largely harmless that this section aims 
to take issue. Rather than being ―just harmless fun‖ (Jolley, 2013, p. 60), widespread 
belief in conspiracy theories can have tangible detrimental consequences, both for 
the individuals who believe the theories, and for the wider community. 
One domain in which conspiracy theories can have harmful consequences is 
in terms of people‘s health choices. The most extensively researched example to date 
concerns beliefs about HIV/AIDS. It is variously claimed that AIDS is caused not by 
the HIV virus, but by recreational drug use or sexual behaviour; that AIDS treatment 
programs are ineffective or actively harmful; or that the HIV virus was created by the 
US government and deliberately disseminated among certain communities as an 
agent of population control. Substantial numbers of people endorse these ideas – 
particularly African Americans, who are often portrayed as the victims of the alleged 
conspiracy (see Bird & Bogart, 2005). Those who believe these theories – including 
HIV-positive individuals – are less likely to use preventative measures or adhere to 
treatment programs (e.g. Bogart, Galvan, Wagner, & Klein, 2011; Bogart, Wagner, 
Galvan, & Banks, 2010). It is not only the general public whose actions are affected. 
In 1999, in the midst of an AIDS epidemic, the South African government declined 
donations of antiretroviral medication for AIDS patients, arguing that the drug was 
ineffective and toxic. It is estimated that, between 2000 and 2005, the deaths of more 
than 330,000 South African AIDS patients could have been prevented if access to 
 19 
effective treatment not been obstructed (Chigwedere, Seage, Gruskin, Lee, & Essex, 
2008). 
Likewise, conspiracy theories have surrounded the practice of vaccination 
since the advent of the first vaccine. In the mid-19
th
 century, laws compelling parents 
to vaccinate their children against smallpox spawned dedicated antivaccination 
leagues across England. These groups argued that the severity of the disease and the 
efficacy of vaccination were exaggerated by doctors intent on increasing their own 
profits (Fitchett & Heymann, 2011; Offit, 2011). These antivaccination movements 
gathered sufficient popular support to force Parliament to overturn compulsory 
vaccination laws, resulting in a resurgence of smallpox (Allen, 2008). Contemporary 
conspiracy theories regarding vaccines make virtually identical claims, arguing that 
vaccines are toxic and that the medical industry, government, and Big Pharma are 
colluding to conceal evidence of harm and ensure profitability (Offit, 2011; Wolfe & 
Sharp, 2002). These allegations have played a role in declining uptake of vaccines 
(Barrelet, Bourrier, Burton-Jeangros, & Schindler, 2013; Chung, 2009; Gerber & 
Offit, 2009; Hilton, Petticrew, & Hunt, 2007; Kata, 2010, 2012; Salmon et al., 2005), 
which in turn has contributed to epidemics of vaccine-preventable diseases (Jansen et 
al., 2003). 
It is not only in the domain of personal health choices that conspiracy theories 
can lead to negative outcomes. Mere exposure to climate change conspiracy theories 
has been shown to reduce participants‘ intentions to reduce their carbon footprint 
(Jolley & Douglas, 2013). Conspiracy theories denying the reality of anthropogenic 
climate change may even have an influence on political policy making; in February 
2010, politicians in the US formulated a resolution recommending the withdrawal of 
carbon dioxide emission restrictions, explicitly endorsing the conspiracy theory that 
scientists are manipulating climate data to produce a global climate change outcome 
(State of Utah, 2010). 
More generally, there is some evidence that conspiracy theories can lead to 
disengagement from mainstream politics (Butler et al., 1995; Jolley & Douglas, 
2013). There are indications that this sense of political powerlessness may motivate 
social action aimed at challenging traditional authorities, such as protesting (Imhoff 
& Bruder, 2013). However, in some cases conspiracist beliefs can foster restrictive 
attitudes towards human rights (Swami et al., 2012). This can extend to radicalisation 
and extremism. One qualitative analysis found that conspiracy theories commonly 
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feature within the ideologies of extremist and terrorist organisations, such as al-
Qaeda and Aryan Nations (Bartlett & Miller, 2010). Individual perpetrators of 
various attacks have apparently been influenced by conspiracy theories (see Byford, 
2011), including Timothy McVeigh (Michel & Herbeck, 2001), Anders Brevich 
(Fekete, 2012), and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (Andersson, 2013). 
Of course, the consequences of conspiracy theories are unlikely to be entirely 
negative. Such beliefs may serve important functions for believers, conferring a 
sense of control, meaning, and understanding in the face of threatening events, and 
potentially providing believers with a supportive social community (Franks, 
Bangerter, & Bauer, 2013). However, given the demonstrable harm that widespread 
belief in conspiracy theories can cause, it is important to understand how such beliefs 
arise. Before turning to the psychology of conspiracism, however, it is necessary to 
demarcate the object of enquiry – that is, to articulate a working definition of 
‗conspiracy theory‘. 
 
Towards a working definition of ‘conspiracy theory’ 
To understand the psychological origins of conspiracy theories, researchers 
need to be clear about what is meant by the term ‗conspiracy theory’. The phrase is 
firmly embedded in the contemporary lexicon. As of May 2013, a Google search for 
‗conspiracy theory‘ returns almost 10 million results. It is used by politicians, 
journalists, academics, and the general public alike to refer to particular claims or 
narratives. For the most part, the label is applied consistently; there is general 
agreement over which claims qualify as conspiracy theories and which do not 
(Byford, 2011; Keeley, 1999). Conspiratorial explanations of the Apollo moon 
landings, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the death of President John F. Kennedy, to 
name but a few prominent examples, are all commonly categorised as conspiracy 
theories in popular discourse (see McConnachie & Tudge, 2008).  
However, ‗conspiracy theory‘ is a deceptively simple term. Though it is 
widely used, articulating what it is that makes one claim a conspiracy theory but not 
another presents unexpected difficulties (Keeley, 1999). The claim that members of 
the US government were complicit in the attacks of September 11th, 2001, for 
instance, is generally branded a conspiracy theory (e.g. Dunbar & Reagan, 2006; 
Grossman, 2006), yet the label is rarely applied to the claim that members of al-
Qaeda secretly planned and executed the attacks. These two claims both postulate a 
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successful conspiracy to commit the attacks. Why is it that, in popular discourse, the 
term conspiracy theory is applied to the former but not the latter? 
The features which distinguish conspiracy theories from legitimate theorised 
conspiracies are not immediately obvious. Dictionary definitions (e.g. Thompson, 
1995) fail to capture the nuanced meaning that the term conveys in common use. 
Psychologists researching conspiracist beliefs have generally avoided the task of 
articulating a definition altogether (e.g. Butler et al., 1995), or have sketched out 
brief, relatively superficial definitions (e.g. Swami et al., 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008; Zonis & Joseph, 1994) with the unspoken assumption that the distinction 
between conspiracy theories and other claims is self-evident (Byford, 2011). The 
situation has been likened to attempting to define pornography – a task which forced 
US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stuart to conclude simply, ―I know it when I see it‖ 
(Byford, 2011, p. 31). The frequency and consistency with which the label 
‗conspiracy theory‘ is used in popular discourse suggests that users feel sufficiently 
confident that they know a conspiracy theory when they see it. Yet for the purposes 
of scientific scrutiny, it is necessary to stipulate a working definition which 
articulates these unspoken assumptions about the characteristics that identify a claim 
as being a conspiracy theory.  
 
The characteristics of conspiracy theories 
The current definition is not concerned with the linguistic origins of the 
words ‗conspiracy‘ and ‗theory‘, nor with the specific meaning of ‗conspiracy‘ in a 
legal context – it is concerned only with capturing the meaning conveyed by the term 
‗conspiracy theory‘ in contemporary popular discourse (see Cubitt, 1989). In popular 
use, the label ‗conspiracy theory‘ refers to a special type of postulated conspiracy. 
These conspiracies tend to depart from legitimate claims of conspiracy in several 
regards. The following section will attempt to identify and describe these 
characteristics by taking a family-resemblance approach, focusing on features of the 
context in which such claims exist, their content, and their epistemic rationale. A 
conspiracy theory will be defined as an unverified claim of conspiracy which is not 
the most plausible account of an event or situation, pertains to significant events or 
has sensationalistic implications, assumes unusually sinister and competent 
conspirators, is based on weak kinds of evidence, and is epistemically self-insulating 
against disconfirmation. Each of these characteristics will be examined in turn. 
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Context. 
Conspiracy theories are unverified claims. Conspiracies have occurred 
throughout history, and occur in some form every day – in politics, organised crime, 
insider dealing, scams, and so on. Philosopher Charles Pigden points out that, ―if a 
conspiracy theory is simply a theory which posits a conspiracy, then every politically 
and historically literate person is a big-time conspiracy theorist‖ (Pigden, 2007, p. 
222). However, this is not how the label is commonly used. The term, as used in 
popular discourse, usually refers to explanations which are not regarded as verified 
by legitimate epistemic authorities. The theory may be regarded as indisputably true 
by those who subscribe to it, but this belief is invariably at odds with the mainstream 
consensus among scientists, historians, or other legitimate judges of the claim‘s 
veracity.  
This is partly a matter of empirical support. The evidence offered in favour of 
a conspiracy theory is generally perceived as deficient by epistemic authorities (e.g. 
Dunbar & Reagan, 2006; Posner, 1994). However, in addition to the lack of well-
regarded evidence, the theories themselves often hinge on the fact that they are not 
widely accepted by the mainstream. Inherent in most conspiracy theories is the 
allegation that the conspiracy is ongoing, and thus is yet to be fully revealed and 
verified (Goertzel, 2010). In this way, conspiracy theories actively cultivate the 
perception that events are unsolved by searching for ambiguity and arguing that all is 
not as it seems (Popp, 2006).  
Conspiracy theories are less plausible alternatives to the mainstream 
explanation. Conspiracy theories are defined in part by their oppositional 
relationship with other explanations of the events or situations to which they pertain 
(Aaronovitch, 2009; Coady, 2006; Keeley, 1999; Oliver & Wood, 2012). A 
conspiracy theory is not merely one candidate explanation among other equally 
plausible alternatives. Rather, the label refers to a claim which runs counter to a more 
plausible and widely accepted account. Conspiracy theories invariably reject this 
mainstream explanation as being false.  
In conspiracist rhetoric, the mainstream explanation is usually termed the 
‗official story‘. This disparaging label is intended to imply that the explanation is 
merely an account that happens to be proffered by some official source, and so 
should not be trusted; the mainstream explanation is construed as not merely a 
mistaken hypothesis, but as a deliberate fraud concocted by the conspirators to 
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mislead the public (Barkun, 2003; Goertzel, 2010). Thus the very existence of an 
official story is incorporated into the conspiracy theory and said to be evidence of a 
conscious plot to deceive the public – ‗that‘s what they want us to believe‘ (Fenster, 
2008; Keeley, 1999). Indeed, a conspiracy theory need not offer a coherent, detailed 
alternative explanation for events; it may simply be based around the allegation that 
something is wrong with the official story (Wood et al., 2012; Wood & Douglas, 
2013). 
Conspiracy theories are sensationalistic. Not all events are equally likely to 
become the subject of a conspiracy theory. Of the many historically documented 
conspiracies, and the many more which are undoubtedly occurring at this very 
moment, most are clearly limited in ambition and consequence. Typical conspiracies 
have mundane aims, such as profiteering or concealing some petty crime, and have 
localised consequences. Conspiracy theories, however, rarely concern these kinds of 
isolated and relatively unimportant events. Typically only events of obvious national 
or international significance attract conspiracy theories, such as terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters, disease pandemics, the deaths of celebrities, and plane crashes 
(Byford, 2011). These kinds of events are often profoundly shocking, have a large 
impact on public consciousness, and receive extensive media coverage.  
In addition to their significant subject matter, conspiracy theories have 
sensational implications. According to such claims, our basic knowledge of current 
events and world history is based on a fabrication (Keeley, 1999). It is often the 
organisations and institutions that are normally expected to be accountable and acting 
in the public interest, such as democratically elected leaders, health care providers, 
and the media, that are portrayed as wantonly deceiving those who rely on them. If 
such claims were true there would often be profound implications for our 
understanding of freedom, liberty, privacy, knowledge, political transparency, and 
even free will. In many cases vindication of the claims would justify the 
impeachment of whole governments, the disbandment and criminal prosecution of 
entire organisations and industries, and the rewriting of history (Byford, 2011). 
Content. 
Conspiracy theories assume that everything is intended. In the real world, 
conspiracies – even relatively simple, petty, straightforward plans – rarely work out 
exactly according to plan or remain undetected for long (Byford, 2011). In contrast, 
conspiracy theories posit an ordered world in which conspiracies are preternaturally 
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successful; the competence and discretion of individuals, coalitions and 
bureaucracies is greatly overstated. According to conspiracy theories almost nothing 
happens by accident, only by agency (Barkun, 2003). Events and situations are 
explained not as a result of many different complex, chaotic, interacting, and 
uncontrollable factors, but solely as the result of the conspirators‘ desires and 
actions. Every observed detail is said to have resulted from conscious planning, 
direct intervention, manipulation, and deception. The potential role of chance, 
accidents, and unintended consequences is largely overlooked. Rather, the 
conspirators are assumed to be hypercompetent in their ability to successfully plan 
and control events and subsequently keep secret their actions (Byford, 2011; Popp, 
2006; Popper, 2006).  
Conspiracy theories assume unusually malign intent. While the act of 
conspiracy necessarily entails some element of secrecy, not all conspiracies are 
malevolent. In the real world, conspiracy is sometimes necessary and benign. 
Consider the routine operations of intelligence agencies in the interests of national 
security, or a group of people conspiring to throw a surprise party for a friend. Of 
course, cruel and destructive conspiracies do take place in the world, but even these 
tend to be limited in ambition and scope. The type of claims typically referred to as 
conspiracy theories invariably posit an altogether more sinister type of conspirator 
(Keeley, 1999; Kramer, 1998; Lewandowsky, Cook, Oberauer, & Marriott, 2013; 
Moscovici, 1987).  
The malevolent intent assumed by most conspiracy theories goes far beyond 
everyday plots borne out of self-interest, corruption, cruelty, and criminality. The 
postulated conspirators are not merely people with selfish agendas or differing values 
(Bale, 2007). Rather, conspiracy theories postulate a black and white world in which 
good is struggling against evil (Bale, 2007; Barkun, 2003; Oliver & Wood, 2012). 
The general public is cast as the victim of organised persecution, and the motives of 
the alleged conspirators often verge on pure maniacal evil (Lewandowsky, Cook, et 
al., 2013). At the very least, the conspirators are said to have an almost inhuman 
disregard for the basic liberty and well-being of the general population. More 
grandiose conspiracy theories portray the conspirators as being Evil Incarnate – of 
having caused all the ills from which we suffer, committing abominable acts of 
unthinkable cruelty on a routine basis, and striving ultimately to subvert or destroy 
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everything we hold dear (Bale, 2007; Hofstadter, 2008; Moscovici, 1987; Popper, 
2006). 
Epistemic rationale. 
Conspiracy theories have low standards of evidence. Richard Hofstadter 
noted the ―heroic strivings‖ with which conspiracy theorists seek out evidence in 
favour of their claims (Hofstadter, 2008, p. 36). This is perhaps even more obvious 
today, with entire online cottage industries devoted to particular conspiracy theories. 
However, not all evidence is treated equally. Conspiracy theories can be identified by 
the types of evidence that they are predicated on.  
Conspiracy theories are primarily built upon negative evidence – gaps or 
ambiguities in current knowledge. An alternative narrative is constructed out of what 
is perceived to be errant data (Keeley, 1999). This term refers to details which are 
either unaccounted for by the mainstream explanation, or which seemingly contradict 
it. Such anomalies are rarely regarded by epistemic experts as sufficient to 
undermine the mainstream explanation in its entirety; in fact, they are usually seen as 
irrelevant or invented, or at least equally consistent with other explanations (Dunbar 
& Reagan, 2006; Lewandowsky, Cook, et al., 2013). Yet conspiracy theories take 
these errant details and weave them into a coherent narrative. Every anomaly is 
interpreted as part of a singular conspiracy, rather than simply an isolated 
unanswered question or an irrelevant spurious factoid. The mere existence of 
anomalies is argued to be compelling evidence that the mainstream explanation is a 
falsehood, and therefore that a conspiratorial explanation must be true.  
When positive evidence is presented in favour of a conspiracy theory, it is 
generally regarded by legitimate epistemic authorities as being of low quality. 
Conspiracy theories often rely upon the testimony of eyewitnesses caught up in 
chaotic and traumatic events, for example (Dunbar & Reagan, 2006). This kind of 
evidence is valued above subsequent methodical investigations, despite the 
abundance of psychological evidence pointing out the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony (e.g. Wells & Olson, 2003).  
Conspiracy theories are epistemically self-insulating. Because of their 
epistemic approach towards new information, conspiracy theories are insulated 
against questioning or refutation. The unparalleled evil and power of the postulated 
conspirators implies that they have virtually unlimited ability to control people and 
information. Thus, the continued failure of those in the mainstream to discover or 
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expose the conspiracy can be interpreted as evidence of their complicity in the plot. 
This epistemic strategy has been termed cascade logic, referring to the tendency for 
conspiracy theories to remain viable hypotheses by implicating more and more 
people in the alleged scheme (Goertzel, 2010; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). In this 
way, conspiracy theories are able to incorporate any inconvenient data: the absence 
of substantiating evidence is interpreted as evidence of a conspiracy of silence, while 
evidence directly contradicting the theory can be seen as disinformation concocted 
by the conspirators as part of their cover-up.  
By invoking the epistemic rationale of ‗heads I win, tails you lose‘ (Boudry 
& Braeckman, 2012; Wiseman, 2010), conspiracy theories seal themselves off from 
respectful and impartial examination of all the evidence, and are ultimately 
unfalsifiable. As contrary information can be reinterpreted to fit with the conspiracy 
theory, providing credible evidence against a claim can even have the unintended 
consequence of reinforcing it (Goertzel, 2010; Keeley, 1999). 
 
Definition summary 
‘Conspiracy theory’ is the name commonly given to a particular category of 
claims: a subset of theorised conspiracies which reliably demonstrate certain 
characteristics. In terms of the context in which conspiracy theories exist, a 
conspiracy theory is an unverified and sensationalistic claim of conspiracy which 
contradicts a more plausible account. In terms of content, the claim assumes 
extraordinary malevolence and competence on the part of the conspirators. In terms 
of epistemic rationale, the claim is based on evidence regarded as poor quality by 
legitimate epistemic authorities, and is resistant to questioning or refutation.  
Individually, each of these features is typical of conspiracy theories, but not 
unique to them. It is the confluence of all these features that identifies the most 
prototypical conspiracy theories. However, it is important to acknowledge the 
limitations of these criteria. There is huge diversity amongst conspiracy theories; not 
all conspiracy theories manifest these attributes in precisely the same way or to the 
same extent. Moreover, most of the characteristics outlined here are not objective 
criteria; classifying a claim as a conspiracy theory unavoidably requires an element 
of subjective judgement and discretion. Yet even with these caveats in mind, the 
family-resemblance approach taken here appears to offer a useful definition of 
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conspiracy theory as it is used in popular discourse, and thus allows the object of 
scrutiny to be adequately delineated. 
 
Review of the psychological literature 
Having outlined the prevalence and consequences of conspiracy theories, and 
provided a sufficient working definition, it is now possible to proceed towards an 
overview of the existing psychological literature. The purpose of this review is to 
examine the relevant psychological literature to date, with the objective of 
systematizing the available data in order to suggest fruitful lines of future enquiry. 
For the purposes of this review, the existing research will be divided into four 
categories – Associations between conspiracy beliefs, Sociodemographic correlates, 
Individual differences, and Cognitive biases and heuristics. It should be noted that 
these categories do not denote mutually exclusive categories or rigid psychological 
divisions, but are intended as convenient subheadings which serve to organise 
existing findings into a meaningful framework. 
 
Associations between conspiracy beliefs 
 One of the most robust findings to emerge from the available literature 
concerns the relationships between various conspiracist beliefs: belief in one 
conspiracy theory correlates with belief in other conspiracy theories (e.g Goertzel, 
1994; Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012). Thus, belief in conspiracy theories can 
be conceptualised as a ‗monological‘ belief system (Goertzel, 1994), or a singular 
personality trait. This trait – the extent to which an individual tends to accept or 
reject conspiracy theories in general – has been termed conspiracist ideation (Swami 
et al., 2011). The degree to which an individual will endorse any particular 
conspiracy theory can be predicted by stable individual differences in general 
conspiracist ideation. 
This ought to be somewhat surprising. The question of whether the historic 
footage of Neil Armstrong‘s giant leap for mankind was shot on the surface of the 
moon or in a terrestrial film studio is unrelated in any obvious sense to the possibility 
that Queen Elizabeth II, George W. Bush, and other powerful figures from 
throughout history are in fact descended from shape shifting alien lizards bent on 
world domination. These separate issues each deserve impartial evaluation of the 
relevant evidence, and presumably an individual might assign each claim a different 
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degree of plausibility based on independent evidential merit. Yet individuals who 
endorse one conspiracy theory tend also to endorse many others. 
Several studies within the psychological literature have used factor analysis 
and indicators of scale reliability to examine the structure of measures of general 
conspiracist ideation. Most existing measures have been composed of between 6 and 
30 items, with each item referring to a different popular conspiracy theory. Theories 
commonly referred to include, for example, the deaths of President John F. Kennedy 
and Princess Diana, and the origin of AIDS. Despite the variety in item content, 
factor analyses have found several such measures to have a single-factor structure 
(Bruder et al., 2013; Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Swami et al., 2011; 
Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010). In addition, most existing measures 
have demonstrated high internal reliability as assessed by Cronbach‘s alpha, further 
indicating that conspiracist ideation constitutes a unidimensional construct 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Darwin, 
Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & 
Cinnirella, 2007; Swami et al., 2011, 2010; Wood et al., 2012). 
It should be noted that some scales have not demonstrated a single-factor 
structure. However, in contrast to measures of general conspiracist ideation which 
have tended to refer to many unrelated theories, measures with more complex 
structures have focused narrowly on conspiracy theories concerning a single event or 
situation. For instance, some (though not all: see Crocker et al., 1999) measures 
focusing on theories alleging a conspiracy against African Americans have been 
reported to have a two-factor structure (Parsons et al., 1999; Simmons & Parsons, 
2005). Parsons et al. (1999) label one factor ‗benign neglect‘ theories and the other 
‗malicious intent‘ theories. While the researchers do not report the correlation 
between the two subscales, scores were largely predicted by the same variables, 
suggesting similar psychological foundations. Likewise, Swami et al. (2010) found 
an analogous two-factor structure for a measure of belief in various conspiracy 
theories concerning the 9/11 attacks. One factor encompassed relatively passive 
theories proposing that the government is merely covering up certain information 
about the events, while the second factor reflected more active theories alleging that 
the government was directly involved in planning and perpetrating the events. 
Despite the distinction between the two factors, factor scores correlated strongly and 
positively. Thus even when distinct factors have emerged, it appears that belief in 
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one type of conspiracy theory about an event is associated with belief in other types, 
and different categories of beliefs are predicted by largely similar variables. 
Another approach towards assessing the relationships between conspiracy 
beliefs has involved simple bivariate correlations or multiple regression analyses 
examining the relationships between various specific conspiracy theories. In addition 
to assessing general conspiracist ideation, Swami et al. (2010) administered a 
measure specifically of belief in conspiracy theories regarding the 9/11 attacks. 
Multiple regression analysis found that the strongest predictor of 9/11 conspiracist 
ideation was belief in other, unrelated conspiracy theories. Similarly, Swami et al. 
(2011) found that conspiracist beliefs about the July 7th, 2005, terrorist attacks in 
London were best predicted by general conspiracist ideation. Likewise, beliefs 
specifically in moon landing conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, et al., 
2013; Swami et al., 2013), conspiratorial explanations for the disappearance of 
Amelia Earhart (Swami & Furnham, 2012), the abduction of an Austrian child 
(Stieger et al., 2013), and rejection of climate change as a scientific hoax 
(Lewandowsky, Oberauer, et al., 2013) have all been demonstrated to correlate 
positively with beliefs in other, unrelated conspiracy theories. Moreover, Swami et 
al. (2011, Study 2) assessed belief in a number of entirely fictitious conspiracy 
theories made up by the researchers for the purposes of the study. Again, the 
strongest predictor of endorsement of these fictional theories perceived as real was 
general conspiracist ideation. 
While the majority of such research has been correlational, Jolley and 
Douglas (2013) provide experimental evidence that beliefs about one conspiracy 
theory can affect endorsement of unrelated theories. The authors manipulated 
participants‘ perceptions of the evidence relating to specific conspiracy theories 
concerning the death of Princess Diana. One group of participants was given 
information critical of the conspiracy theories, while another group was given 
information supportive of the theories. Those who read evidence supportive of the 
theories later endorsed other unrelated conspiracy theories more strongly than did 
those who read disconfirming evidence. Other research suggests that this influence of 
conspiracy theories is surreptitious; when an individual‘s attitudes have been 
influenced by conspiracist information, the individual is likely to remain unaware 
that their own opinions have been influenced at all (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). 
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Perhaps the strongest evidence that an individual who accepts one conspiracy 
theory is likely to endorse others comes from data indicating that beliefs in mutually 
incompatible conspiracy theories of the same event are positively correlated. Wood 
et al. (2012) demonstrated this by assessing belief in several conspiracy theories 
concerning the death of Princess Diana. Crucially, some of the theories contradict 
one another. For instance, one theory alleges that Princess Diana faked her own 
death, while another proposes that her death was arranged by the British secret 
service. Analyses showed that individuals who endorsed the former theory were 
more likely to endorse the latter, despite the fact that these explanations obviously 
cannot both be true. A second study, conducted shortly after the US military 
operation which resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden, found that people who 
endorsed a conspiracy theory postulating that Bin Laden was in fact still alive 
following the raid were more likely to endorse another theory claiming that at the 
time of the raid Bin Laden was already dead (Wood et al., 2012). 
Goertzel (1994) argued that beliefs in conspiracy theories are intercorrelated 
because the existence of one conspiracy can be taken as evidence for the existence of 
others, and in this way conspiracist ideation constitutes a monological network of 
mutually supportive beliefs. However, this can not be true in the case of mutually 
incompatible theories such as those alleging that Osama Bin Laden is both dead and 
alive. Wood et al. (2012) argue that correlations between conspiracy theories may be 
observed not because of any direct logical relationship between individual theories, 
but rather because each theory is in agreement with higher-order beliefs about the 
world which promote and sustain even contradictory conspiracist beliefs. Consistent 
with this, the researchers found that although beliefs in contradictory theories 
regarding Osama Bin Laden correlated positively, the relationship was fully 
mediated by endorsement of the more general allegation that the US government is 
hiding important information about the raid. This suggests that beliefs in the 
contradictory theories regarding Bin Laden are the product of a single more generic 
belief proposing simply that the ‗official‘ narrative is not to be trusted. Consistent 
with this, Wood and Douglas (2013) found that conspiracy theory advocates who 
posted comments on online news forums tended to argue against the mainstream 
explanation of events, rather than espousing a particular alternative theory of their 
own.  
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Sociodemographic correlates 
 Few sociodemographic factors have emerged as consistent correlates of 
conspiracist ideation. Several studies report no significant relationships between 
belief in conspiracy theories and age, gender, income, occupational category, or level 
of education (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et al., 1999; Darwin et al., 2011; 
Goertzel, 1994; Herek & Capitanio, 1994; Jolley & Douglas, 2013; Parsons et al., 
1999; Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Swami et al., 2011, 2013), or at best report weak, 
inconsistent, or indirect relationships (Goertzel, 1994; Stempel et al., 2007; Swami et 
al., 2010; Swami & Furnham, 2012). These largely negative findings suggest that, 
contrary to some popular stereotypes, conspiracist beliefs are generally not limited 
only to males, the young, the poor, or the uneducated; rather, conspiracist beliefs are 
equally prevalent amongst almost all sectors of society.  
 One demographic factor which has been found to correlate with conspiracist 
ideation is ethnicity; members of ethnic minorities appear to be more susceptible to 
conspiracy theories. Goertzel (1994) examined conspiracist ideation among 
randomly sampled Caucasians, Hispanics, and African Americans living in New 
Jersey. For the purposes of analyses, ethnicity was treated as a linear ‗minority 
status‘ variable. The author argued that, within the US, Caucasians represent the least 
socially marginalised community and African Americans the most marginalised, 
with Hispanics somewhere between the two. A moderate correlation was found 
between minority status and conspiracist ideation, and the group means confirmed 
that endorsement of conspiracy theories was lowest among Caucasians, highest 
among African Americans, and intermediate among Hispanics. 
Two subsequent studies compared conspiracist ideation between ethnic 
groups within the US. Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found that amongst a sample of 
students at a US university, Caucasians rated various conspiracy theories least 
favourably while Hispanics and African Americans tended to be more favourable. In 
this study differential endorsement between Hispanics and African Americans was 
negligible. Similarly, Stempel et al. (2007) surveyed beliefs about 9/11 conspiracy 
theories within a large sample of randomly selected participants from across the 
United States. The authors found that Hispanics, African Americans, and Asian 
Americans were generally more favourable towards certain 9/11 conspiracy theories 
than were Caucasians, though differences between the three minorities were 
inconsistent. 
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Thus, while Goertzel‘s (1994) contention that racial minority status can be 
conceptualised as a linear variable is problematic and largely unsupported, the 
finding that conspiracist ideation is generally stronger among members of ethnic 
minorities appears to be robust. One explanation which has been offered for this 
finding is based on the ‗social marginality‘ hypothesis: members of socially 
marginalised and less powerful groups may turn to conspiracy theories in reaction to 
their disadvantaged position in society (Stempel et al., 2007). Yet increased 
conspiracist ideation has not reliably been observed within other marginalised groups 
(such as females, youths, or those with low income). Crocker et al. (1999) found that 
ethnicity fully mediated the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
conspiracist ideation, while Simmons and Parsons (2005) observed no difference in 
endorsement of conspiracy theories between African Americans of differing social 
status. Rather than being an effect of general social marginalisation, the observed 
differences appear to be specific to racial or ethnic marginalisation. 
One possibility is that the discrimination faced by ethnic minorities promotes 
alienation and distrust of the authorities and institutions seen as allowing racial 
discrimination to persist. Greater belief in conspiracy theories may be a secondary 
effect of this sense of powerlessness and disaffection (this possibility is explored in 
more general terms later in this review under the heading Individual differences). 
Lending some support to this speculation, Herek and Capitanio (1994) found that 
African Americans were less trusting of scientists and doctors than Caucasians. 
Goertzel (1994) found that scores on measures of interpersonal distrust and anomie 
were generally higher among African Americans and Hispanics than among 
Caucasians, partially mediating the relationship between conspiracist ideation and 
minority status. In addition, African Americans who believe they have been the 
victims of police harassment because of their race, who believe that African 
Americans have little political influence, or who blame the problems faced by the 
African American community on institutional racism, are more likely to endorse 
conspiracy theories than African Americans who do not report these experiences or 
beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et al., 1999; Simmons & Parsons, 
2005). A problem with this explanation, as with much of the individual differences 
literature discussed later, is that the direction of causality remains to be established. It 
is not clear whether racial or ethnic discrimination results in alienation which in turn 
leads to susceptibility to conspiracy theories, or whether greater susceptibility to 
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conspiracy theorising among ethnic minorities for other reasons causes increased 
alienation, distrust, and system blame. 
Another potential (not mutually exclusive) explanation is that elevated 
conspiracist ideation among ethnic minorities is a result of greater familiarity with 
certain conspiracy theories due to their personally relevant and evocative content. 
Highly emotive rumours are more likely to be passed on than less emotive claims 
(Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001). Given the specific relevance and emotiveness to 
African Americans of claims of a conspiracy victimising the black population, it is 
possible that such a claim is more likely to be transmitted within African American 
communities than within other minorities or Caucasians. Sunstein and Vermeule 
(2009) suggest that greater familiarity with a conspiracist claim may result in 
increased unwillingness to dismiss it outright, even if the individual does not 
explicitly agree with the claim. It has been demonstrated that mere exposure to 
conspiracist information can increase endorsement of the claims, though individuals 
may be unaware that their attitudes have been influenced (Butler et al., 1995; 
Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Jolley & Douglas, 2013; Swami et al., 2013). This 
‗conspiracy cascade‘ (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009) effect may account, at least in 
part, for stronger endorsement (or weaker rejection) among African Americans of 
conspiracy theories relevant to their ingroup (Crocker et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; 
Herek & Capitanio, 1994; Ross, Essien, & Torres, 2006). However, this explanation 
remains to be directly tested, and cannot account for stronger endorsement among 
minorities of conspiracy theories unrelated to their own ethnic group (Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Ross et al., 2006; Stempel et al., 2007).  
It should be noted that all studies concerning ethnicity to date have been 
carried out on US samples, and so the findings are of questionable generalisability. 
Conspiracy theorising amongst African Americans in particular may be a response to 
the deeply ingrained history of social and institutional discrimination against black 
people in the US (e.g. Thomas & Quinn, 1993). It is possible that the relationship 
between ethnicity and conspiracist ideation is different in other countries with 
different ethnic populations and different histories of institutional discrimination. 
 
Individual differences 
A large proportion of the existing literature concerns the relationships 
between endorsement of conspiracy theories and individual differences in a selection 
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of personality variables and other beliefs. The findings reveal that certain clusters of 
related traits reliably correlate with conspiracist ideation, suggesting a number of 
‗conspiracy-prone‘ personality types. Taking an overview of the research, the pattern 
of observed correlations suggests three plausible ways in which certain traits may 
promote and sustain beliefs in conspiracy theories: conspiracist ideation as a 
response to mild paranoia, conspiracist ideation as a problem-externalising tool, and 
conspiracist ideation as a result of openness to new and unusual ideas. However, 
these proposed mechanisms should be regarded as speculative as in most cases the 
direction of causality remains to be experimentally demonstrated. 
Conspiracist ideation as a response to mild paranoia. One cluster of traits 
to emerge from the available literature revolves around paranoid ideation. Goertzel 
(1994) assessed individual differences in trust and anomie in addition to conspiracist 
ideation. Interpersonal trust was measured by asking participants to rate the degree to 
which they felt they could trust their friends, neighbours, and the police. Anomie, 
which refers to the pessimistic belief that the world is generally getting worse, was 
measured by asking participants the degree to which they believed that it is hardly 
fair to bring a child into the world, for example. Analyses showed that stronger 
conspiracist ideation was associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust and 
higher levels of anomie. Subsequent studies have replicated the finding that distrust 
and anomie are associated with stronger conspiracy beliefs, as well as finding modest 
correlations with similar variables including high levels of hostility, cynicism, 
defiance of authority, impulsive nonconformity, and low agreeableness, reflecting 
inability to get along easily with other people (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2013; Parsons et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013). A handful of 
studies report mixed findings – relationships with the Big-5 trait agreeableness are 
not entirely consistent (e.g. Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Swami et al., 2013, 2010), and 
Wood and Douglas (2013) found that conspiracist comments posted online exhibited 
less hostility than anticonspiracist comments. Yet, on the whole, the general pattern 
of results supports a relationship between conspiracist ideation and a cluster of traits 
revolving around distrust, cynicism, and disagreeableness.  
Darwin et al. (2011) suggest that these apparent relationships may result from 
subclinical paranoid and schizotypal personality traits. The authors assessed paranoid 
ideation and schizotypal traits within a university undergraduate sample. These two 
measures reflect elements of many of the individual difference variables previously 
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mentioned. Higher scores on both scales were associated with stronger endorsement 
of conspiracy theories, and confirmatory factor analysis found a best fit model of 
conspiracist ideation to include both personality measures. The authors argue that 
extreme forms of these traits lead to maladaptive behaviours and experiences, such as 
serious persecutory delusions, which can have a detrimental effect on the 
individual‘s mental health and social relationships. Milder versions of the same traits, 
however, may actually prove adaptive; being slightly suspicious of the intentions of 
others could lead to the avoidance of personal harm if the suspicions turned out to be 
correct. Thus conspiracy theories may be a byproduct of mild paranoid and 
schizotypal traits which promote some degree of distrust, hostility, pessimism and 
magical thinking. People high in these traits are likely to reject ‗official‘ explanations 
which appear to be handed down by authorities whom the individual distrusts, and 
conspiracy theories may offer an appealing alternative explanation. Additionally, as 
conspiracy theories are predicated on the sinister intentions of hidden conspirators 
they may seem especially attractive and plausible due to congruence with the 
individual‘s existing paranoid worldview. 
Conspiracy theories as a response to powerlessness. A second cluster of 
personality variables pertains to the aversive psychological states associated with a 
sense of powerlessness. This general hypothesis suggests that conspiracy theories 
may offer an appealing explanatory tool for individuals seeking to rationalise the 
problems they perceive in life, allowing the individual to externalise blame and 
restore a sense of understanding, justification, and control.  
Some research stemming from this hypothesis concerns authoritarianism; 
however, the findings are mixed. Authoritarianism is the tendency to attribute blame 
to outgroups for the problems faced by the ingroup. Conspiracy theories may appeal 
to individuals high in authoritarianism by allowing them to identify specific 
individuals or groups who are to blame for their disadvantaged position, thus 
avoiding the negative psychological impact of self-blame. Consistent with this, 
studies have reported small correlations between high authoritarianism and stronger 
endorsement of conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Grzesiak-Feldman 
& Irzycka, 2009; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Swami & Furnham, 2012). In contrast, 
however, McHoskey (1995) found that right-wing authoritarianism was associated 
with the tendency to reject conspiracy theories of the assassination of President John 
F. Kennedy. The author explains this finding as a result of the tendency of right-wing 
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authoritarians to conform to the conventions of the established authority. In the case 
of conspiracy theories relating to President Kennedy, individuals high in right-wing 
authoritarianism may therefore be more accepting of the official conclusion of the 
US government that no conspiracy occurred. Thus, the role of authoritarianism in 
conspiracist ideation is currently unclear. It is possible that authoritarianism may 
influence the endorsement or rejection of certain conspiracy theories but not others. 
More research has examined individual differences in variables related to 
perceived self-efficacy. Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) administered a measure of 
powerlessness assessing participants‘ beliefs about their capacity to control and 
change aspects of their life. Regression analysis found higher scores on the measure 
to predict stronger endorsement of various specific conspiracy theories. The authors 
also measured locus of control, finding external locus of control to predict 
acceptance of the existence of conspiracies generally (but not endorsement of 
specific conspiracy theories). Some studies focusing on African American samples 
report perceived lack of control over political processes to be the most important 
variable for explaining the belief that the US government routinely conspires against 
the African American population (Parsons et al., 1999; Simmons & Parsons, 2005; 
however, see Crocker et al., 1999). Other variables indicative of low self-efficacy, 
including lack of self-esteem, dissatisfaction with life, and anxiety, have also been 
reliably found to correlate with conspiracist ideation (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; 
Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Swami et al., 2011). 
Consistent with this correlational data, several studies provide experimental 
evidence that lacking control increases susceptibility to conspiracy theories. Whitson 
and Galinsky (2008) manipulated participants‘ sense of control by having some 
participants recall a situation in which they lacked control and others recall a 
situation in which they possessed control. All participants then completed a task 
requiring them to reason about the possible existence of a conspiracy in an 
ambiguous situation. Analyses showed that participants made to feel powerless were 
more likely to perceive the existence of a conspiracy than participants whose sense of 
control was not compromised. Likewise, Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) found that 
experimentally inducing uncertainty influenced participants‘ reasoning about 
potential conspiracies. Outside the laboratory, Grzesiak-Feldman (2013) found that 
students in an anxiety-inducing situation – awaiting an exam – were especially 
susceptible to conspiracy theorising. 
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In total, it appears that individuals experiencing aversive psychological states 
relating to diminished self-efficacy are more receptive to conspiracy theories. One 
study to look at the consequences of endorsing a conspiracist explanation for an 
ambiguous event suggests that conspiracy theorising may alleviate the negative 
psychological consequences of low self-efficacy by restoring the perception of 
personal control and risk, and externalising blame for the situation (Sullivan, Landau, 
& Rothschild, 2010). Thus, a function of conspiracy theories may be the potential 
attribution of negative or uncontrollable events to a mysterious external agency or a 
specific identifiable outgroup. The available literature largely supports these 
speculations, though findings concerning trait authoritarianism are inconclusive. 
Conspiracy theories and information-seeking strategies. A third cluster of 
variables concerns individual differences in information-seeking strategies. One 
relevant hypothesis which has not found support is that conspiracist ideation results 
from a preference for simple and concrete explanations over complexity and 
ambiguity. Groh (1987) argued that the conspiracist mindset, in reflexively 
attributing events to a conspiracy rather than entertaining alternative possibilities, 
may be a product of this need for simplicity. Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) examined 
this hypothesis by assessing individual differences in need for cognition, tolerance of 
ambiguity, and attributional complexity, predicting negative correlations between 
these variables and conspiracist ideation. Contrary to expectations, however, all three 
variables failed to predict conspiracist ideation. Likewise, Leman and Cinnirella 
(2013) found no difference between conspiracy believers and nonbelievers in terms 
of individual differences in need for cognitive closure. On reflection, while the 
conspiracist mindset may in some regards constitute a relatively simplified view of 
the world, individual conspiracy theories are themselves often nuanced and complex. 
Believers can exert significant cognitive effort in seeking out evidence in favour of 
certain theories, and the task of maintaining belief in a conspiracy theory despite the 
existence of compelling evidence to the contrary may be cognitively demanding.  
A hypothesis which has found more support is that individuals who believe 
conspiracy theories, rather than being intellectually rigid and closed, are in fact more 
open to new and unusual ideas than nonbelievers. Swami et al. (2010) found that 
individuals who endorse conspiracy theories of the 9/11 attacks report consuming 
more information about the theories. This is perhaps unsurprising, but it should be 
noted that the direction of causality is unclear; information consumption may lead to 
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belief that 9/11 was a conspiracy, or prior belief may lead to greater information 
consumption (or both processes may occur reciprocally). The relative intellectual 
openness of those who believe conspiracy theories does not appear to be limited to 
conspiracist information; conspiracist ideation has been found to correlate positively 
with other anomalous beliefs, including the paranormal, superstitions, New Age 
beliefs, as well as anomalous experiences (Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; 
Drinkwater, Dagnall, & Parker, 2012; Newheiser et al., 2011; Stieger et al., 2013; 
Swami et al., 2011, 2013). 
Overall, these findings suggest that appreciation for new and unusual ideas is 
associated with actively seeking out information about conspiracy theories, and 
perhaps being particularly receptive to such information. However, the generality of 
this apparent openness to unusual ideas is currently unclear. Some studies looking at 
relationships between conspiracist ideation and the Big-5 personality inventory 
report weak but statistically significant relationships with trait openness (Swami et 
al., 2010, 2011, 2013). However, other studies have produced mixed findings 
(Swami & Furnham, 2012), or failed to reproduce the relationship (Bruder et al., 
2013; Furnham, 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013). Thus, it is possible that the 
intercorrelations between conspiracist ideation and various anomalous beliefs reflect 
domain-general openness, but findings are not conclusive. An alternative possibility 
is that the relative open-mindedness of conspiracists is limited to certain specific 
kinds of anomalous claims. 
Summary of individual differences. The literature concerning individual 
difference correlates of conspiracism suggests that individuals relatively high in 
paranoid ideation, high in openness, and low in self-efficacy, are particularly 
susceptible to conspiracy theories. This review has proposed speculative causal 
mechanisms by which these traits could lead to conspiracy theorising, yet it must be 
made clear that the existing research is largely correlational and thus does not 
establish the direction of causality. It is speculated, for instance, that paranoid 
ideation may predispose an individual to endorsement of conspiracy theories. 
However, an alternative explanation for the relationship is that prior acceptance of 
conspiracy theories increases feelings of distrust, hostility and alienation. Similarly 
the causal relationship between conspiracist ideation and openness is as yet unclear. 
While there is some experimental evidence that lacking control increases conspiracy 
theorising, this does not rule out the possibility that conspiracy theories, in 
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postulating a world controlled from behind the scenes by a powerful elite, erode 
individuals‘ sense of self-efficacy. A likely possibility is that the relationships are 
reciprocal, such that an existing paranoid, powerless, or intellectually open 
disposition drives the acquisition of conspiracist beliefs, creating a worldview which 
validates and strengthens the prior disposition, which in turn reinforces the 
conspiracist beliefs, and so on. Other individual difference variables yet to be 
examined may also contribute to conspiracist ideation. 
  
Cognitive biases and heuristics 
The distinction between cognitive and personality variables is not always 
clear, and interactions between variables from either category are likely (Irwin, 
1993); however, while the previous section focused on the role of largely stable and 
domain-general personality traits, this section is intended to focus on biases and 
heuristics in information processing which may be associated with belief in 
conspiracy theories.  
Over the last four decades, extensive research has corroborated a two-system 
model of cognition (see Kahneman, 2003). System 1 reflects intuition; the processes 
are automatic, fast and approximate, based on heuristics, biases and emotional cues, 
and are not available to conscious awareness or introspection. In contrast, System 2 
reflects reason; the processes are slow, systematic and effortful, based on rules, logic 
and rational evaluation of evidence. Research demonstrates that many everyday 
judgements under uncertainty are biased in systematic ways by the unconscious 
processes of System 1, which System 2 often fails to correct (Gilovich, Griffin, & 
Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Pohl, 2004; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  
This insight has been applied to the psychology of anomalous beliefs, 
producing evidence that supernatural beliefs may be at least in part a product of some 
of the systematic biases of System 1 (for a review, see French & Wilson, 2007). To 
date, little research has looked at conspiracist beliefs from the perspective of 
cognitive biases, yet a small handful of studies provide preliminary evidence that 
conspiracist ideation, like other anomalous beliefs, may be a product, at least in part, 
of certain biases and heuristics. Many specific biases have been identified, but thus 
far only four have been examined in relation to conspiracist ideation – 
proportionality, projection, illusory pattern perception, and the confirmation bias. 
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Proportionality. A product of the representativeness heuristic – the 
assumption that ―like goes with like‖ (Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002, p. 617) – the 
proportionality bias refers specifically to the tendency to attribute an outcome to a 
cause proportional to the magnitude of the event. Major events are judged to have 
major causes while minor events are assumed to have minor causes (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972). Many conspiracy theories pertain to events of national or 
international significance, providing an explanation in terms of an equally significant 
conspiracy. Thus conspiracy theories may elicit the proportionality bias, imbuing the 
theories with an intuitive appeal which the ‗official‘ explanations lack. To take one 
example, explaining the death of President John F. Kennedy, an event of 
considerable magnitude, as the result of a lone, otherwise unremarkable individual 
violates the principle of proportionality. On the other hand, explaining the 
assassination as the result of a vast, powerful, insidious conspiracy maintains 
proportionality between cause and consequence, and may thus appear more 
plausible.  
To date, three studies have specifically examined the potential role of the 
proportionality bias in the formation or maintenance of conspiracist beliefs. All have 
used the context of an assassination. First, McCauley and Jacques (1979) tested the 
proportionality hypothesis experimentally by creating two versions of a newspaper 
headline reporting the shooting of a fictitious President. One headline read ―Man 
shoots at the President and misses‖ while the other read ―Man shoots at the President 
and kills him‖. Consistent with the proportionality bias hypothesis, the fatal 
assassination (and thus more momentous event) was judged more likely to be the 
result of conspiracy while the nonfatal assassination attempt was judged more likely 
the result of a lone assassin. However, follow-up studies suggested that participants 
expected a conspiracy to be generally more likely to succeed in killing a President 
than a lone assassin. The authors suggested that, rather than being influenced by an 
automatic, unconscious proportionality heuristic, perhaps participants inferred 
conspiracy as the most likely cause of a successful assassination using a rational 
calculation based on the prior expected efficacy of a conspiracy as compared to a 
lone gunman. 
Following from this, Leman and Cinnirella (2007) attempted to rule out any 
effect of prior expected efficacy by breaking the causal link between the efficacy of 
the assassin and the outcome. Four vignettes were created. Two were similar to the 
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headlines used by McCauley and Jacques (1979): in the first scenario a President had 
been shot and killed, while in the second scenario a shot had missed the President. 
The two additional vignettes consisted of one which claimed that the president had 
been shot at and hit but survived, and one which claimed that a shot was fired at the 
president and missed, yet the President subsequently died of an unrelated cause. The 
former thus provides an outcome of minor consequence (the president survived) 
which was unrelated to the efficacy of the shooter (as the shot hit the president), 
while the latter provides an event of major consequence (the president died) which 
again was unrelated to the efficacy of the shooter (as the shot missed the President). 
Conspiracy was deemed the most likely explanation for both scenarios in which the 
president died, despite the fact that in one of these scenarios the shooter‘s bullet 
missed the President. Conversely the shooter was judged less likely to be part of a 
conspiracy for both scenarios in which the President lived, even though this included 
a scenario in which the gunman succeeded in shooting the President. This would 
appear to confirm that an unconscious proportionality bias, rather than a rational 
calculation, was driving the inference of conspiracy; the attribution of conspiracy 
depended more on the magnitude of the observed outcome rather than the skill of the 
shooter. Yet expected efficacy may not have been ruled out completely. Perhaps 
participants reasoned that a gunman who can succeed in wounding but not killing 
their target is less effective than one who fatally shoots their target and thus less 
likely to have been part of a conspiracy. 
LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) created vignettes in which the consequences of 
an assassination were even more far removed from the efficacy of the shooter. Again, 
vignettes reported the assassination of the President of a small (unidentified) country. 
However, extending upon the vignettes used in earlier research (Leman & Cinnirella, 
2007; McCauley & Jacques, 1979), participants were informed that a British 
newspaper had subsequently criticised the assassinated leader, and that the criticism 
had incited attacks against Britain. In a large-magnitude condition, participants were 
told that the attacks had led to the British Prime Minister declaring war. In a small-
consequence condition, participants were told that the British Prime Minister 
responded peacefully, subduing the attacks. Thus, the assassination itself was not the 
consequence; rather the magnitude of the consequences – whether Britain became 
embroiled in a war – was arbitrarily determined by the British Prime Minister‘s 
reaction. Participants were tasked with deciding whether the initial assassination was 
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more likely the result of a lone gunman, or of a conspiracy within the government of 
the assassinated leader‘s country. Despite the absence of a direct causal link between 
the assassination and the ultimate consequences, participants preferred the 
conspiratorial explanation when the magnitude of the consequences was large. 
LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) subsequently demonstrated the same effect using 
stimuli modelled after the real-world assassination of President John F. Kennedy. 
Some participants were led to believe that the assassination prolonged the Vietnam 
War, resulting in 40,000 extra American deaths. Other participants were told that the 
assassination had no effect on America‘s involvement in Vietnam. Participants were 
slightly more likely to endorse a conspiracy theory of the assassination when the 
consequences were presented as large. Although the effect in this case was smaller 
than with the fictitious stimuli, the fact that a difference was observed at all for a 
scenario involving President Kennedy, where it is possible that participants have firm 
prior beliefs about the subject, would appear to attest to the robustness of the 
proportionality bias. 
Projection. One study suggests that conspiracist ideation may be a product of 
the sociocognitive tool of projection (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). The projection bias 
simplifies the complex task of reasoning about the social environment by attributing 
one‘s own tendencies on to others. This bias leads individuals to believe that others 
will generally think, feel, and behave in the same way as they themselves do (Ames, 
2004). Douglas and Sutton (2011) note that conspiracy theories arise when 
conflicting or incomplete information prevents an individual from arriving at a clear 
and satisfying explanation of an event. Uncertain situations such as these are likely to 
elicit the projection bias: rather than relying on objective facts, an individual may 
attempt to infer the mental state and intentions of the alleged conspirators. In this 
case, an individual‘s personal willingness to have conspired may affect their 
judgement of whether the alleged conspirators did in fact conspire. If an individual 
supposes that they would have been willing to conspire to fake the moon landing, for 
instance, the process of projection may lead the individual to believe that most other 
people would be equally willing to have participated in such a conspiracy. And if 
most other people would, then by implication it is more likely that those accused did 
in fact go through with it. In this way the projection bias may make conspiracy 
theories seem especially plausible to individuals with a personal morality which 
permits engaging in conspiracy. 
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To test this hypothesis, Douglas and Sutton (2011) first conducted a 
correlational study which examined beliefs in a number of conspiracy theories, and 
participants‘ perceptions that, if in the same position themselves, they would have 
personally participated in the alleged conspiracies. Machiavellianism, an indicator of 
moral tendencies, was also assessed. Analysis found that, as expected, greater 
personal willingness to conspire predicted stronger conspiracist ideation. In addition, 
the relationship between Machiavellianism and belief in conspiracies was fully 
mediated by personal willingness to conspire, suggesting that moral qualities are 
related to conspiracist ideation only in as much as those qualities influence personal 
willingness to conspire.  
A second study aimed to establish causality by experimentally manipulating 
participants‘ perceptions of their own moral tendencies. An experimental group was 
primed with positive moral qualities by recalling an event in which they had helped 
another person. A control group was not exposed to any moral prime. All participants 
subsequently rated their belief in various conspiracies and their personal willingness 
to conspire. The manipulation proved successful; participants primed with positive 
moral qualities perceived themselves as less likely to conspire than the control group. 
As predicted, the experimental group also displayed weaker endorsement of 
conspiracy theories than the control group, and this relationship was fully mediated 
by personal willingness to conspire. Thus, it appears that perceiving oneself to be 
moral does not directly affect reasoning about conspiracy theories. Rather, personal 
morality influences the perception of oneself as willing to conspire, and it is 
projection of that quality on to others which accounts for the relationship between 
morality and conspiracist ideation.  
Illusory pattern perception. Elsewhere in this review the relationship 
between individual differences in self-efficacy and conspiracist ideation was 
described. It was suggested that lacking a sense of personal control, either 
temporarily or as a stable disposition, may increase conspiracy theorising as a 
strategy to restore order and control over the environment. One study suggests that 
the cognitive mechanism underlying this process is illusory pattern perception. The 
cognitive system is adept at detecting meaningful patterns in complex and chaotic 
stimuli; without this ability essential tasks such as perceiving threats in the 
environment or identifying familiar faces would not be possible. However, because 
the costs of failing to perceive a genuine pattern often exceed the costs of identifying 
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an illusory pattern, occasionally seemingly meaningful relationships are detected 
where objectively none exist (see Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) demonstrated that the tendency to perceive illusory patterns across a number 
of modalities increases under conditions of low self-efficacy. Following a 
manipulation designed to decrease participants‘ sense of control, participants were 
more likely to perceive visual images in purely random visual noise, to perceive 
illusory correlations in the financial market, and were more likely to make 
superstitious causal attributions for events. Crucially, the manipulation also increased 
the tendency to attribute ambiguous events to conspiracy. 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) argue that conspiracy theories are just one 
possible product of a cognitive perceptual bias towards seeking meaning within 
ambiguous stimuli. Conspiracy theories are often predicated upon the perception of 
meaningful causal relationships between anomalies within a large, complex, and 
often ambiguous dataset. To take one illustrative example, it has been claimed that a 
man who conspicuously opened an umbrella moments before President John F. 
Kennedy was fatally shot must have been a co-conspirator signalling to the assassin 
(Posner, 1994). The alternative explanation – that the temporal relationship between 
umbrella and gunfire was merely a coincidence – does not satisfy the need to 
perceive order in the environment, and so may be less intuitively appealing. Whitson 
and Galinsky‘s (2008) findings also provide a possible explanation as to why 
conspiracy theories inevitably follow shocking events such as unexpected deaths, 
terrorist attacks, and natural disasters. Such unpredictable and uncontrollable events 
are likely to threaten people‘s sense of control and understanding over their 
immediate environment, thus increasing the tendency to seek patterns which may 
provide a satisfying causal explanation. By incorporating a large amount of 
anomalies and errant data into a coherent explanatory framework (see Keeley, 1999) 
and thus maximising the perception of meaning, conspiracy theories may be more 
psychologically satisfying than their nonconspiratorial alternatives. 
Confirmation bias. Once beliefs are formed they are rarely subjected to 
critical evaluation. Rather, a bias exists towards seeking and interpreting information 
in such a way as to confirm an existing preconception (see Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 
1979). This bias has been observed in abstract deductive tasks as well as in reasoning 
about complex, real-world issues (e.g. Powell, Hughes-Scholes, & Sharman, 2012). 
There is no reason to suppose that conspiracist beliefs should be immune to the 
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confirmation bias; yet to date just one study has examined the role of confirmation 
bias in the context of conspiracy theories.  
McHoskey (1995) aimed to investigate whether conspiracy theories of the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy elicit the confirmation bias. First, 
participants were surveyed to ascertain their initial opinions towards the conspiracist 
and nonconspiracist theories of the assassination. Participants were then presented 
with summaries of evidence for the conspiracy theory and the Oswald theory of the 
assassination. Each summary contained nine key arguments or counterarguments. 
After exposure to this information, participants rated the persuasiveness of each of 
these arguments, and re-rated their endorsement of the conspiracy theory and Oswald 
theory. Analysis revealed evidence of biased assimilation: people who began the 
study believing that a conspiracy took place found arguments supporting this position 
to be more persuasive than evidence in favour of the lone-gunman theory. On the 
other hand, participants who were initially sceptical of the conspiracy theory rated 
arguments consistent with the lone-gunman account as more persuasive. The extent 
of this biased assimilation was proportional to the extremity of the initial attitude; 
participants with a weak initial leaning demonstrated modest biased assimilation 
while those with an extreme initial belief displayed stronger biased assimilation. The 
end result of exposure to the mixed evidence was attitude polarization – participants 
endorsed their pre-existing position even more strongly following exposure to the 
evidence. 
These findings appear to confirm the relevance of the confirmation bias to the 
maintenance of conspiracist beliefs. Rather than subjecting an initial preconception 
to impartial evaluation, the reasoning process is simplified by attending 
disproportionately to evidence consistent with the initial attitude. The confirmation 
bias suggests one reason why particular conspiracy theories can be so enduring over 
time, even in the face of substantial contradictory evidence. When evidence is mixed, 
complex, and uncertain, as is often the case with the events which attract popular 
conspiracy theories, exposure to this ambiguous evidence can nevertheless result in 
the strengthening of an initial attitude. Thus people on opposite sides of an argument 
can feel that the same body of evidence supports their own pre-existing belief. It 
should be noted that this bias does not only help perpetuate belief in conspiracy 
theories, but also disbelief.  
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Summary of cognitive biases and heuristics. As with other avenues of 
research discussed in this review, the small number of studies and lack of replication 
prevent firm conclusions from being drawn; however, the limited available findings 
suggest that cognitive biases and heuristics may indeed play a role in the formation 
and maintenance of conspiratorial beliefs. Aspects of conspiracy theories may elicit 
proportionality, projection, and pattern seeking biases, making the theories appear 
more plausible than their nonconspiratorial alternatives, while the confirmation bias 
may contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of conspiracist beliefs over 
time. Although research has examined each of these biases in isolation, their effects 
are likely to be additive. It is also possible that other biases yet to be examined may 
play a role in the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs. 
 
Summary of the literature 
This review outlined existing psychological research into conspiracist 
ideation, divided into four distinct avenues of research. The main findings to emerge 
from each of these approaches are summarised as follows. 
Looking first at associations between conspiracist beliefs, converging 
evidence from multiple studies using various experimental designs and statistical 
analyses suggests that endorsement of one conspiracy theory is associated with 
endorsement of others. Thus, belief in conspiracy theories can be conceptualised as a 
stable individual difference variable – conspiracist ideation. Recent research suggests 
that the correlations between theories arise because conspiracist ideation is a product 
of a small set of intercorrelated higher-order conspiracist beliefs. These core beliefs 
promote and sustain belief in a wide range of specific conspiracy theories, thus 
accounting for the correlations between ostensibly unrelated and even directly 
contradictory theories.  
Second, ethnicity has emerged as the only reliable sociodemographic 
correlate of conspiracist ideation. Ethnic minorities within the United States have 
been found to endorse conspiracy theories more strongly than Caucasians, especially 
theories relevant to their own ethnic demographic. However, the causal relationships 
between ethnicity, discriminatory experiences, political alienation, and conspiracist 
ideation, and the generalisability of these findings, are not known.  
Third, research examining individual difference correlates of conspiracist 
ideation suggests that there may be certain ‗conspiracy-prone‘ personality types, 
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including individuals high in paranoid ideation and related traits, individuals low in 
self-efficacy, and individuals relatively open to unusual (particularly anomalistic) 
ideas. Individuals possessing these traits may be especially attracted to conspiracy 
theories; however, the causal mechanisms underlying these correlations remain to be 
established. 
Finally, a handful of studies examining cognitive biases and heuristics in the 
context of conspiracist ideation suggest that conspiracy theories may elicit a number 
of biased reasoning strategies. In this way unconscious cognitive processes may 
serve to make conspiracy theories generally appear more plausible or appealing than 
their nonconspiracist counterparts. 
It is perhaps possible to begin to speculate about a unifying model of 
conspiracist ideation by integrating findings from each of the different avenues of 
research. It appears that certain information-processing biases and heuristics can 
imbue generic assumptions about the prevalence of conspiratorial behaviour in the 
world with intuitive plausibility, such as the assumption that governments generally 
do not tell the public the truth about significant events. People in certain 
psychological states, either due to stable personality traits or temporary situational 
factors, may be more inclined to entertain these generic conspiracist assumptions. To 
the extent that these assumptions are applicable to events and observations on hand 
from the real world, conspiracy theories of events may be adopted as viable 
explanations. Belief in the paranormal has been conceptualised in similar terms (e.g. 
French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 1993); therefore, this speculative model begins to 
suggest that conspiracist ideation can be situated within the wider context of 
anomalous beliefs. 
 
Limitations and research objectives 
 While some specific methodological and theoretical weaknesses have been 
discussed throughout this review, it is important to consider some general limitations 
which concern the body of research as a whole. It is these limitations which serve to 
motivate the research undertaken in the current thesis.  
First, the findings to date have been produced using a variety of scales to 
assess conspiracist ideation. However, relatively little attention has been given to the 
measurement devices themselves. Each measure is composed of an arbitrary 
selection of items, each referring to a specific, currently popular conspiracy theory. 
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Moreover, with only one recent exception (Bruder et al., 2013), the psychometric 
properties of the various measures have not been extensively examined. It is 
therefore difficult to be sure that the various scales measure precisely the same 
psychological construct, and whether the findings from studies using different 
measures are directly comparable. This leads to the first research objective of the 
present thesis – to devise and validate a novel measure of conspiracist ideation. 
Findings concerning the structure of conspiracist beliefs suggest a potentially 
superior assessment approach. It appears that beliefs in specific conspiracy theories 
are the product of more generic assumptions – particularly that something is wrong 
with the ‗official story‘ (Wood et al., 2012). If this is the case, a more useful 
measurement approach may be to assess attitudes towards these kinds of fundamental 
generic conspiracist assumptions. 
Second, the research as a whole has lacked a theoretical framework, taking a 
largely piecemeal approach towards selecting variables of interest. This is perhaps 
understandable, given that the body of research is in its infancy. However, some 
avenues of research would potentially benefit from a more theory-driven approach. 
The integrative summary presented by the current literature review suggests that a 
useful theoretical starting point may be the wider literature on anomalistic 
psychology. Anomalistic beliefs are those which defy conventional understanding of 
reality, including (but not limited to) superstitions, belief in the paranormal, and 
certain alternative medical beliefs (see French & Stone, 2014; Holt, Simmonds-
Moore, Luke, & French, 2012). Like anomalous beliefs (see French & Wilson, 2007; 
Irwin, 1993), conspiracist ideation appears to result from the operation of various 
low-level cognitive biases mediated by a selection of personality variables. The 
reliable correlations observed between beliefs in conspiracy theories and beliefs in 
the kinds of paranormal phenomena on which anomalistic psychology has 
traditionally focused further suggest that both may result from similar psychological 
factors. To date, however, there has been little explicit consideration of the potential 
conceptual overlap between conspiracism and anomalous beliefs.  
This leads to the second research objective of the current thesis – to 
systematically investigate the role of certain cognitive biases in conspiracist ideation, 
taking existing research into anomalous beliefs as a starting point. This research 
objective is driven by the hypothesis that biases which influence supernatural beliefs 
may also influence conspiracist beliefs. In particular, the present research will focus 
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on the representativeness heuristic. Judgements by representativeness result in the 
plausibility of a claim being determined by the extent to which it is consistent with – 
representative of – an individual‘s intuitive assumptions about the world. The 
representativeness heuristic can result in various distinct biases. Research suggests 
that one such bias – the proportionality bias – may lend certain supernatural claims 
intuitive plausibility by offering to explain significant events in terms of significant 
causality (Lupfer & Layman, 1996). Research suggests that the proportionality bias 
may influence conspiracist beliefs in a similar way (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; 
Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). Other biases resulting from the representativeness 
heuristic have also been implicated in anomalistic beliefs, including the conjunction 
fallacy (Rogers et al., 2009) and a bias towards attributions of intentionality 
(Kelemen & Rosset, 2009). Extending upon this, the present thesis will examine the 
role of these biases in conspiracist ideation. 
 
Research programme 
The following three chapters of this thesis each present multiple empirical 
studies aiming to achieve the research objectives outlined in the previous section. For 
each study reported in this thesis, informed consent was obtained from all 
participants and ethical approval for the research was granted by the Goldsmiths, 
University of London, Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
Chapter 2 concerns the development of a novel measure of conspiracist 
ideation. The chapter begins by discussing the limitations of existing measures of 
conspiracist ideation and the potential merits of taking a more generic assessment 
approach. A series of 4 studies then details the creation and validation of a novel 
measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation. Study 1 
documents the item selection process, while three subsequent studies aimed to 
establish the psychometric validity of the resulting 15-item scale. Study 2 establishes 
content and criterion-related validity, as well as test-retest reliability. Study 3 
concerns convergent validity, while Study 4 turns to discriminant validity. A final 
general discussion outlines the strengths and limitations of this novel measure, as 
well as the contribution of this research to theoretical understanding of conspiracy 
theories. 
Chapter 3 concerns judgements by representativeness. The chapter begins 
with a general introduction to the representativeness heuristic, detailing the role of 
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representativeness in judgments of causality and in the evaluation of supernatural 
explanations. It is argued that the representativeness heuristic may play a similar role 
in conspiracism. The chapter goes on to present two studies examining specific 
biases which result from the representativeness heuristic which have been 
demonstrated to play a role in anomalous beliefs, and are thus hypothesised to play a 
role in conspiracist ideation. First, Study 5a focuses on the proportionality bias. This 
study sought to extend upon previous findings suggesting that the proportionality 
bias imbues conspiracy theories for significant events with intuitive plausibility 
(LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). Second, Study 5b aimed to 
investigate the role of another product of the representativeness heuristic, the 
conjunction fallacy. People with greater belief in the paranormal have been found to 
be more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011). This 
current study aims to investigate the association between the conjunction fallacy and 
conspiracist beliefs. These two studies are followed by a general discussion which 
summarises the implications of these findings. 
Chapter 4 goes on to examine whether the representativeness heuristic 
influences conspiracist ideation in a third way – through biased attributions of 
intentionality. The chapter begins with an overview of the literature on judgments of 
intentionality, including the tendency towards overattribution of intentionality. 
Evidence suggests that certain supernatural claims appear plausible because they are 
representative of a world in which events are the product of intentional agency 
(Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2003; Evans & Wellman, 2006; Kelemen, 2004; 
Petrican & Burris, 2012; Riekki, Lindeman, Aleneff, Halme, & Nuortimo, 2013). 
Extending upon these findings, this chapter presents four studies guided by the 
hypothesis that conspiracy theories may be evaluated favourably to the extent that an 
individual is biased towards explaining ambiguous events in the world in terms of 
intentional agency, as opposed to accident or chance. Study 5c examines this 
hypothesis in the context of imagined events, while Study 6 concerns the context of 
perceived events. Study 7 concerns individual differences in anthropomorphic 
attributions. Finally, Study 8 examines anthropomorphism and inferences of 
intentionality in conjunction. The studies are followed by a general discussion which 
seeks to integrate the somewhat mixed findings. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 presents a summary of key findings and implications, as 
well as considering limitations of the research and potential directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Creation of a Generic 
Conspiracist Beliefs Scale 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in the literature review section of Chapter 1 of this thesis, the 
most robust finding to emerge from the limited existing literature is that individuals 
who endorse one conspiracy theory tend to endorse others. This includes ostensibly 
unrelated theories (Bruder et al., 2013; Goertzel, 1994; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami et 
al., 2010, 2011, 2013), fictitious theories made up by psychological researchers 
(Leman & Cinnirella, 2007, 2013; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Swami et al., 2011), 
and even mutually contradictory theories (Wood et al., 2012). In total, these findings 
suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories is not exclusively a result of rational 
evaluation of the evidence relating to each specific conspiracist claim; if that were 
the case, positive correlations between unrelated and incompatible theories would not 
be observed with such regularity. Rather, it appears there are stable individual 
differences in the general tendency to entertain or dismiss conspiracist explanations 
for events. This trait has been termed conspiracist ideation (Swami et al., 2011). 
More research is required to illuminate the psychology of conspiracist 
ideation, and the number of recent publications on the topic (e.g. Bruder et al., 2013; 
Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2013; Jolley & Douglas, 2013; Leman & Cinnirella, 2013; Newheiser et al., 
2011; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami & Furnham, 2012; Swami et al., 2011, 2013, 2010; 
Swami, 2012; Wood et al., 2012; Wood & Douglas, 2013) suggests that research is 
gaining momentum. However, the current body of research is limited by the lack of a 
validated measure of individual differences in conspiracist ideation. To date, research 
has relied on rudimentary measures consisting of an arbitrary selection of statements 
relating to currently popular conspiracy theories. No scale has been subjected to 
psychometric validation, and no existing scale has been adopted by researchers other 
than its creators. As a result, several scales attempting to assess individual 
differences in conspiracist ideation exist; however, it is not possible to state 
confidently that any existing scale successfully measures the trait it is intended to 
assess, nor whether findings obtained using one measure would replicate if a 
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different measure were used. Moreover, the reliance on reference to conspiracy 
theories currently popular in Great Britain or the US means that existing scales will 
quickly become obsolete, and are inadequate for sample populations beyond the UK 
and America.   
To produce a coherent body of research it is necessary to devise a valid and 
psychometrically sound measure which can be used across a variety of empirical 
contexts. The current chapter will begin by discussing the limitations of earlier 
approaches towards the measurement of conspiracist beliefs in more depth, before 
detailing the creation and validation of a novel measure of conspiracist ideation. 
 
Previous approaches towards measuring conspiracist beliefs 
Several scales aiming to measure individual differences in general 
conspiracist ideation have been created to date (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Darwin 
et al., 2011; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2013; 
Swami et al., 2010). The dominant approach has been to devise a short self-report 
questionnaire assessing belief in a small number of conspiracy theories concerning 
real-world events and situations. Measures have consisted of between six and thirty 
items with each item referring to a specific currently popular claim of conspiracy. 
Common subjects include the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the spread 
of HIV/AIDS, and the Apollo moon landing. Participants rate their endorsement of 
each item on a Likert-type rating scale ranging from certain disbelief to certain 
belief. However, there has been little attempt to assess the psychometric properties of 
any existing measure. Most studies have employed novel measures, with little 
consideration of the psychometric properties of the measure beyond noting the value 
of Cronbach‘s alpha. In the few cases in which a single measure has been used 
repeatedly (Bogart et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012), little attempt 
was made to investigate the validity or reliability of that measure beyond comparing 
the value of Cronbach‘s alpha to the value obtained in previous research.  In 
addition, no measure has yet been adopted by researchers other than the original 
authors.  
This situation presents practical and theoretical problems. Despite the 
apparent homogeneity of this approach towards measuring conspiracist ideation, 
each scale represents a unique subset of currently prominent conspiracy theories. For 
example, climate change conspiracy theories feature in some scales (Douglas & 
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Sutton, 2011) but not others (Swami et al., 2010). In addition, idiosyncrasies in item 
content could influence participant responses. Consider two items concerning 
conspiracy theories alleging the cover-up of extraterrestrials: ―Governments are 
suppressing evidence of the existence of aliens‖ (Douglas & Sutton, 2011), and 
―Area 51 in Nevada, U.S., is a secretive military base that contains hidden alien 
spacecraft and/or alien bodies‖ (Swami et al., 2010). Although both items implicitly 
refer to the same theory, the differences in tone and specificity may systematically 
bias responses. It is possible therefore that existing scales do not produce equivalent 
or directly comparable measures of conspiracist ideation. Thus, the generalisability 
of existing findings is questionable.  
This practical problem could be resolved if researchers adopted a single 
standardised measure. However, any such measure would likely be appropriate for 
only a limited range of geographical and temporal contexts (Bruder et al., 2013; 
Byford, 2011). Responses may be confounded by the cultural familiarity and 
relevance (or lack thereof) of the selected theories. For example, conspiracy theories 
concerning the July 7
th
, 2005, bombings in London are relatively well known within 
the UK, but are likely to be less familiar elsewhere. In addition, such a measure 
would require modification over time as particular conspiracy theories fade from 
popular awareness and new theories arise in response to world events.  
A more fundamental theoretical problem is that existing scales assess 
attitudes towards a limited number of specific conspiracy theories, yet their intended 
purpose is to provide a measure of individuals‘ generalised tendency towards 
conspiracy theorising. A successful measure of this overall conspiracist ideation 
ought to reflect the entire spectrum of conspiracism. However, any measure referring 
to specific conspiracy theories faces the problem of selecting a small and arbitrary 
subset of real-world conspiracy theories out of a virtually infinite pool, with the 
assumption that the selected items are representative of the individual‘s overall level 
of conspiracist ideation. While there is substantial evidence that conspiracist ideation 
is a unidimensional construct (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 
2012), the content validity of short and potentially unrepresentative measures has 
thus far gone untested.  
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Measuring generic conspiracist beliefs 
The issues discussed so far raise concerns over the comparability and 
generalisability of the handful of existing psychological findings, and the theoretical 
validity and practical utility of any measure which explicitly refers to prominent real-
world conspiracy theories. An alternative, and potentially preferable, approach 
towards measuring conspiracist ideation may be to assess generic conspiracist 
ideation – conspiracist beliefs stripped of the context of any specific event or entity.  
Recent theoretical advances suggest that beliefs in specific conspiracy 
theories are a product of a smaller set of more generic conspiracist beliefs. By 
analysing comments posted to online news websites, Wood and Douglas (2013) 
provide evidence that conspiracy theories are predicated upon rejection of 
mainstream explanations, rather than endorsement of any specific alternative 
narrative. Moreover, Wood et al. (2012) demonstrated that endorsement of various 
mutually contradictory conspiracy theories about the death of Osama Bin Laden is 
predicted by acceptance of the more general claim that the US government is hiding 
some important information about the Bin Laden raid. Thus, assessing an 
individual‘s attitude towards a single generic statement can provide a valid and 
economical indication of beliefs about numerous specific conspiracy theories.  
It would be possible to produce a yet more generic scale item concerning the 
more abstract idea that governments routinely hide information about the deaths of 
public figures in order to deceive the public. Endorsement of this abstract claim 
would presumably provide a valid indication of an individual‘s beliefs about many 
popular governmental assassination conspiracy theories, such as those concerning 
Osama Bin Laden, Princess Diana, and President John F. Kennedy. To take another 
example, rather than referring explicitly to conspiracy theories of the 9/11 attacks, a 
nonspecific item would have individuals rate their acceptance of the more generic 
belief that conspiracy within governments to secretly perpetrate terrorist activities on 
their own citizens is commonplace. In sum, a scale which samples a representative 
range of these kinds of generic conspiracist beliefs would assess individuals‘ beliefs 
about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the real world removed from the 
context of specific historical events. 
Taking this generic, non-event-based approach towards measuring 
conspiracist ideation can potentially overcome the previously mentioned theoretical 
and practical problems associated with measures referring to specific popular 
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conspiracy theories. While constructing a measure which refers to specific real-world 
conspiracy theories necessitates arbitrarily selecting a small subset of conspiracy 
theories and thus compromising content validity, a generic measure could represent 
the entire spectrum of conspiracist ideation in an economical way by identifying and 
reflecting the most important generic beliefs which support beliefs in numerous 
specific conspiracy theories. While a measure referring to currently popular 
conspiracy theories will require modification as fashions in popular conspiracy 
theorising change, a generic measure will remain an appropriate measurement device 
over time. In addition, by decontextualising conspiracist beliefs, a generic measure 
can provide a measurement device suitable for any geographical context.  
To date, only one attempt at creating and validating such a measure has been 
presented. The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ: Bruder et al., 2013) is a 
5-item scale which measures endorsement of generic conspiracist statements such as 
―I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens.‖ The authors present 
initial evidence of the scale‘s validity and cross-cultural utility. However, the process 
of item generation and selection is not documented. As with other existing measures, 
the 5 items of the CMQ represent an arbitrary subset of conspiracist ideas, assumed 
(but not demonstrated) to reflect the entire spectrum of conspiracist ideation. To date, 
no measure of conspiracist ideation has been designed from the bottom up, 
endeavouring to first identify the most important facets of conspiracism which a 
successful measure should represent, and to provide a measure which represents 
these facets. The current research was designed to produce such a measure. 
 
Overview of the present studies 
In sum, while several measures of conspiracist ideation have been produced 
to date, theoretical and practical limitations with these measures call into question 
their validity and generalisability. The aim of the current research was to produce a 
psychometrically valid measure of conspiracist ideation by taking a non-event-based 
assessment approach. The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale, a novel 
measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation, was developed 
across four studies with large and diverse samples. Study 1 details the initial item 
generation and selection process. Study 2 confirms the construct and criterion-related 
validity of the 15-item GCB. Studies 3 and 4 provide evidence of the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the measure. 
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Study 1: Identifying essential facets of conspiracism 
This first study represents the first step towards creating a measure of generic 
conspiracist ideation, which was to identify the most important aspects of 
conspiracism which should be represented in the measure. To ensure content validity, 
a measure should sample from the entire gamut of conspiracist themes; however, a 
short measure is desirable so as to avoid practical problems associated with lengthy 
questionnaires such as participant frustration, careless responding, drop out, and 
reluctance to take part in future studies (see Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 
2006; Schmidt, Le, & Ilies, 2003). To reconcile the conflicting requirements of 
brevity and completeness, a lengthy measure consisting of 75 generic conspiracist 
items was administered to an international sample of the general public and subjected 
to exploratory factor analysis in order to identify the underlying dimensions of 
conspiracism which a successful measure should represent 
 
Method 
Participants and procedure. To recruit a large and diverse sample not 
composed exclusively of undergraduate psychology students, volunteers were 
requested via a blog post on psychologytoday.com and a public ‗Psychology of the 
Paranormal‘ emailing list. In all, 500 participants (225 females, 269 males; no gender 
data for 6 respondents) completed the questionnaire. Data from eleven participants 
missing data for more than 1 item were omitted (total valid N = 489). Age ranged 
from 18 to 87 years (M = 35.9, SD = 13.9). The majority of participants indicated 
that they were British/Irish (46.6%) or American/Canadian (31.4%). Other 
nationalities accounted for 18.9% of the sample (3.8% did not provide nationality 
information). No reward was offered for taking part. Self-selected respondents 
completed the questionnaire online via a web-based interface.  
Measures.  
Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (long-form). A novel questionnaire was created, 
consisting of 75 items intended to reflect generic (i.e. non-event-based) conspiracist 
beliefs. Items were generated by reviewing the academic (e.g. Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999; Bogart et al., 2010; Crocker et al., 1999; Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas & 
Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Parsons et al., 1999; 
Swami et al., 2010) and popular (e.g. Dunbar & Reagan, 2006; McConnachie & 
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Tudge, 2008; Tuckett, 2005; Whalen & Vankin, 2004) literature on conspiracy 
theories. Some items were adapted from existing measures, while novel items were 
created based on the ideas promoted by various popular conspiracy theories. Effort 
was made to cover a diverse and fully representative range of conspiracist claims. 
Examples include the possibility of terrorist attacks being covertly directed by a 
country‘s own government, clandestine use of mind-control technology, secret 
experimentation and administration of harmful substances on the populace, and 
concealment by some organisation of evidence of extraterrestrial visitation (see 
Table 2.1 for exact wording of all positively-worded items). Each item referred to a 
generic belief such as this which could support belief in various specific real-world 
conspiracy theories. To produce generic items, nonspecific descriptors such as 
―certain organisations‖, ―the government‖, and ―significant events‖ were used in 
place of references to specific entities or events which are the subject of popular 
conspiracy theories, such as the US government and the 9/11 attacks. Participants 
rated items on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with a qualitative label associated with 
each point (1: definitely not true; 2: probably not true; 3: not sure / cannot decide; 4: 
probably true; 5: definitely true).  
 
Results 
Descriptive data. Average conspiracism scores were approximately normally 
distributed, with slight positive skew (skewness = .40); the overall mean for the 
sample (M = 2.55; SD = 0.78) was slightly below the mid-point of possible values 
(3.00), indicating modest scepticism towards conspiracy theories on the whole.  
Males and females did not differ in terms of conspiracist ideation (t(481) = 0.67, p = 
.50, d = 0.06), nor did the three major nationality groups (British & Irish/North 
American/Other) represented by the sample (F(2, 468) = 1.85, p = .16, ; η2p = .01). 
There was a small but significant negative correlation between participants‘ mean 
conspiracism scores and age (r = -.125, p < .01); increasing age was associated with 
decreased endorsement of the generic conspiracist statements. 
Factor analysis. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using principal-axis 
factoring was conducted to examine the internal structure of the 75-item measure of 
conspiracist beliefs. Based on the observed Eigenvalues and visual inspection of the 
scree plot, a 6-factor solution was initially extracted. All negatively worded items 
were found to load onto a single factor. As there was no clear conceptual grouping 
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other than their negative phrasing this was deemed indicative of differential item 
functioning rather than a true latent dimension (Greenberger, Chen, Dmitrieva, & 
Farruggia, 2003). Accordingly, all negatively worded items were dropped. EFA was 
repeated on the remaining pool of 59 items. The significance of Bartlett‘s test of 
sphericity, 
2
 (1711) = 23820.85, p < .001, and the size of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy, KMO = .97, showed that the 59 items had adequate 
common variance for factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2005).  
Examination of initial Eigenvalues and visual inspection of the scree plot 
prompted investigation of the first unrotated factor as well as a 5-factor solution. 
Parallel analysis (PA) (O‘Connor, 2000) suggested 6 potentially meaningful factors; 
Eigenvalues for the first 6 EFA factors extracted from the actual data were larger 
than the corresponding PA Eigenvalues generated from random data, and are thus 
significant at the level p < .05 (see Table 2.1). Thus, retaining 6 or fewer factors for 
interpretation could be appropriate. However, the Eigenvalue of the 6
th
 factor was 
only marginally greater than the 95
th
 percentile of the 6th Eigenvalue distribution 
generated with 500 random datasets of the same size, while Eigenvalues for the first 
5 factors were substantially greater than the corresponding PA Eigenvalues. Given 
that PA has been reported to sometimes overfactor by 1 (Silverstein, 1987; Zwick & 
Velicer, 1986), as well as the relatively more meaningful pattern of item loadings 
evident within the 5-factor solution (described below), the more parsimonious 5-
factor solution was retained (for completeness, the pattern of item-loadings for the 
alternative 6-factor solution is given in Appendix 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. Comparison of results of EFA Eigenvalues with PA Eigenvalues. 
Factor EFA  PA  
1 27.48 0.96 
2 3.43 0.88 
3 1.33 0.82 
4 1.25 0.77 
5 1.04 0.73 
6 0.73 0.69 
7 0.64 0.66 
Note. Values obtained using 500 random (uncorrelated) datasets, with 59 variables 
and N = 473 cases (the number of participants with complete item-level data). 
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The first unrotated factor accounted for 46.64% of the total variance 
(Eigenvalue ( ) = 27.48), over 7 times more than the second unrotated factor (  = 
3.43, 6.36% of variance accounted for). All items loaded positively with loadings 
ranging from .43 to .82 (see Table 2.1). Cronbach‘s α for this factor was .98. Despite 
the strong first unrotated factor, the forced 5-factor solution was analysed. 
The 5-factor solution explained 60.9% of the total variance. Promax oblique 
rotation was used based on the assumption that the factors should be related to one 
another. Following rotation, the five factors accounted for approximately equal 
amounts of variance. Each factor had a minimum of five items loading substantially 
(.50 or greater) and univocally on to that factor. Three items which failed to achieve 
a loading of .32 or greater on any factor were dropped. In addition, the few items that 
cross loaded (achieved a loading of .32 or greater on to more than one factor) were 
dropped from further analyses (factor pattern matrix loadings, item loadings for the 
first unrotated factor, Eigenvalues and variance accounted for by each factor are 
shown in Table 2.1).  
The pattern of loadings reflected conceptually meaningful, cohesive, and 
distinct groupings. Factor one, termed government malfeasance (GM), reflected 
allegations of routine criminal conspiracy within governments. This factor contained 
16 items (α = .93). A second factor, termed extraterrestrial cover-up (ET), contained 
seven items (α = .94) concerning the deception of the public about the existence of 
aliens. A third factor, termed malevolent global (MG) conspiracies, consisted of nine 
items (α = .94) concerning allegations that small, secret groups exert total control 
over global events. A fourth factor, termed personal well-being (PW), consisted of 16 
items (α = .95) relating to conspiracist concerns over personal health and liberty, 
such as the spread of diseases and the use of mind control technology. The fifth 
factor, termed control of information (CI), contained eight items (α = .87) relating to 
unethical control and suppression of information by organisations including the 
government, the media, scientists, and corporations. 
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Table 2.2. Continued.   
 Factor 
 GM ET MG PW CI FUF 
2.     The government has employed people in secret to 
assassinate others 
.80 .08 -.10 -.16 .01 .49 
48.   Government agencies have been secretly involved in the 
assassination of their own citizens 
.80 -.01 .02 -.11 .04 .61 
61.   The deaths of certain high-profile public figures have been 
the result of covert, government-sanctioned operations 
.75 .07 .06 .04 -.01 .68 
20.   Certain world leading political figures who died untimely 
deaths were in fact ―taken out‖ by government operatives 
.72 .07 .02 -.01 -.02 .65 
55.   Some of the people thought to be responsible for acts of 
terrorism were actually set up by those responsible 
.65 -.04 .10 .21 -.14 .68 
19.    For strategic reasons, the government permits certain 
terrorist activities to occur which could otherwise be 
prevented 
.63 -.02 -.05 .33 -.07 .71 
69.    Some acts of terrorism, which have resulted in the deaths 
of many civilians, have been secretly directed by 
government operatives 
.61 -.12 .10 .31 -.09 .71 
57.   High-level politicians have had certain people killed in 
order to prevent embarrassing events from becoming 
publicly known 
.58 -.03 .01 .15 .05 .66 
38.   Government agencies secretly keep certain outspoken 
celebrities and citizens under constant surveillance  
.56 .04 .03 -.16 .19 .52 
34.   The government keeps many important secrets from the 
public 
.53 .08 -.04 -.21 .30 .52 
9.     Some individuals thought to be responsible for the 
assassination of public figures were set up by the group 
responsible 
.52 .05 .04 .18 .00 .67 
15.   The government lies about their knowledge of terrorist 
activities 
.49 -.08 -.14 .09 .36 .61 
22.   There are ongoing, hidden efforts to marginalise, control or 
destroy certain groups of people through the use of 
political policies 
.45 -.10 .12 .01 .33 .68 
1.     Certain celebrities and/or public figures actually faked 
their own deaths in order to escape the spotlight 
.41 .08 -.20 .26 -.03 .43 
27.   Viruses and/or diseases have been deliberately 
disseminated to infect certain populations 
.37 .02 -.03 .24 .06 .57 
4.     The government has staged important societal events in 
order to manipulate voters 
.36 -.05 .09 .10 .18 .59 
12.   The government fakes evidence relating to significant 
world events to deceive citizens 
.31 -.01 .12 .15 .28 .73 
30.   Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the 
public 
.02 .91 -.05 -.12 .14 .63 
53.   Evidence of alien presence on earth is being covered up .02 .90 -.04 -.03 .07 .66 
25.   Secret organisations communicate with extra-terrestrials, 
but keep this fact from the public 
.09 .87 -.06 .05 -.05 .64 
29.   Some UFO sightings and rumours are planned or staged in 
order to distract the public from real alien contact 
.09 .76 -.03 .06 .04 .68 
10.   Some existing technologies are the result of reverse 
engineering alien technology 
-.02 .73 .02 .09 .02 .63 
37.   Space missions are deliberately sabotaged so that the 
public does not learn of existing alien activity in the solar 
system 
.00 .61 .03 .36 -.17 .66 
58.   Movies and TV shows featuring aliens are a way of 
preparing the population for the news that aliens are real 
and have visited earth 
-.12 .58 .27 .15 -.05 .64 
 spiracist Beliefs Scale (long-form) items and factor loadings. 
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Table 2.2. Continued.   
 Factor 
 GM ET MG PW CI FUF 
59.    The power held by heads of state is second to that of small 
unknown groups who really control world politics 
.08 -.02 .88 -.04 .00 .80 
11.   A small, secret group of people is actually in control of the 
world economy 
-.11 .04 .87 -.01 .05 .75 
70.   Certain significant world events have been the result of the 
activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world 
politics 
.17 -.03 .87 -.08 -.01 .80 
42.   A small, secret group of people is responsible for making 
all major world decisions, such as going to war 
-.10 -.01 .86 .08 .05 .78 
68.   Members of a secret group have infiltrated governments 
and powerful organisations in order to one day bring their 
group to the point of global control 
.04 .03 .76 .04 -.02 .75 
64.   Many well-known celebrities, politicians and wealthy 
people are members of a secret society which has control 
over our lives 
-.07 .08 .67 .15 -.03 .70 
14.   Large, influential industries are in fact tightly controlled by 
a small, secret group of people 
.07 -.02 .66 -.03 .17 .63 
44.   Small groups of people are in possession of secret 
knowledge which would change our understanding of the 
world, and are deliberately keeping it hidden 
.09 .17 .38 .05 .28 .80 
40.   Secret organisations have access to large amounts of 
personal data on every citizen and sell it to the government 
.09 .17 .38 .05 .28 .66 
50.   The rapid spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the 
result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some 
organisation 
.10 .05 .00 .68 -.02 .73 
36.   Experiments involving new drugs are carried out on the 
general public without their knowledge or consent 
-.03 .04 .09 .66 .07 .75 
18.   Cures for certain deadly and common diseases exist, but 
are being deliberately withheld 
-.13 .04 .09 .65 .07 .73 
7.     Certain natural disasters have in fact been the result of 
secret testing of powerful and advanced technology with 
unknown capabilities 
.08 .14 -.06 .64 -.07 .65 
41.   The pharmaceutical industry administers harmful 
treatments without people‘s consent in order to keep 
people sick and boost drug sales 
.02 .12 .14 .63 -.07 .73 
23.   Technology with mind-control capacities exists and is 
currently being used on people without their knowledge 
-.01 .14 .09 .62 .00 .73 
24.   A lot of information about diseases and treatments is 
withheld from the public 
-.06 -.12 -.07 .61 .48 .75 
8.      The government withholds a lot of information about 
diseases and their treatments from the public 
-.02 .02 -.06 .56 .32 .72 
33.   Certain chemicals are put in the water supply in order to 
control the people 
-.13 .18 .26 .54 -.06 .70 
46.   Experiments involving  advanced technologies are carried 
out on the general public without their knowledge or 
consent 
.08 .07 .11 .53 .05 .74 
3.     Groups of scientists deliberately attempt to create panic 
about future risks because it is in their interests to do so 
.07 -.03 -.17 .49 .35 .61 
62.   Advanced technology is secretly used to placate the people 
and suppress dissent 
.06 .05 .22 .49 .06 .78 
39.   The government deliberately permits certain terrorist 
activities to occur to keep the public in a state of fear 
.41 -.03 .14 .47 -.06 .82 
54.   Progress towards a cure for cancer, AIDS and other 
diseases is deliberately being hindered 
-.13 .08 .11 .45 .33 .72 
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Table 2.2. Continued.   
 Factor 
 GM ET MG PW CI FUF 
13.   Technology with mind-control capacities is tested on 
people without their knowledge or consent 
.09 .16 .15 .44 .02 .75 
51.   Some viruses and/or diseases which many people are 
infected with were created in laboratories as bio-weapons 
.11 .09 .05 .43 .14 .70 
60.   Family planning policies are part of a plot to control and 
limit certain populations 
.05 .02 .14 .28 .23 .62 
66.   Drugs are deliberately supplied to certain communities in 
order to marginalise or destroy them 
.26 .00 .24 .26 .06 .71 
28.   New and advanced technology which would harm current 
industry is being suppressed 
.20 .10 .01 -.11 .62 .64 
52.   New and better technology is suppressed by those whose 
current business would be disrupted by it  
.23 .06 .10 -.19 .62 .66 
65.   Groups of scientists ensure that only evidence which 
supports a pre-determined conclusion is made known to 
the public 
-.14 .05 .10 .16 .57 .63 
72.   Technology is being concealed which is far in advance of 
what is known to the general public 
.05 .13 -.03 .14 .57 .70 
21.   Government funded scientists manipulate evidence in order 
to support existing government policy 
.15 -.01 -.02 .14 .53 .67 
74.   The media ensures that only certain information is made 
known to the public 
.18 -.08 .07 .09 .45 .60 
71.   Certain groups of scientists fabricate data in support of a 
particular scientific theory out of self-interest 
.17 -.09 -.04 .15 .43 .53 
17.   The government has a large amount of confidential data on 
every citizen without their knowledge or permission 
.08 .00 .18 -.05 .38 .49 
       
Unrotated Eigenvalues 27.48 3.43 1.33 1.25 1.04  
% of variance accounted for following rotation 19.7 15.3 21.6 22.8 18.5  
Note. N = 473. Rotated loadings above .32 are shown in bold. GM = government 
malfeasance, ET = extraterrestrial cover-up, MG = malevolent global conspiracy, PW = 
personal well-being, CI = control of information, FUF = first unrotated factor. 
 
Factor scores were computed by averaging participants‘ responses to each 
item associated with that factor. All five factors were modestly to strongly positively 
intercorrelated, and all strongly correlated with the overall scale score (see Table 
2.2).  
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Table 2.3. Correlations between factor scores and overall Conspiracist Beliefs Scale 
(long-form) score. 
Factor ET MG PW CI Overall score 
GM .49 .72 .72 .75 .88 
ET  .65 .72 .54 .72 
MG   .83 .74 .91 
PW    .73 .92 
CI     .87 
Note. N = 489. All correlations significant at the level p < .001 (2-tailed). GM = government 
malfeasance, ET = extraterrestrial cover-up, MG = malevolent global conspiracies, PW = 
personal well-being, CI = control of information 
 
Discussion 
The results of exploratory factor analysis conducted on a large set of generic 
conspiracist scale items suggests that five important facets of conspiracism must be 
represented by a successful measure of conspiracist ideation: Government 
malfeasance conspiracies, malevolent global conspiracies, extraterrestrial 
conspiracies, personal well-being conspiracies, and control of information 
conspiracies. Unsurprisingly, given previous evidence for the unidimensional 
structure of conspiracy beliefs (e.g. Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 
2012), as well as the strong first unrotated factor and factor intercorrelations 
observed here, real-world conspiracy theories frequently merge these different 
themes. For instance, a conspiracy theory alleging that the US government is secretly 
colluding with intelligent extraterrestrials to control and harm the human population 
using advanced technologies merges several of the facets identified here into a single 
specific theory. The factors identified here are thus not intended to reflect discrete 
categories of conspiracy theory but rather fundamental underlying assumptions about 
the world which promote beliefs in many specific conspiracy theories. 
 
Study 2: Factor structure, reliability & criterion validity 
Based on the results of Study 1, the 15-item GCB scale was created. The 
current study aimed to establish content and criterion-related validity, as well as test-
retest reliability, using a sample of undergraduate students as is typical of most 
psychological research. To this end, the factor structure of the scale and its 
relationships with several existing measures of specific conspiracist ideation were 
examined. 
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Method 
Participants and procedure. A sample of 235 university undergraduate 
students was recruited from amongst several UK universities. Participants took part 
in exchange for entry into a £50 prize draw. Data were collected online via a web-
based interface, and participants were asked to complete the questionnaire in a single 
sitting. Participants were primarily female (77.9%) and British or Irish (75.7%). Age 
ranged from 18 to 59 years (M = 24.97, SD = 8.76). 
Test-retest data for the GCB scale were solicited from the first 70 participants 
who completed the questionnaire at Time 1, of which 42 responded and provided 
complete Time 2 data. Participation in the follow up study at Time 2 was voluntary; 
no reward was offered. The interval between Time 1 and Time 2 assessments was 
approximately five weeks. The GCB was the only measure administered at Time 2. 
Measures.  
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (GCB). A 15-item scale was devised (full 
item wording and instructions to participants can be found in Appendix 2.1). Three 
items were generated to represent each factor identified in Study 1. These five factors 
were intended to guide construction of the measure, ensuring content validity; 
however, given the observed factor intercorrelations and frequent merging of themes 
observed in real-world conspiracy theories, in practical usage the final GCB is 
primarily intended to assess conspiracist ideation as a unidimensional construct. With 
this in mind, and in the interest of producing the most concise measure possible, it 
was not deemed necessary to include more than three items per factor. As the long-
form measure designed for Study 1 was intended to reveal the important generic 
assumptions upon which a subsequent measure should be based rather than to 
provide definitive scale items, the wording of some high-loading items was modified 
slightly to refer more clearly to the intended generic conspiracist belief, some novel 
items were generated by merging a number of similar high-loading items into one, 
and some high-loading items from Study 1 were included unchanged. Participants 
again rated items on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with a qualitative label associated 
with each point (1: definitely not true; 2: probably not true; 3: not sure / cannot 
decide; 4: probably true; 5: definitely true).  
Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI: Swami et al., 2010). The 
BCTI assesses belief in 14 conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events 
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or organisations (α = .92; example item ―Government agencies in the UK are 
involved in the distribution of illegal drugs to ethnic minorities‖). A mean BCTI 
score was computed for each participant, excluding those with more than one 
missing data point (total valid n = 213).  
Belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2010) was measured using a 
scale consisting of 17 items, each of which presents a specific conspiracy theory 
relating to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (α = .97; example item, ―Individuals within the 
US government knew of the impending attacks and purposely failed to act on that 
knowledge‖). The responses of participants with more than one missing data point 
were excluded (total valid n = 217). 
Belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011) was measured using a 
scale consisting of 12 items covering a range of specific conspiracy theories relating 
to the London bombings of July 7
th
, 2005 (α = .95; example item, ―The fact that the 
UK government is withholding information about the 7/7 bombings is evidence of a 
cover-up‖). The responses of participants with more than one missing data point 
were excluded (total valid n = 220). 
Belief in fictitious Red Bull conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011) was 
measured using a scale consisting of 12 items covering a range of novel conspiracy 
theories regarding the energy drink Red Bull (α = .90; e.g., ―Red Bull contains illegal 
substances that raise the desire for the product‖). Each of these statements was made 
up for the purposes of previous research. The responses of participants with more 
than one missing data point were excluded (total valid n = 218).  
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, and 
nationality.  
 
Results 
Descriptive data. A mean GCB score was computed for each participant. On 
the whole, participants demonstrated modest conspiracist ideation; participants were 
mildly sceptical but neither strongly agreed nor strongly disagreed that the 
conspiratorial behaviour described by the GCB occurs routinely, evident from a 
grand mean score (M = 2.61; SD = 0.87) approaching the mid-point of the range of 
possible values (3.00). Means for each item also reflected this trend, with item means 
ranging from 1.88 (SD = 1.13) for the item ―Secret organisations communicate with 
extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public‖ to 3.86 (SD = 1.21) for the item 
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―A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-
interest‖. No floor or ceiling effects were evident; ratings for each item covered the 
entire range of possible scores and showed acceptable levels of skew. Overall GCB 
mean scores showed slight positive skew (.24). Males and females did not differ in 
terms of conspiracist ideation (t(233) = 1.63, p = .10, d = 0.21). A small but 
significant difference emerged between the nationality groups represented by the 
sample, with British participants (M = 2.53; SD = 0.89) demonstrating slightly more 
scepticism towards generic conspiracist statements than other nationalities (M = 2.87; 
SD = 0.79); t(230) = 2.54, p < .05, d = 0.33. There was a small but marginally 
significant positive correlation between conspiracist ideation and age (r(233) = .13, p 
< .05); increasing age was associated with stronger endorsement of the generic 
conspiracist statements. 
Internal reliability and factor structure. Reliability and factor analyses 
were restricted to participants with complete item level GCB data (n = 225). Given 
that the wording of some items was modified from Study 1, the sample was split into 
2 in order to permit both EFA and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) analyses. First, 
EFA was carried out on data from the first 110 participants. The significance of 
Bartlett‘s test of sphericity, 2 (105) = 1956.81, p < .001, and the size of the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, KMO = .93, showed that the 15 items 
had adequate common variance for factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2005). 
Examination of initial Eigenvalues and visual inspection of the scree plot suggested a 
strong first factor, followed by 4 weaker factors. The first unrotated factor accounted 
for 49.56% of the total variance (  = 7.43), over 7 times more than the second 
unrotated factor (  = 1.53, 10.20% of variance accounted for). All items loaded 
positively on to the first factor, with loadings ranging from .54 to .84. Cronbach‘s α 
for the factor was .93. Despite the strong first unrotated factor, the forced 5-factor 
solution was analysed. The 5-factor solution explained 64.3% of the total variance. 
Promax oblique rotation was used based on the assumption that the factors should be 
related to one another. Following rotation, the five factors accounted for 
approximately equal amounts of variance. Items largely loaded substantially and 
univocally on to their intended factor; however, two items failed to load as expected 
on to the personal wellbeing factor (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.4. GCB scale items and standardised factor loadings obtained with 
exploratory factor analysis. 
 Factor 
Scale item GM MG ET PW CI 
1 The government is involved in the murder of innocent 
citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps 
this a secret 
.67     
6 The government permits or perpetrates acts of 
terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement 
.81     
11 The government uses people as patsies to hide its 
involvement in criminal activity 
.64     
2 The power held by heads of state is second to that of 
small unknown groups who really control world 
politics 
 .67    
7 A small, secret group of people is responsible for 
making all major world decisions, such as going to 
war 
 .88    
12 Certain significant events have been the result of the 
activity of a small group who secretly manipulate 
world events 
 .73    
3 Secret organisations communicate with 
extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public 
  .70   
8 Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the 
public 
  .97   
13 Some UFO sightings and rumours are planned or 
staged in order to distract the public from real alien 
contact 
  .79   
4 The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the 
result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some 
organisation 
     
9 Technology with mind control capacities is used on 
people without their knowledge 
  .33   
14 Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are 
routinely carried out on the public without their 
knowledge or consent 
   .83  
5 Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress 
evidence in order to deceive the public 
    .62 
10 New and advanced technology which would harm 
current industry is being suppressed 
    .75 
15 A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest 
    .80 
       
Unrotated Eigenvalues 0.71 1.07 7.43 0.60 1.53 
% variance accounted for following rotation 5.49 5.75 4.80 4.75 4.86 
Note. N = 110. Loadings below .32 are omitted. GM = government malfeasance, ET = 
extraterrestrial cover-up, MG = malevolent global conspiracies, PW = personal well-being, 
CI = control of information 
 
Second, a maximum likelihood CFA using Amos 20.0 was conducted on data 
from the remaining 115 participants. Given that EFA revealed some ambiguity as to 
whether the 5-factor solution obtained in Study 1 replicated with the current version 
of the GCB, CFA was intended to provide a more stringent test of whether the 
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intended 5-factor structure adequately fits the current data. Given the factor 
intercorrelations observed in Study 1, a model was specified in which each factor 
was allowed to correlate with each other factor. Table 2.5 shows factor loadings for 
each item, and Table 2.6 shows factor intercorrelations. Model fit was evaluated 
using the following goodness-of-fit indices: the chi-square per degree of freedom 
(
2
/df) ratio, the comparative fit index (CFI), the goodness of fit index (GFI), the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardised root mean 
square residual (RMR). A 
2
/df ratio of less than 3 indicates acceptable fit (Byrne, 
2001). Concerning CFI and GFI indices, models with a value of .90 or above can be 
considered as adequately fitting. A RMSEA value below 0.08 indicates adequate fit. 
A RMR value of 0.05 or lower indicates close model fit. These rules of thumb are 
considered overly strict in some circumstances, including small sample size (N < 
250); in such cases values approximating the above can be considered satisfactory 
(Marsh, Hau, & Zhonglin, 2004). The results indicated fit bordering on satisfactory. 
A 
2
 value of 160.02 was obtained (df = 80, p < .001, 
2
/df = 1.86). Other fit indices 
were: CFI = .78; GFI = .85; RMSEA = 0.09; RMR = 0.07. This 5-factor model was a 
better fit for the data than a unidimensional model, according to the 
2 
difference test 
for nested models (
2
 = 197.44, df = 90; 
2
(diff) = 37.42, df(diff) = 10, p < .001). 
 
Table 2.5. Item standardised factor loadings obtained with confirmatory factor 
analysis. 
 Factor 
Item GM MG ET PW CI 
1  .45     
6  .60     
11  .79     
2   .70    
7   .67    
12   .74    
3    .40   
8    .73   
13    .68   
4     .02  
9     .03  
14     .02  
5      .50 
10      .68 
15      .68 
Note. N = 115. GM = government malfeasance, ET = extraterrestrial cover-up, MG = 
malevolent global conspiracies, PW = personal well-being, CI = control of information 
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Table 2.6. Correlations between latent variables. 
Factor MG ET PW CI 
GM .37* .15 .35* .34* 
MG  .16 .31* .14 
ET   .38* .05 
PW    .45* 
Note. N = 225. * = correlation is significant at the level p < .001 (2-tailed). GM = 
government malfeasance, ET = extraterrestrial cover-up, MG = malevolent global 
conspiracies, PW = personal well-being, CI = control of information. 
 
Short-term retest reliability. Within the test-retest sample (N = 42), mean 
GCB scores at Time 1 and Time 2 were 2.34 (SD = 0.82) and 2.28 (SD = 0.78), 
respectively. A paired samples t-test revealed that overall mean GCB scores did not 
change significantly over the 5-week interval; t(40) = 1.14, p = .26, d = 0.07. 
Additionally, the correlation between mean GCB scores at Time 1 and Time 2 was 
positive and strong (r(40) = .89, p < .001), indicating good test-retest reliability. 
Criterion-related validity. The correlation between GCB and BCTI scores 
was strong (r(200) = .82, p < .001). GCB scores correlated strongly with scores on 
the measure of belief specifically in 9/11 (r(204) = .75, p < .001) conspiracy theories. 
In addition, mean GCB scores correlated moderately with endorsement of 7/7 (r(203) 
= .67, p < .001) theories, and with fictitious Red Bull theories (r(207) = .61, p < 
.001).  
To examine the criterion-related validity of the 5 individual GCB facets, a 
multiple regression analysis was performed with belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories as 
the criterion variable and the scores on the 5 GCB factors as predictors. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics revealed no substantial multicollinearity (Table 2.5).  
 
Table 2.7. Multicollinearity diagnostics for regression model.  
Predictor Tolerance VIF 
Government Malfeasance .41 2.43 
Extraterrestrial Cover-up .37 2.70 
Malevolent Global .57 1.76 
Personal Well-being .39 2.96 
Control of Information .59 1.70 
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The overall regression model was significant (F(5, 217) = 38.06, p < .001, 
Adj. R
2
 = .47). Of the 5 factors, Government Malfeasance, reflecting the belief that 
governments routinely act to harm their own citizens, was the strongest predictor (see 
Table 2.6 for standardised β values, t-values, and p-values). 
 
Table 2.8. Results of multiple regression analysis with GCB factor scores predicting 
9/11 conspiracist beliefs.  
Factor β t p 
Government Malfeasance .34 4.29 < .001 
Extraterrestrial Cover-up .20 3.04 < .01 
Malevolent Global .18 2.25 < .05 
Personal Well-being .11 1.24 .22 
Control of Information -.03 -0.44 .66 
 
Discussion 
The approximately normal distribution of mean GCB scores centred close to 
the mid-point of the scale, and the absence of floor/ceiling effects or strong skew, 
suggests that the GCB has acceptable psychometric properties and successfully 
captures variation in conspiracist ideation within the undergraduate student 
population. The pattern of relationships between the GCB and measures of 
conspiracist ideation assessing belief in certain specific event-based conspiracy 
theories indicates criterion-related validity; that is, mean GCB scores successfully 
correlate with scores on other measures of conspiracist ideation assessed 
concurrently. Most of these relationships were strong. The smallest relationship – 
with a measure assessing endorsement of an entirely novel conspiracy theory – was 
still substantial and in the expected direction. In total, these findings indicate that the 
GCB has acceptable criterion-related validity. The ability to successfully predict a 
range of specific conspiracist beliefs, including endorsement of a novel theory, 
suggests that the GCB scale, when employed as a unidimensional measure, possesses 
content validity. In addition, the strong correlation between participants‘ initial GCB 
scores and retest scores after a 5-week interval indicates excellent short-term test-
retest reliability. 
Looking at the internal factor structure of the scale, individual factor scores 
differentially predicted endorsement specifically of 9/11 conspiracy theories, with 
the government malfeasance factor predicting these beliefs most strongly. This 
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indicates that, to the extent that certain specific event-based conspiracy theories 
pertain more or less to particular GCB facets, the factor scores may be useful in 
predicting beliefs in different theories. It must be noted that the results of EFA and 
CFA cast some doubt on the reliability of the 5 subscales, particularly the personal 
wellbeing factor; however, these analyses are limited by the small sample sizes used 
in each. Thus, future research using adequate sample sizes is required to establish the 
reliability of the internal factor structure of the GCB. However, the primary goal in 
constructing the GCB was to produce a measure which reflects all important facets of 
conspiracism, but which can be used as a unidimensional scale. With this in mind, 
only three items were included per facet, and with such a small number it is perhaps 
unsurprising that, in practice, the subscales are somewhat unreliable. Given the 
substantial evidence that overall GCB scores successfully predict an individual‘s 
degree of conspiracist ideation, it seems fair to suggest that the GCB can be most 
productively employed as a single-factorial measure of conspiracist ideation, as 
intended. 
 
Study 3: Convergent validity and additional evidence of criterion-related 
validity 
Having provided evidence that the GCB possesses content and criterion-
related validity, the current study aims to establish convergent validity by examining 
how well the GCB relates to interpersonal trust, anomie, paranormal beliefs, and 
delusional ideation – individual difference factors previously found to correlate with 
belief in conspiracy theories (Darwin et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 
2011, 2013) – using a sample of the general public. 
 
Method 
Participants and procedure. In an effort to recruit a sample not composed 
exclusively of undergraduate students, volunteers were requested via a public 
‗Psychology of the Paranormal‘ emailing list. A total of 208 participants (91 females, 
116 males, 1 participant did not provide gender information) completed the survey. 
Age ranged from 18 to 63 years (M = 40.5, SD = 13.5). The majority of participants 
indicated that they were British or Irish (69.2%) or US (10.1%) citizens. Other 
nationalities made up 19.2% of the sample (1.4% did not provide nationality 
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information). Self-selected respondents completed the questionnaire online via a 
web-based interface.  
Measures. 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale (GCB). The 15-item GCB scale 
developed for Study 2 was used unchanged. The internal reliability of the GCB scale 
in the current study was extremely high (α = .95). 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI: Swami et al., 2010). The 
BCTI was administered once again to ensure criterion-related validity in an 
independent sample. As in previous studies, the BCTI demonstrated high internal 
reliability (α = .93). A mean BCTI score was computed for each participant.  
 Interpersonal trust was measured using a three-item scale (α = .70; example 
item: ―You can trust your family‖) which has been used in previous research on 
conspiracist beliefs (Goertzel, 1994). A moderate negative correlation with GCB 
scores was expected based on previous findings (Goertzel, 1994). 
Anomie (the belief that the world is generally getting worse) was measured 
using a three-item scale (α = .59; example item: ―It‘s not really fair to think about 
having a child in today‘s world‖) which has been used in previous research on 
conspiracist beliefs (Goertzel, 1994). A moderate positive correlation with GCB 
scores was expected based on previous findings (Goertzel, 1994). 
 Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS: Thalbourne & Delin, 1993). Belief in 
the paranormal was measured using the 18-item ASGS (α = .96; example item, ―I 
believe in the existence of ESP‖). This measure assesses belief in extrasensory 
perception, psychokinesis, and life after death. Participants respond to each item on a 
three-point scale, labelled ―True‖, ―?‖ (i.e., do not know), and ―False‖, resulting in a 
score of 2, 1, or 0 points, respectively. Higher scores reflect stronger belief in the 
paranormal. A moderate correlation with conspiracy theory beliefs was expected 
based on previous findings (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011). 
Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI-21: Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). 
The PDI-21 is a psychometrically validated measure of delusional ideation within the 
general population. Internal reliability in the current study was high (α = .94). The 
PDI assesses magical ideation, paranoia and schizotypal traits, which have 
previously been linked with belief in conspiracies (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 
2013). In addition, one item explicitly refers to conspiracy (―Do you ever feel there is 
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a conspiracy against you?‖). Thus, a moderate positive correlation with GCB scores 
was expected. 
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, and 
nationality.  
 
Results 
Descriptive data. Participants generally demonstrated modest scepticism 
towards conspiracist statements, with the grand mean (M = 2.22; SD = 0.92) below 
the mid-point of the range of possible values (3.00). The mean rating for each item 
also reflected this trend, with average item ratings ranging from 1.61 (SD = 0.94) for 
the item ―Secret organisations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact 
from the public‖ to 3.52 (SD = 1.27) for the item ―A lot of important information is 
deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest‖. No floor or ceiling 
effects were evident; ratings for each item covered the entire range of possible scores 
and showed acceptable levels of skew. Overall GCB scores showed mild but 
acceptable positive skew (.76). Males and females did not differ in terms of conspiracist 
ideation (t(205) = 1.84, p = .07, d = 0.26); nor did the three major nationality groups (British 
& Irish/North American/Other) represented by the sample (F(2, 202) = 0.71, p = .49, ; η2p = 
.01). There was no significant correlation between conspiracist ideation and age (r(206) = -
.09, p = .22). 
Criterion-related and convergent validity. The correlation between GCB 
and BCTI scores was positive and strong (r(206) = .86, p < .001). Higher GCB 
scores correlated modestly with delusional ideation, higher anomie, lower 
interpersonal trust and stronger belief in the paranormal. A similar pattern of 
correlations emerged between BCTI scores and the personality measures (see 2.6 for 
all interscale correlations, means and standard deviations).  
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Table 2.9. Means, standard deviations, and interscale correlations for Study 3. 
 GCB 
(M = 2.22; SD = 0.91) 
BCTI 
(M = 2.58; SD = 1.50) 
Trust 
(M = 5.15; SD = 1.11) 
-.34 -.26 
Anomie 
(M = 5.06; SD = 1.29) 
.42 .38 
ASGS 
(M = 8.77; SD = 1.50) 
.67 .67 
PDI 
(M = 31.37; SD = 31.83) 
.48 .45 
Note. N = 208. All correlations significant at the level p < .001 
 
Discussion 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the GCB retains acceptable 
psychometric properties when used with a sample not composed entirely of 
undergraduate students. Together with the results of Study 2, this indicates that the 
GCB is an appropriate measurement device both for student and nonstudent samples. 
On the whole, participants in the current study (self-selected from the general 
population) indicated similar, though slightly lower, levels of conspiracist ideation 
than the student sample reported in Study 2. The strong correlation between the GCB 
and the BCTI indicates that the GCB possesses criterion-related validity when used 
with a nonstudent sample; that is, higher GCB scores successfully correlate with 
stronger endorsement of specific conspiracy theories. The observed pattern of 
correlations between the GCB and measures of interpersonal trust, anomie, 
paranormal belief, and delusional ideation is consistent with previous findings 
(Darwin et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011, 2013), and indicates that 
the GCB converges with related measures. In addition, the GCB demonstrated a 
highly similar pattern of correlations with trust, anomie, delusions, and paranormal 
belief as did the BCTI, as would be expected of a successful measure of conspiracist 
ideation. In total, these findings indicate that the GCB possesses criterion-related and 
convergent validity. 
 
Study 4: Discriminant validity 
Having provided satisfactory evidence of convergent validity, this final study 
aimed to establish discriminant validity by demonstrating the absence of 
relationships between the GCB and measures of other theoretically unrelated 
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constructs using a separate sample of the general public. These constructs consisted 
of sensation seeking, emotional intelligence, and the Big Five factors. 
 
Method 
Participants and procedure. To recruit a sample not composed exclusively 
of undergraduate students, volunteers were requested via online social networks, as 
well as conspiracy-oriented forums and mailing lists. A sample of 194 participants 
(88 females, 105 males, 1 participant did not provide gender information) completed 
the survey. Age ranged from 18 to 81 years (M = 35.0, SD = 14.8). The majority of 
participants indicated that they were British or Irish (67%) or US (12.9%) citizens. 
Other nationalities made up 18% of the sample (2.1% did not provide nationality 
information). Self-selected respondents completed the questionnaire via a web-based 
interface.  
Measures. 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB). The 15-item GCB was administered. 
Internal reliability was again extremely high (α = .95).  
Big Five inventory (IPIP Big-Five: Goldberg, 1999). The IPIP Big-Five is a 
50-item measure of the Big-Five factor markers. Internal reliability for each of the 
five factors was acceptable in the current study: openness (α = .75); 
conscientiousness (α = .83); extraversion (α = .90); agreeableness (α = .82); 
neuroticism (α = .85). Some previous studies have reported small but significant 
relationships between belief in conspiracies and higher openness and lower 
agreeableness, but have found no relationships with the other Big-5 traits (Swami et 
al., 2010; Swami et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). Thus weak correlations between 
GCB scores and openness and agreeableness were expected. No correlations are 
anticipated between GCB scores and other Big-5 traits. 
Sensation Seeking (SSS-V: Zuckerman, 2007). To demonstrate that the 
GCB is independent of theoretically independent constructs beyond the Big-5, trait 
sensation seeking was selected. Of the Big-5 traits, sensation seeking is most 
strongly related to extraversion , 2003), which has 
consistently been found to be unrelated to conspiracist ideation (e.g. Swami et al., 
2010; Swami et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013); thus, no strong relationship between 
GCB and SSS-V scores was expected. The SSS-V is a 40-item questionnaire (α = 
.76) assessing individual differences in sensory stimulation preferences. Each 
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question presents participants with two statements and asks that they select the 
statement which best reflects their own personality, e.g. ―I like ‗wild‘ uninhibited 
parties,‖ or ―I prefer quiet parties with good conversation.‖ Higher scores reflect 
greater sensation seeking. 
Emotional intelligence (TEIQue-SF: Petrides & Furnham, 2006). 
Emotional intelligence appears to be related to Big-5 neuroticism, but weakly and 
unreliably correlates with agreeableness and openness (Petrides et al., 2010). Thus, 
no strong relationship between GCB and TEIQue-SF scores was expected. The 
TEIQue-SF is a 30-item measure of trait emotional intelligence (α = .87; example 
item: ―Expressing my emotions with words is not a problem for me.‖). Higher scores 
reflect greater emotional intelligence. 
 
Results 
Descriptive data. Once again, participants generally demonstrated modest 
conspiracist ideation, with a grand mean (M = 2.44; SD = 1.00) slightly below the 
mid-point of the range of possible values (3.00). No strong skew was evident (.47). 
Means for individual items reflected a similar trend as observed in Studies 2 and 3, 
with mean endorsement ratings ranging from 1.74 (SD = 1.02) for the item ―Secret 
organisations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public‖ 
to 3.68 (SD = 1.31) for the item ―A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest‖. No floor or ceiling effects were 
evident; ratings for each item covered the entire range of possible scores and showed 
acceptable levels of skew. Males and females did not differ in terms of conspiracist 
ideation (t(191) = 0.20, p = .84, d = 0.03); nor did the three major nationality groups (British 
& Irish/North American/Other) represented by the sample (F(2, 187) = 1.61, p = .20, ; η2p = 
.02). There was no significant correlation between conspiracist ideation and age (r(190) = -
.13, p = .07). 
Discriminant validity. Given the sample size of the study, correlations of r = 
.20 will be detected at the level p < .05 with 80% confidence. Correlations between 
GCB scores and each of the Big-5 traits, sensation seeking, and emotional 
intelligence scores are shown in Table 2.7. No significant correlations were found 
between conspiracist ideation and sensation seeking, emotional intelligence, 
neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, or openness. A small significant correlation 
was found between conspiracist ideation and conscientiousness.  
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Table 2.10. Means, standard deviations, and interscale correlations for Study 4. 
 GCB 
(M = 2.44; SD = 1.00) 
Openness 
(M = 4.03; SD = 0.49) 
-.01 
Conscientiousness 
(M = 3.13; SD = 0.70) 
-.16* 
Extraversion 
(M = 3.09; SD = 0.83) 
-.01 
Agreeableness 
(M = 3.85; SD = 0.62) 
.11 
Neuroticism 
(M = 3.06; SD = 0.72) 
-.07 
SSS-V 
(M = 20.00; SD = 5.84) 
.03 
TEIQue-SF 
(M = 4.92; SD = 0.71) 
-.14 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the level p < .05 
 
Discussion 
As in Studies 2 and 3, the GCB demonstrated acceptable psychometric 
properties, adequately capturing variation in conspiracist ideation in a sample of the 
general population. In contrast to some previous findings (Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 
2013), conspiracist ideation as measured by the GCB was not related to the Big-5 
traits agreeableness and openness, while a small but significant correlation emerged 
between greater conspiracist ideation and lower conscientiousness. While previous 
research looking at correlations between Big-5 traits and conspiracist ideation has 
failed to find this relationship, the small correlation may be explained in terms of a 
failure to conscientiously attend to all the available evidence, including that which 
conflicts with conspiracist claims. However, among the few studies to report 
relationships with Big-5 traits, the relationships have been small and not consistently 
replicated (see Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Swami et al., 2010, 2013). It seems most 
reasonable to conclude that relationships with these traits are small and somewhat 
unstable. Thus, conspiracist ideation cannot be described simply in terms of the Big-
5 personality dimensions. As expected, GCB scores were unrelated to the remaining 
Big-5 traits of extraversion and neuroticism, as well as the related traits of sensation 
seeking and emotional intelligence. Given the power of the study to detect 
correlations of r = .20 or greater, the pattern of nonsignificant correlations observed 
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provides evidence for the discriminant validity of the GCB scale; the GCB is either 
independent of other theoretically unrelated psychological constructs or is at most 
only weakly associated with them. 
 
General discussion 
The aim of this research was to create and validate a novel measure of 
individual differences in conspiracist ideation. Previously, the dominant approach 
towards measuring conspiracist beliefs has involved assessing attitudes towards a 
small number of arbitrarily selected event-based conspiracy theories (e.g. Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999; Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; 
Leman & Cinnirella, 2007, 2013; Swami et al., 2010). Numerous scales have been 
devised, yet there has been little attempt to validate the various measures or to adopt 
a single measurement device, and there are concerns over the theoretical validity and 
practical utility of this general approach. To overcome these problems, this research 
endeavoured to devise a measure which assesses acceptance of the generic 
assumptions which support belief in specific conspiracy theories.  
Study 1 identified five facets of generic conspiracism through exploratory 
factor analysis – belief in routine governmental malfeasance; belief in the existence 
of malevolent global conspiracies; belief in the existence and cover-up of 
extraterrestrials; concerns over the unethical control of information; and belief in 
conspiracies infringing on personal well-being and liberty. The existence of these 
dimensions is not inconsistent with other research which has found conspiracist 
ideation to be unidimensional (e.g. Bruder et al., 2013; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 
2010; Wood et al., 2012). Indeed, in the present research, the five identified 
dimensions of conspiracism were highly intercorrelated. Based on these findings, it is 
argued that the five identified facets reflect a small set of intercorrelated conspiracist 
assumptions which collectively serve to promote and sustain beliefs in individual 
conspiracy theories, resulting in a coherent network of specific conspiracist beliefs. 
 Based on the findings of Study 1, the GCB, a short measure sampling from 
each of the five identified facets of conspiracism, was produced. Studies 2, 3, and 4 
provide evidence of the reliability, content, criterion, convergent, and discriminant 
validity of this novel measure. Study 2 demonstrated that overall GCB scores 
correlate strongly with scores on a measure of belief in various event-based 
conspiracy theories (the BCTI; Swami et al., 2010), as well as measures assessing 
 80 
belief in three specific conspiracy theories (9/11 theories, 7/7 theories, and fictitious 
Red Bull theories: Swami et al., 2010, 2011). Study 2 also presented evidence that, to 
the extent that certain conspiracy theories reflect certain facets of conspiracism to a 
greater or lesser degree, the individual GCB factors may differentially predict 
endorsement of certain event-based conspiracy theories. However, EFA and CFA 
found that the intended 5-factor structure was somewhat unreliable, particularly in 
relation to the personal wellbeing factor. Given the success of the GCB in predicting 
a range of specific conspiracy beliefs when treated as a unidimensional measure, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that in practical use the GCB can be considered a 
unidimensional measure of generalised conspiracist ideation. In sum, these findings 
indicate criterion-related validity; that is, the generic beliefs assessed by the GCB 
successfully predict endorsement of various real-world conspiracy theories.  
Study 3 provided further evidence of criterion-related validity, finding GCB 
scores to predict general belief in various event-based conspiracy theories using an 
independent sample of the general public. In addition, and largely consistent with 
previous findings, GCB scores correlated with other related measures including low 
interpersonal trust, anomie, delusional ideation, paranormal belief, as well as 
conscientiousness (Darwin et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011, 2013). 
Study 4 demonstrated that GCB scores were independent of unrelated psychological 
constructs including sensation seeking, emotional intelligence, extraversion, and 
neuroticism. Together, Study 3 and 4 indicate that the GCB possesses convergent 
and divergent validity. 
It should be noted that the self-selection recruitment methods used in the 
current research may have resulted in unrepresentative samples; however, comparing 
the findings of the 4 studies does not suggest this to be the case. In Studies 1, 3, and 
4, efforts were made to recruit general-population samples diverse in terms of age, 
nationality, and prior beliefs. Study 2 allowed these samples to be compared with a 
sample of university students, as is typical of most psychological research. The GCB 
demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties when used with university students 
as well as when used with a self-selected sample drawn from the general population. 
Consistent with previous research, on the whole the current samples indicated 
modest scepticism towards the existence of conspiracies (e.g. Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2012). In addition, the 
relationships between the GCB and other psychological constructs were largely 
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consistent with previous findings (Darwin et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 
2010, 2011, 2013). 
Overall, the current findings show the GCB to be psychometrically at least as 
useful as any existing measure of conspiracist ideation which refers to specific event-
based conspiracy theories (e.g. Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et 
al., 2010). Given the strength of the relationships between the GCB and the BCTI 
(Swami et al., 2010), which refers to specific real-world conspiracy theories, it may 
be the case that either measure is equally useful when looking at a range of relatively 
homogeneous, particularly British and American, samples. However, the GCB has 
important advantages over these measures. By sampling from the entire range of 
universal and unchanging assumptions from which all specific conspiracy theories 
arise, the GCB possesses content validity. In addition, by removing the context of 
particular historical events, the GCB offers a measurement device potentially suitable 
for more diverse sample populations and which will endure over time despite 
changing trends in popular conspiracy theorising. These practical benefits make the 
GCB a potentially preferable measurement device for researchers wishing to assess 
conspiracist ideation.  
Given the extent to which the results of exploratory factors analysis depend 
on the items which are created as input, it may have been possible to identify 
different facets of conspiracism by beginning with a different list of generic items. 
Study 1 aimed to reflect a wide range of the most popular conspiracy theories 
commonly discussed in the popular and academic literature; thus the 5 identified 
facets ought to faithfully reflect the spectrum of popular conspiracy theorising, at 
least in Western cultures. However, different groups or cultures may be preoccupied 
with different types of conspiracy theories. In light of this, other measures of generic 
conspiracist ideation may be preferable in some contexts. 
Bruder et al. (2013) present an even more generic conspiracist measure than 
the GCB. The GCB specifies the content and objectives of some conspiracies (e.g. 
the suppression of new technology) while remaining nonspecific about any entities or 
events involved in the conspiracies. In contrast, Bruder et al.‘s Conspiracy Mentality 
Questionnaire (CMQ) remains largely nonspecific in regards to both objectives and 
entities or events. The CMQ was employed cross culturally to successfully predict 
belief in certain specific conspiracy theories in British, American, German, and 
Turkish samples. It is possible that the relative brevity and nonspecificity of the 
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CMQ may have advantages in some contexts. The CMQ may be more suitable for 
use on certain non-Western cultures, particularly those with nondemocratic political 
systems (Bruder et al., 2013). However, given that three of the five items of the 
CMQ allude specifically to the existence of political conspiracies, that scale too may 
be susceptible to confounding factors such as local system of government and current 
political events. Indeed, the factor structure of the CMQ was somewhat unstable 
when employed on a Turkish sample (Bruder et al., 2013). Future research may seek 
to directly compare the validity of different measures of conspiracist ideation across 
a variety of different cultures. 
In addition to providing a validated measure of conspiracist ideation, the 
present findings also enhance theoretical understanding of belief in conspiracy 
theories. Wood et al. (2012) demonstrated that relatively generic beliefs are 
important antecedents of specific conspiracy beliefs. The current findings extend 
upon this, identifying five underlying conspiracist beliefs and showing that these 
generic assumptions about the world strongly predict endorsement of various specific 
conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the idea that conspiracist ideation is a 
monological belief system in which beliefs in many individual conspiracy theories 
are supported by relatively generic convictions such as the belief that governments 
routinely harm and deceive their citizens (Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012). Given 
the intercorrelations between the five conspiracist facets observed here, it is feasible 
that these convictions are themselves a product of even more abstract ideas, such as 
an essential distrust of authority. While it may be possible to construct a measure 
which aims to tap into these abstract sentiments, the most successful measure of 
conspiracist ideation may be one which achieves an appropriate balance between 
specificity and abstractness, as the current research aimed to achieve with the GCB. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
In sum, the current findings indicate that the GCB is a successful and 
psychometrically valid measure of individual differences in conspiracist ideation. 
The GCB has a number of advantages over existing measures, making it a preferable 
measurement device for use in future research. The psychology of conspiracist 
beliefs is thus far a relatively under-researched topic, but recently more psychologists 
are turning their attention to conspiracy theories. It is hoped that the GCB will 
provide researchers wishing to assess individual differences in conspiracist ideation 
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with a measurement device which can be used across a wide variety of empirical 
contexts, resulting in a consolidated and cohesive body of research.  
The next two chapters of this thesis describe the first efforts to employ the 
newly created GCB to investigate psychological factors which may influence the 
formation or maintenance of conspiracist beliefs. Specifically, the GCB is employed 
to investigate the relationships between conspiracist ideation and several cognitive 
biases resulting from the representativeness heuristic.   
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Chapter 3 
Conspiracy Theories and Judgements by Representativeness: The 
Proportionality Bias and the Conjunction Fallacy 
 
Introduction 
 
The representativeness heuristic 
The representativeness heuristic refers to the intuitive assumption that ―like 
goes with like‖ (Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002, p. 617). More specifically, the heuristic 
is the reflexive belief that a specific observation, such as an event, outcome, or 
member of a category, ought to be similar to the population or category prototype, 
and should reflect relevant features of the processes that produced it (Gilovich & 
Savitsky, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Teigen, 2004; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1971, 1974). The subjective probability of an outcome or hypothesis is 
evaluated in terms of how well these representativeness criteria are satisfied: 
outcomes which conform to these expectations will be judged to be more plausible 
than those which do not.  
This simple rule of thumb is often useful, requiring few cognitive resources 
but leading to correct (or at least approximately correct) judgements in many 
contexts (Teigen, 2004). However, outcomes which are deemed subjectively 
representative are not always objectively the most probable. Because it entails 
disregarding potentially relevant factors and alternative possibilities, the 
representativeness heuristic can lead to systematically biased judgements. The 
diversity of situations in which the heuristic is invoked, the variety of systematic 
reasoning biases which can result, and its ability to affect the judgements of 
laypeople and experts alike led Fiske and Taylor to suggest that representativeness is 
―our most basic cognitive heuristic‖ (1991, p. 384).  
The representativeness heuristic was initially explored in relation to 
predictions about statistical probability and randomness, wherein the difference 
between objective probability and subjective judgements can be easily demonstrated. 
In particular, when predicting the likelihood of a particular sample or the distribution 
of outcomes within a sample, such as the outcome of a series of coin tosses, the 
representativeness heuristic entices people to neglect the importance of sample size, 
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expecting small samples to be as free of bias (and thus as subjectively representative) 
as much larger samples (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tune, 1964; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1971, 1974; Wagenaar, 1972). Even statistically sophisticated 
mathematical psychologists were found to underestimate the effects of random 
sampling variation in small samples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). 
Subsequent research moved beyond predictive scenarios in which objective 
probabilities can be easily calculated, into the domain of intuitive diagnostic 
decisions. That is, rather than using knowledge of the population or process to 
predict the occurrence of a specific outcome, participants are given information 
about a particular sample, observation, or individual and asked to estimate the 
likelihood that it belongs to specified categories or populations (Teigen, 2004). In 
one of the best known examples, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) presented 
participants with a personality sketch of a hypothetical individual, Jack, designed to 
resemble a stereotypical engineer. Participants were also given information about the 
‗base-rate‘ of engineers. Half of the participants were told Jack‘s personality sketch 
had been selected at random from a population of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers, while 
half were told the reverse – that there were 70 engineers and 30 lawyers. Participants 
then had to estimate the probability that Jack was one of the engineers from the 
population of 100. The information concerning the proportion of engineers versus 
lawyers was almost entirely disregarded; the two different groups of participants 
differed only marginally in their assessment of the probability of Jack being an 
engineer, despite the prior probability being considerably different in each case.  
This neglect of base-rate information has been demonstrated using a variety 
of other experimental stimuli (e.g. Bar-Hillel, 1980; Eliades, Mansell, & Blanchette, 
2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Novemsky & Kronzon, 1999; Obrecht & 
Chesney, 2013; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Rusconi, Marelli, Russo, D‘Addario, 
& Cherubini, 2013). When no information on a randomly selected individual‘s 
personality is provided, judgements are generally in line with the base-rate. That is, 
when people are told that there are 30 engineers in the sample of 100 and given no 
information about Jack, the chances of him being an engineer are estimated to be 
30% (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). When personality information is available, 
however, the pertinent base-rate information is often neglected entirely. Instead, 
judgements are primarily a product of how representative the personality description 
is perceived to be of the relevant category. In testament to the power of the 
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representativeness heuristic, people continue to rely upon personality information at 
the expense of other relevant factors even when explicitly told that the information is 
of low predictive validity (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
In addition to causing failure to take into account base-rate information, the 
representativeness heuristic leads to nonregressive predictions. Given an 
exceptionally high-scoring student evaluation, for instance, it may be reasonable to 
predict that the student will achieve equally exceptional academic success in the 
future. However, if the evaluation is based on unreliable projective tests, then 
predictions based on it ought to be regressive – estimates of future academic 
performance should be less extreme, and closer to the population average. The 
representativeness heuristic, on the other hand, leads to the assumption that top 
scorers should continue to excel, and average scorers should remain average (Teigen, 
2004). Consistent with this, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that participants 
given a favourable but unreliable evaluation of a student made unduly favourable 
predictions about the student‘s future academic performance.  
 
Representativeness and judgements of causality 
In addition to affecting predictive and diagnostic judgements, the 
representativeness heuristic can affect judgements of causality. When determining 
the cause of a particular outcome, the representativeness heuristic dictates that ‗like 
causes (or is caused by) like‘ (Teigen, 2004). Specifically, the subjective probability 
that a particular causal explanation is true is evaluated in terms of the extent to which 
salient features of the event in question match relevant features of the attributional 
model. Explanations which offer the expected correspondence will be judged to be 
more plausible than explanations which result in a mismatch.  
There are various potentially salient features which may be used in making 
these judgements. Some research has focused on physical attributes. Research 
focusing on children‘s inferential strategies has found that children assume that, for 
example, a loud noise was caused by a heavy, as opposed to a light, object (Shultz & 
Ravinsky, 1977). The representativeness heuristic is not limited to simple physical 
properties, however. Salient psychological features, such as magnitude, potency, 
significance, complexity, or emotional valence, can influence attributions. Thus, 
mundane events are judged to have mundane causes, while exceptional events have 
exceptional causes; consequences of large magnitude are deemed to have causes of 
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similarly large magnitude; and negative outcomes are perceived to have negative 
causes, while positive causes produce positive outcomes (Gavanski & Wells, 1989; 
LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Sim & Morris, 1998).  
Taking emotional valence as an example, events which lead to desirable 
consequences are likely to be attributed to a positive cause. To demonstrate this, 
LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) created a fictitious scenario in which a husband and wife 
argued before the husband, Steve, left for work one morning. Steve, wracked by guilt 
on the way to work, took a detour to buy his wife flowers, and, as a result, arrived 
late to work. There were two versions of the outcome. In one, Steve‘s late arrival 
caused him to miss an important meeting and lose his job. In another, the meeting 
had been postponed and Steve gave an excellent presentation, earning himself a 
promotion. Thus, a negative or positive cause (the argument vs. the detour to buy 
flowers) in turn led to a negative or positive outcome (Steve getting fired vs. 
promoted). When asked to choose the cause most responsible for Steve getting to 
work late, participants who were told Steve had been fired tended to choose the 
argument as the primary cause. On the other hand, participants who were told Steve 
had been promoted tended to choose the altruistic detour as the primary cause. 
 
Representativeness and anomalous beliefs 
So far representativeness has been discussed in terms of relatively mundane 
predictions and judgements. In addition to this, the representativeness heuristic may 
play a role in the formation or maintenance of anomalous beliefs. Representativeness 
may make pseudoscientific or supernatural causal explanations appear intuitively 
plausible in certain circumstances (Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002; Teigen, 2004). 
Lupfer and Layman (1996) examined the conditions under which naturalistic, 
religious, or nonreligious supernatural attributions, such as fate, are favoured for 
events. Experimental stimuli were created consisting of vignettes in which salient 
aspects of the event could be systematically manipulated. The crucial factors were 
whether the actor had control over events, whether the outcome was positive or 
negative, and whether the outcome was life altering. Analyses showed that 
naturalistic explanations were preferred when events were under the actor‘s control, 
while religious and other supernatural explanations were preferred for events which 
were uncontrollable – especially when the outcome had life-altering consequences. 
In terms of religious explanations, positive outcomes were attributed to God, while 
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negative outcomes were attributed to Satan. This pattern of results is consistent with 
the representativeness hypothesis: hypothesised religious and other supernatural 
causal mechanisms are characteristically beyond our control and comprehension, and 
so these attributions are representative of events which are similarly uncontrollable. 
The representativeness heuristic is not limited to explanations involving God 
or fate. Many pseudoscientific medical models, for example, are based on the idea 
that the causes (and/or cures) of physiological and psychological states or illnesses 
resemble the symptoms of the state or disease. Thus, eating boar is judged to result in 
aggression and irritability (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1989), and consuming powdered 
rhino horn is thought to cure impotence (Still, 2003). Astrology may also be driven 
by representativeness. The core tenet of astrology is that people‘s personalities are 
caused by the positions of the stars when they are born, and thus a person‘s 
characteristics match features of their astrological sign‘s namesake. People born 
under ‗Leo‘, the lion, are said to be proud, forceful leaders, while those born under 
‗Pisces‘, represented by fish, are said to be quiet, reserved, and reasonable (Gilovich 
& Savitsky, 2002). Similarly, graphology, aura reading, and psychoanalysis are all 
pseudoscientific belief systems which demonstrate a reliance on the principle of ‗like 
causes like‘; repressed emotions are said to cause handwriting which slants to the 
left, depression supposedly results in a dark aura, and preoccupation with sex is 
thought to cause dreams of snakes or cigars (Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002). 
 
Overview of the current studies 
So far this chapter has discussed various effects of the representativeness 
heuristic, including insensitivity to sample size, neglect of base-rate information, and 
nonregressive predictions. The role of the heuristic in causal attributions has also 
been described, including the potential role of representativeness in the formation or 
maintenance of anomalous beliefs. Two further specific biases which the 
representativeness heuristic can lead to are the proportionality bias and the 
conjunction fallacy. Each has been suggested to contribute towards anomalistic belief 
formation (Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Rogers et al., 2009, 2011). Extending upon this, 
the two studies reported in this chapter explore the notion that proportionality and 
conjunction biases may play a similar role in the formation or maintenance of 
conspiracist beliefs, by making conspiracist explanations appear particularly 
representative, and thus plausible, in certain circumstances or for certain individuals. 
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First, Study 5a extends upon previous research concerning conspiracist ideation and 
the proportionality bias. Second, Study 5b presents an investigation of the association 
between the conjunction fallacy and conspiracist ideation. 
A sample of 102 first-year psychology undergraduate students participated in 
all three studies in return for course credit. Data for the three studies were collected 
concurrently for convenience. The various measures administered were thought to be 
theoretically distinct, permitting the use of the same sample across the three studies. 
Volunteers were given a questionnaire booklet containing the questionnaire measures 
for each of the three studies in a fixed order. The intentional attributions scale (Study 
5c) was administered first, as it was thought to be the most susceptible to order 
effects – specifically, responses may have been biased by responding to 
conspiratorial questions which may prime intentional attributions. The conjunction 
measure (Study 5b) was administered second. Two versions were randomly 
distributed, with the order of items reversed. The proportionality vignette (Study 5a) 
was administered third, followed lastly by the GCB. This order was determined so 
that the most explicitly conspiratorial measures were administered last, aiming to 
avoid prematurely revealing the true purpose of the research. Additionally, to avoid 
priming ideas of conspiracy theories at the beginning of the study, the word 
‗conspiracy‘ was not mentioned in the information sheet given to participants prior to 
filling in the questionnaire. Participants were asked to read all items and instructions 
carefully, and to respond to all questions as quickly as possible. No time limit was 
given. 
The sample of 102 students was composed of 81 females and 21 males. The 
majority were of British (63.1%) or other European nationality (26.2%). Participant 
age ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 21.0, SD = 5.2). Males and females did not 
differ in terms of conspiracist ideation (t(100) = 0.40, p = .69, d = 0.08); nor did the 
two major nationality groups (British & Irish/Other European) represented by the 
sample (t(90) = 0.45, p = .66, d = 0.09). There was no significant correlation between 
conspiracist ideation and age (r(100) = -.01, p = .97). 
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Study 5a: Belief in conspiracy theories and the proportionality bias 
 
Introduction 
Overview of the proportionality bias. As discussed in the introduction to 
this chapter, the representativeness heuristic dictates that the plausibility of potential 
causal attributions will be evaluated in terms of the extent to which relevant features 
of the explanation correspond to salient features of the event to be explained. The 
better the perceived match between event and potential explanation, the more likely 
that explanation is to be endorsed (Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002; LeBoeuf & Norton, 
2012; Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Teigen, 2004). There are various potentially salient 
features which may be used in making these judgements; however, perhaps the most 
fundamental psychological dimension is magnitude – the perceived scale or potency 
of an event or its consequences (Osgood, 1957). When an event is large, a 
proportionally large cause is sought; conversely, when consequences are modest, 
more modest attributions are made. This proportionality bias has been demonstrated 
using a variety of experimental scenarios. 
Ebel-Lam, Fabrigar, MacDonald, and Jones (2010) created experimental 
vignettes describing an outbreak of an infectious disease. One group of participants 
was told that the disease had killed a substantial number of people (a high-magnitude 
effect), while a second group was told that the disease had merely hospitalised a 
smaller number of people (low-magnitude effect). All participants were asked to rate 
the likelihood of four potential causes. Two were high-magnitude: the outbreak was 
an act of biological warfare, or the outbreak was the result of an unusually infectious 
superpathogen. The remaining two potential explanations were low-magnitude: the 
outbreak was caused by a standard bacterial infection, or was the result of a single 
employee who became infected with a virus while travelling overseas. Analysis 
confirmed that participants who had been told that the outbreak had large 
consequences deemed the high-magnitude causes more probable, while those who 
were told that the consequences were more mundane rated the relatively mundane 
causes as more plausible (see also LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Spina et al., 2010).  
Likewise, extreme causes are preferred for extreme crimes, such as a brutal 
murder (McClure, Lalljee, & Jaspars, 1991), for devastating natural disasters, such as 
particularly destructive tornados (Spina et al., 2010), and for extreme accidents, such 
as a plane crash involving a large number of fatalities (Ebel-Lam et al., 2010). 
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Proportionally smaller attributions are favoured for lesser crimes, less extreme 
disasters, or nonfatal accidents.  
The effect even extends to a preference for physically large causes for 
extreme events (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Spina et al., 2010). LeBoeuf and Norton 
(2012) created a vignette which described the outbreak of an unusual disease among 
animals at a zoo. In a large-magnitude scenario, participants were told that the 
disease killed most of the animals at the zoo before being contained. In a small-
magnitude scenario, participants were told that the disease was brought under control 
quickly so that only a few animals died. Two potential causes were offered: a newly 
obtained small rabbit, or a newly obtained fully grown bear. The bear – the (literally) 
larger cause – was preferred by participants who had been told that many animals 
had died, while the rabbit was deemed the more likely culprit when participants 
believed that few animals had died. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that the proportionality bias may influence 
anomalous beliefs. As mentioned in the general introduction to this chapter, Lupfer 
and Layman (1996) found that life-changing events (high-magnitude outcomes) are 
more likely to be attributed to God or Satan (high-magnitude causes) than more 
mundane events. Other supernatural explanations of relatively lesser magnitude, such 
as fate or luck, may be offered for certain more mundane events, such as winning a 
small amount of money in a game of chance; however, consistent with the 
proportionality hypothesis, the highest-magnitude causes tended to be reserved for 
the most momentous events. 
The proportionality bias and conspiracy theories. Given the influence of 
the proportionality bias on everyday judgements, as well as its role in the formation 
of anomalous beliefs, it seems reasonable to suggest that the bias may play a role in 
endorsement of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories generally pertain to events 
of obvious national or global significance, offering to explain such events in terms of 
an equally significant conspiracy (see definition section of Chapter 1 of this thesis). 
Viewed in this light, a conspiracy theory is usually a high-magnitude attribution for a 
high-magnitude event. Lending further credence to this suggestion, some of the types 
of events that previous proportionality bias research has focused on, such as 
outbreaks of disease, natural disasters, extreme crimes, and transportation accidents, 
are, in fact, the focus of popular conspiracy theories. For example, conspiracy 
theories claim that HIV/AIDS is a biological weapon, that weather-manipulation 
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technology was behind Hurricane Katrina, that mass shootings have been staged by 
the government, and that flight TWA800 was brought down not by a fuel line 
malfunction, but by the US military. Other conspiracy theories concern events of 
similar magnitude, such as the deaths of public figures, terrorist acts, and other 
significant geopolitical events or situations (see McConnachie & Tudge, 2008).  
As the literature review section of Chapter 1 described, three studies to date 
have specifically examined the role of the proportionality bias in reasoning about 
fictitious Presidential assassinations (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 
2007; McCauley & Jacques, 1979). Consistent with the proportionality hypothesis, 
each study found conspiracist attributions to be more likely when the alleged 
assassination attempt succeeded or led to a war, as compared to when the 
assassination failed or had minor consequences. This relationship persisted even 
when the magnitude of the consequences was explicitly presented as causally 
unrelated to the actual cause of the event (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & 
Cinnirella, 2007). 
In sum, evidence suggests that the proportionality bias may influence 
anomalous belief formation in general and endorsement of conspiracy theories in 
particular. However, to date, proportionality research concerning conspiracy theories 
has involved binary comparisons of assassination scenarios with either small or large 
consequences. The current study aims to extend upon this by producing an ordinal 
set of vignettes of increasing magnitude. Specifically, rather than two conditions 
(high vs. low magnitude), the current study will employ three conditions (low vs. 
intermediate vs. high magnitude). If the proportionality bias effect holds true, it is 
hypothesized that the low magnitude event will garner weakest conspiracist 
attributions, the high magnitude event will invoke the strongest conspiracy 
theorising, and the intermediate event will invoke attributions between the two. 
 
Method 
Participants
1
. A sample of 102 first-year psychology undergraduate students 
(81 females and 21 males) completed the questionnaire in return for course credit. 
                                                 
1
 Data for studies 5a, b, and c were collected in a single session as part of a combined questionnaire 
package; thus each of the three studies uses the same sample of 102 undergraduate psychology 
students. 
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The majority were of British (62.7%) or other European nationality (27.5%). 
Participant age ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 21.0, SD = 5.2). 
Design. Adapting the design used by Leman and Cinnirella (2007), the 
between-subjects IV in the current study was the magnitude of the consequences of a 
fictitious terrorist attack. This variable had three levels: low (n = 35), intermediate (n 
= 34), and high (n = 33). The primary DV was the extent to which participants 
attributed the event to a conspiracy. In line with Leman and Cinnirella (2007), the 
study also measured participants‘ confidence in the accuracy of details contained in 
the fictitious report, as well as participants‘ levels of general conspiracist ideation. 
Materials.  
Generic conspiracist beliefs (GCB). Conspiracist ideation was measured 
using the novel measure of generic conspiracist ideation described in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. Cronbach‘s alpha for the scale was high (.91). 
Proportionality vignettes. Following Leman and Cinnirella (2007), vignettes 
were created which aimed to manipulate the magnitude of a hypothetical event. The 
vignettes were presented as a fictitious newspaper report detailing an ostensible 
terrorist attack. Participants were asked to imagine that the text presented had been 
transcribed from a real newspaper article, and to use the information in the report to 
answer the questions which followed (instructions to participants, as well as the 
vignettes themselves, can be found in Appendix 3.1). The vignettes stated that a 
bomb had exploded underneath a large office building in a city‘s financial district, 
and that a suspect had been detained. Crucially, each vignette also stated how many 
people had been killed in the blast – this information constituted the magnitude 
manipulation.  
Three versions of the news report were prepared, varying in the magnitude of 
the consequences of the bombing. The vignettes employed by Leman and Cinnirella 
(2007) aimed to control for the confounding influence of expected efficacy of a 
conspiracy versus a lone individual. Similarly, LeBoeuf and Norton (2012) ensured 
that the consequences were arbitrarily determined, rather than determined by any 
feature of the event itself. With this in mind, the current study portrayed the 
consequences of the bombing as arbitrary and incidental, rather than a direct result of 
the competence with which the bombing was carried out. Specifically, the extent of 
the loss of life was portrayed as a product of luck, rather than design. One group of 
participants (low magnitude) read a version which reported that nobody had been 
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killed in the blast; the report stated that, despite extensive damage to the building, 
―By pure chance, no lives were lost.‖ A second group (intermediate magnitude) was 
informed that 6 people had been killed, and that, ―Officials have expressed relief that 
more people were not harmed in the explosion.‖ A third group (high magnitude) 
learned that 600 people had been killed, making the event ―the most destructive 
terrorist act on [redacted] soil.‖ 
Aside from the number of people killed, all other details of the three vignettes 
were identical. Potential contextual effects (such as the influence of knowledge or 
memories for events) were minimised by keeping the three vignettes as similar as 
possible in all regards, with the exception of the magnitude component. To avoid 
confounding effects of contextual information, other key details of the report, 
including the name and location of the building, were obscured with black boxes in 
the style of redacted information.  
After reading one of these vignettes, all participants were asked to respond to 
the same set of statements relating to the described events. Following Leman and 
Cinnirella (2007), two types of statements were presented. First, four statements 
related to participants‘ perceptions of the factual content of the report; that is, 
whether participants believe that the facts of the event have been reported accurately 
(e.g. ―The building is not in the financial district‖ [underlining in original]). Second, 
four statements related to participants‘ inferences about the cause of the event, 
requiring extrapolation beyond the details reported in the vignette. Specifically, 
participants were asked to infer whether a lone terrorist was responsible for the 
attack, or whether a conspiracy had taken place (e.g. ―The bomb was planted by 
someone else (the arrested man was framed)‖). Participants were asked to indicate 
their responses on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (―Definitely not true‖) to 7 
(―Definitely true‖). 
Half of the items (two factual and two inferential) were negatively worded. 
After reverse scoring these items, two overall scores were calculated – an average 
factual score (for which higher scores indicate that participants had greater 
confidence that the report was factually accurate), and an average conspiracy score 
(for which higher scores indicate that participants had greater confidence that a 
conspiracy was responsible for the event). 
Procedure. Undergraduate students were approached to take part in research 
following a lecture on an unrelated topic. Volunteers were given the questionnaire as 
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part of a larger questionnaire package (see Studies 5b and 5c). To avoid priming 
ideas of conspiracy theories, the word ‗conspiracy‘ was not mentioned in the 
information sheet given to participants prior to filling in the questionnaire. Three 
versions of the questionnaire pack, each containing one version of the proportionality 
vignette, were randomly distributed. The proportionality vignette and related 
questions were presented before the GCB. Participants were asked to read the 
proportionality vignette carefully, and to respond to all questions as quickly as 
possible. No time limit was given.  
 
Results 
Data screening. No cases were excluded due to missing data, and no 
multivariate outliers were identified. In contrast to Leman and Cinnirella (2007), 
scale reliabilities for the four factual and four inferential questions were low. 
Cronbach‘s alpha for the factual items verged on acceptability (α = .50). However, 
reliability among the four inferential statements was unacceptable (α = -.12). 
Accordingly, the averaged factual and inferential scores were dropped, and all eight 
factual and inferential items were analysed separately.  
Inferential and factual reasoning. A one-way MANOVA was performed to 
assess the effect of the magnitude of consequences on responses to each of the 8 
statements (4 factual and 4 inferential) relating to the reported events. The IV was 
vignette group (low, intermediate, or high magnitude of consequences). The DVs 
were mean ratings for each of the 8 statements. Overall, the analysis failed to reach 
statistical significance (Pillai‘s Trace = .11, F(16, 186) = .67, p = .81, η2p = .06). 
Individually, none of the 8 analyses emerged as significant; that is, responses did not 
differ systematically between conditions, either for factual evaluations or inferential 
judgements. For completeness, mean ratings for each item, and the MANOVA 
results are displayed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Mean ratings for likelihood of statements being true (standard 
deviations in parentheses), and MANOVA results. 
   Vignette group  MANOVA 
Item Low 
Inter- 
mediate High F(2,99) 
Factual statements     
The bomb was detonated remotely 4.86 
(1.35) 
4.82 
(1.19) 
4.82 
(1.29) 
0.01 
p = .99 
The building is not in the financial 
district* 
5.37 
(1.57) 
5.56 
(1.40) 
5.70 
(1.36) 
0.43 
p = .65 
Someone has been detained 4.86 
(1.46) 
5.15 
(1.48) 
4.88 
(1.45) 
0.42 
p = .66 
The terrorist is not 35 years old* 4.20 
(1.53) 
4.79 
(1.49) 
4.64 
(1.39) 
1.51 
p = .23 
Inferential statements     
The terrorist was a madman acting 
alone* 
5.20 
(1.08) 
4.91 
(1.49) 
5.30 
(1.53) 
0.73 
p = .48 
The bomb was planted by 
someone else (the arrested man 
was framed) 
3.97 
(1.07) 
3.82 
(1.03) 
3.70 
(1.10) 
0.56 
p = .57 
The terrorist was acting alone but 
was perfectly sane* 
4.74 
(1.27) 
4.35 
(1.45) 
4.52 
(1.72) 
0.60 
p = .55 
The terrorist was part of a 
conspiracy to achieve certain 
political goals 
4.40 
(1.31) 
4.15 
(1.35) 
4.64 
(1.11) 
1.23 
p = .29 
Note. * item reverse scored. 
 
Conspiracist ideation and novel conspiracist inferences. Mean GCB scores 
correlated significantly with the two most pertinent conspiracist inference items, 
―The terrorist was part of a conspiracy…‖ (r(100) = .32, p < .01), and, ―The bomb 
was planted by someone else…‖ (r(100) = .21, p < .05). GCB scores did not 
correlate significantly with the other two inferential items, nor with any of the factual 
items.  
Given these apparent relationships between general conspiracist ideation and 
novel inferences of conspiracy, further analyses were carried out examining the 
effect of vignette group on conspiracist inferences. Specifically, in order to increase 
statistical power by controlling for the relationship between general conspiracist 
ideation and novel conspiracist attributions, two ANCOVA analyses were performed 
with GCB scores entered as a covariate. In each case, the IV was vignette group.  
In the first analysis, the DV was mean ratings for the item ―The bomb was 
planted by someone else …‖. ANCOVA requires that there is no effect of the IV on 
 97 
the covariate, and that there should be homogeneity of regression slopes – that is, the 
relationship between DV and covariate should not differ by experimental condition 
(G. A. Miller & Chapman, 2001). Thus, the interaction between vignette group and 
GCB scores was examined first. The interaction was nonsignificant (F(2, 96) = 0.62; 
p = .54, η2p = .01); that is, the relationship between general conspiracist ideation and 
novel conspiracist attributions was the same at each level of the IV. Moreover, when 
the covariate was treated as a DV, there were no differences across the 3 
experimental groups in this study (F(2, 99) = 0.11; p = .89, η2p <. 01). Thus, 
ANCOVA is an appropriate analysis with a straightforward interpretation. GCB 
scores emerged as a significant covariate (F(1, 98) = 4.80; p < .05, η2p = .05). 
However, despite adjusting for each participants‘ level of conspiracist ideation, the 
effect of vignette group remained nonsignificant (F(2, 98) = 0.63; p = .54, η2p = .01).  
In the second analysis, the DV was mean ratings for the item ―The terrorist 
was part of a conspiracy…‖. Again, the interaction between covariate (GCB scores) 
and IV (vignette group) was nonsignificant (F(2, 96) = 0.51; p = .60, η2p = .01). GCB 
scores once again emerged as a significant covariate (F(1, 98) = 11.86; p < .01, η2p = 
.11). In this case, the effect of vignette group increased slightly as compared to the 
previously conducted univariate ANOVA, yet still failed to reach significance (F(2, 
98) = 1.60; p = .21, η2p = .03). 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present research was to examine whether a conspiracist 
attribution – a high-magnitude cause – is more likely to be offered for an event which 
is of proportionally high magnitude. Unlike previous studies (LeBoeuf & Norton, 
2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; McCauley & Jacques, 1979), the current data do 
not provide support for this hypothesis. Three vignettes were prepared describing a 
fictitious terrorist attack, differing in the magnitude of their consequences; the event 
was portrayed as either of low, intermediate, or high magnitude in terms of the 
number of people killed in the blast. Contrary to expectations, the magnitude of the 
consequences had no effect on the likelihood of participants endorsing a conspiracist 
explanation of the event. 
The current design was largely a conceptual replication and extension of 
Leman and Cinnirella (2007; see also LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; McCauley & 
Jacques, 1979). This previous study presented participants with versions of an 
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assassination scenario differing in the magnitude of the consequences (specifically, 
whether or not the president was killed). When the president died, people were more 
likely to attribute the shooting to a conspiracy. The current study extended on this 
binary manipulation to comprise an ordinal set of three terrorist attack scenarios, in 
which the number of civilian causalities was either low (nobody was killed), 
intermediate (a relatively small number of people were killed), or high (a relatively 
large number of people were killed). However, this manipulation had no effect on the 
likelihood of conspiracist attributions. 
In addition to failing to replicate the proportionality effect, the current 
findings differ from those of Leman and Cinnirella (2007) in several important 
regards. In particular, Leman and Cinnirella found that novel conspiracist attributions 
for the assassination scenario were unrelated to participants‘ prior levels of 
conspiracist ideation. The current study, however, did find a relationship, with higher 
levels of conspiracist ideation predicting stronger endorsement of two items offering 
conspiratorial explanations for the novel terrorist attack scenario. Though this is not 
consistent with Leman and Cinnirella (2007), it appears consistent with other 
research indicating that endorsement of novel or unrelated conspiracy theories is 
associated with endorsement of other theories (Goertzel, 1994; Lewandowsky, 
Oberauer, et al., 2013; Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012). 
To put it another way, Leman and Cinnirella (2007) found that participants‘ 
causal inferences were influenced by contextual magnitude information but not by 
their prior beliefs, while the current study found the reverse – participants‘ 
judgements appear to have been guided by their own prior beliefs rather than by 
contextual magnitude information. It does not appear to be the case that any 
proportionality effect was merely overshadowed in analyses by the relationship 
between prior conspiracist ideation and novel conspiracist inferences; ANCOVA 
analyses controlling for conspiracist ideation suggest that the magnitude 
manipulation simply did not influence conspiracist inferences. 
This suggests one possible reason for the failure to replicate the 
proportionality effect: it is possible that, in general, novel conspiracist inferences are 
guided primarily by an individual‘s general level of conspiracist ideation. When 
contextual factors are salient enough, however, this relationship is ameliorated, and 
judgements are guided instead by reasoning biases. It is unclear, however, why the 
vignettes in the current study did not invoke the proportionality bias, while those 
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used by other researchers (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; 
McCauley & Jacques, 1979) did invoke the bias. Perhaps the crucial magnitude 
component of the vignettes used in the current study was too subtle, or was 
overshadowed by the mere fact that, according to every vignette, a bomb exploded, 
damaging a building and putting lives at risk. 
Two other differences between the current study and that of Leman and 
Cinnirella (2007) are worth noting. First, contrary to Leman and Cinnirella (2007), 
prior conspiracist ideation was not associated with distrust of the veracity of reported 
facts. In the previous study, people who indicated stronger general conspiracist 
ideation indicated lesser trust in the ‗facts‘ surrounding the fictitious assassination. In 
contrast, the current study found no correlations between conspiracist ideation scores 
and endorsement of the factual items relating to the fictitious terrorist attack. 
Second, the factual and inferential subscales possessed low internal reliability 
in the current study. This is in contrast with the data presented by Leman and 
Cinnirella, in which both subscales possessed acceptable reliability. The specific 
questions used in the current study were slightly different, but closely modelled on 
those created by Leman and Cinnirella. It is possible that participants in the current 
study interpreted the questions differently than those who took part in Leman and 
Cinnirella‘s study. In particular, two of the questions in the inferential subscale are 
contradictory. One item suggests that a lone ―madman‖ carried out the attack, while 
another suggests that a lone but ―perfectly sane‖ individual carried out the attack. 
Although participants were not discouraged from rating competing explanations 
favourably, the presentation of explicitly contradictory items may have given some 
participants the impression that they should preferentially endorse only one 
explanation. If this were the case, it is perhaps unsurprising that covariation among 
these items would be negative, though it remains unclear why this was the case in the 
current study but not in Leman and Cinnirella (2007).  
It is worth noting that Leman and Cinnirella (2007) found that two items 
which specifically suggested a conspiracy were influenced by vignette magnitude, 
while the two items which suggested a lone actor were not individually affected by 
magnitude. In the current study, the analogous two items suggesting a conspiracy 
were influenced not by vignette group, but by prior conspiracist ideation. The two 
items which suggest a lone actor were influence by neither prior conspiracist 
ideation, nor vignette group. Given this lack of consistency, and the low scale 
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reliability observed in the current study, future research might seek to refine the way 
in which conspiracist inferences for novel events are measured, bearing in mind that 
items disavowing conspiracist explanations are not necessarily directly comparable 
to items affirming a conspiracy (see also Chapter 2, Study 1 of this thesis). 
Future research might also look at what features influence whether (and to 
what extent) the proportionality bias is evoked. Several studies suggest that the 
assassination of a President reliably evokes the proportionality bias (LeBoeuf & 
Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; McCauley & Jacques, 1979). However, 
given that the current study failed to evoke the bias, it does not appear that merely 
increasing the absolute number of fatalities resulting from an event is sufficient to 
increase the effects of the proportionality bias. 
 
Study 5b: Belief in conspiracy theories and susceptibility to the conjunction 
fallacy 
 
Introduction 
The conjunction fallacy is a specific error of probabilistic reasoning whereby 
people overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events. The fallacy was first 
explored in detail by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). Participants were presented 
with a brief personality sketch describing a hypothetical individual, Linda. The 
description was constructed to be stereotypically representative of an active feminist, 
and unrepresentative of a bank teller. Following this description, participants rated 
the likelihood of a number of statements about Linda, including three key 
propositions – (a) Linda is an active feminist, (b) Linda is a bank teller, and (c) Linda 
is a bank teller and an active feminist. Thus, participants judge the likelihood of two 
singular constituent propositions (one representative and one unrepresentative), as 
well as a conjunction of the two propositions. Participants who select the conjunctive 
statement as being more likely than either individual constituent statement have 
fallen victim to the conjunction fallacy; a conjunction cannot be more probable than 
one of its constituents, because the former is necessarily a more restrictive set of 
possibilities than the latter (however, see Gigerenzer, 1991; Wolford, Taylor, & 
Beck, 1990). 
 Using several variations of the Linda scenario, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) typically found that between 50 and 90% of participants committed the 
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conjunction fallacy. These figures have generally been borne out by subsequent 
research using a wide variety of conjunction scenarios (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; 
Epstein, Donovan, & Denes-Raj, 1999; Fiedler, 1988; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996, 1997, 
1998; Moro, 2009; Rogers et al., 2009, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Wolford 
et al., 1990). The effect appears to be strongest when the conjunction suggests a 
motive or causal relationship (Nestler, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Conversely, there is some evidence that the fallacy can be ameliorated by giving 
participants incentives, such as a financial reward, for making sound decisions 
(Charness, Karni, & Levin, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  
Tversky and Kahneman (1983; see also Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) argue 
that the fallacy is a product of the representativeness heuristic
2
. In the case of the 
fictitious Linda, the objectively restrictive conjunctive description (Linda is a 
feminist bank teller) may seem more subjectively representative of the described 
individual, and thus more intuitively plausible than the singular, unrepresentative 
(though objectively more inclusive) component description (Linda is a bank teller). 
This reasoning defies objective laws of probability, but satisfies the 
representativeness heuristic. 
The conjunction fallacy and anomalistic beliefs. To date, three studies have 
explored the relationship between susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and belief 
in the paranormal. In the first (Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007), participants were 
asked to rate the likelihood of various outcomes of a local football match – (a) Team 
A score first, (b) Team A score first and win, (c) Team A score first and lose, and (d) 
Team A score first and the game is drawn. Contrary to expectations, there was no 
difference in conjunction error rates between paranormal believers and nonbelievers. 
However, this study has been criticised on the grounds that the sample consisted only 
of psychology students (who may not be representative of the general population in 
terms of statistical sophistication), limitations of the measure of paranormal belief 
employed (the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale: Tobacyk, 1988), and limitations in 
the measurement of susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (see Rogers et al., 2009). 
Rogers et al. (2009) aimed to overcome these limitations by controlling for 
participants‘ training in statistics, using a superior measure of paranormal beliefs 
(Thalbourne & Delin, 1993), and creating a more sophisticated measure of 
                                                 
2
 Other potential explanations of the conjunction fallacy have been offered (see Fisk, 2004), but 
exploration of these hypotheses is beyond the scope of the current research. 
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susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. This measure consists of paranormal-themed 
items (such as an apparently precognitive dream) as well as neutral items (involving, 
for example, a case of food poisoning). A significant relationship was reported 
between belief in the paranormal and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. 
Participants who indicated stronger paranormal belief committed more conjunction 
errors on the paranormal-themed items, and also on neutral items. This finding was 
replicated by Rogers et al. (2011). These findings suggest that paranormal believers 
are especially prone to the conjunction fallacy, and that susceptibility to the fallacy is 
to some extent domain general, affecting all conjunctive judgements regardless of 
context (paranormal or otherwise). 
These findings may reflect a tendency to base judgements on subjective 
perceptions of the representativeness of certain coincidences rather than on objective 
probabilistic laws (Rogers et al., 2009). Believers appear to look beyond ‗mere 
coincidence‘, and instead attribute an underlying causal relationship to co-occurring 
events (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; 
Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002). The imagined causal relationship adds to the subjective 
representativeness of conjunctive events, making them appear more probable than 
the component events (Nestler, 2008; Rogers et al., 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983). For instance, if a person prone to perceiving separate events as causally 
related were to have a dream about an old friend and subsequently run into the same 
person the next day, they may attribute the experience to an underlying paranormal 
cause. A person less susceptible to this bias may be more likely to attribute the 
experience to mere coincidence.  
The conjunction fallacy and conspiracy theories. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that the tendency to fall victim to the conjunction fallacy may play a similar 
role in conspiracist ideation as in paranormal beliefs. A general characteristic of 
conspiracy theories is the presumption that ostensibly unrelated events are causally 
related by a conspiracist narrative (Keeley, 1999). Disparate details surrounding an 
event are woven together and attributed to the machinations of a conspiracy. To take 
one example, some conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination of President 
John F. Kennedy point out that video of the event shows a man conspicuously 
opening an umbrella moments before the gunshots. According to the conspiracy 
theory, the two events are causally related: the umbrella was a signal to the 
assassin(s) (Posner, 1994). The tendency to perceive conjunctive events as having an 
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underlying causal relationship may make conspiracist explanations appear more 
subjectively representative of events in general and thus more subjectively probable 
than alternative explanations.  
To date, one study, conducted by the present author as part of a Masters 
research project (Brotherton & French, in press), has investigated the relationship 
between susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and belief in conspiracy theories. 
This study aimed to replicate the finding that paranormal-believers commit more 
conjunction fallacy errors as compared to nonbelievers, and to extend the design to 
examine conspiracy-believers as compared to nonbelievers. To assess susceptibility 
to the conjunction fallacy in various contexts, the research employed an existing 
measure of susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy consisting of paranormal and 
neutral-themed items (Rogers et al., 2009). In addition, 8 novel conspiracy-themed 
conjunction vignettes were created. Conspiracist ideation was measured by way of an 
existing measure of endorsement of various real-world conspiracy theories (Douglas 
& Sutton, 2011).  
Consistent with previous research, people with stronger belief in the 
paranormal tended to made more conjunction fallacy errors (Rogers et al., 2009, 
2011). Moreover, the same was found to be true of conspiracy-believers; people who 
indicated stronger endorsement of various popular conspiracy theories committed 
more conjunction fallacy errors. Also consistent with previous research, this bias was 
largely unaffected by context. Conspiracy believers made more conjunction errors 
consistently across all conjunction item types – the effect was not limited to 
conspiratorial items. 
The current study aims to extend on this preliminary work by replicating the 
relationship between conspiracist beliefs and the conjunction fallacy using the 
generic measure of conspiracism detailed in Chapter 2 of the present thesis. In 
addition, while the previous study used a self-selected sample of the general public, 
the present study employs a sample of university undergraduate students – as is 
typical of most psychological research – to examine whether the relationship holds 
true in a non-self-selected sample. 
 
Method 
Participants. Studies 5a, 5b, and 5c employed the same sample of 102 first-
year psychology undergraduate students. A sample of 102 first-year psychology 
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undergraduate students (81 females and 21 males) completed the questionnaire in 
return for course credit. The majority were of British (62.7%) or other European 
nationality (27.5%). Participant age ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 21.0, SD = 5.2). 
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were 
conspiracist ideation and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy in two contexts – 
neutral and conspiracy. To reproduce the type of analysis used by Rogers et al. 
(2009), a quasi-IV was formed by performing a median split on the conspiracism 
variable, dividing the sample into conspiracy believers vs. nonbelievers. For this 
analysis, the dependent variable was the number of conjunction fallacies made by 
each participant. 
Materials. 
Generic conspiracist beliefs (GCB). Conspiracist beliefs were measured 
using the validated measure of generic conspiracist ideation as described in Chapter 
2 of this thesis. Cronbach‘s alpha for the scale was high (.88). 
Modified Scenario Judgements Questionnaire (M-SJQ). A modified version 
of the SJQ created by Rogers et al. (2009) was employed to assess susceptibility to 
the conjunction fallacy. The original scale consists of 16 conjunction vignettes. Each 
vignette describes a situation, followed by three statements pertaining to the 
situation: two component statements, plus a conjunction of the two. Participants rate 
the ‗chances in 100‘3 that each of the three statements is true. A conjunction fallacy 
error is made when the third (conjunction) statement is rated as being more likely 
than one or both of the singular constituent statements.  
Of the 16 original vignettes, 8 describe neutral events, such as the outcome of 
a horse race and the clientele of a café. The remaining 8 items each had a paranormal 
theme; that is, each was designed such that the conjunction statement could imply 
that a paranormal event had taken place. As the current study was not concerned with 
paranormal beliefs, these 8 items were dropped. In their place, 8 new vignettes were 
created, each with a conspiratorial theme. That is, in each case the conjunction 
statement could imply that a conspiracy had taken place. As an example, the 
following vignette was presented: ―Patrick works for a pharmaceutical company 
testing the efficacy and side effects of some of the drugs they manufacture. He 
                                                 
3
 While Rogers et al. (2009) employed a more explicitly frequency-based estimate (phrased as ‗the 
number out of 100 occurrences‘) in addition to the ‗chances in 100‘ response format, their analyses 
showed no difference between the two response formats. Accordingly, only the latter was used in the 
current study. 
 105 
discovers that one of their widely available over-the-counter drugs is associated with 
an increased risk of heart disease.‖ Participants rate the likelihood that (a) ―Patrick‘s 
data gets lost after an I.T. failure affecting his computer‖, (b) ―Patrick is taken off the 
project‖, and (c) ―Patrick‘s data gets lost after an I.T. failure affecting his computer 
and Patrick is taken off the project‖ (full wording of the 8 novel conspiracy-themed 
items can be found in Appendix 3.2).  
A neutral example item (on which a conjunction error was not made) was 
included at the start of the M-SJQ to ensure participants understood the task 
instructions. 
Procedure. Undergraduate students were approached to take part in research 
following a lecture on an unrelated topic. Volunteers were given the questionnaire as 
part of a larger questionnaire package (also containing Studies 5a and 5c). To avoid 
priming ideas of conspiracy theories, the word ‗conspiracy‘ was not mentioned in the 
information sheet given to participants prior to filling in the questionnaire. The order 
of items in the M-SJQ was reversed for half of the participants; however, the M-SJQ 
was always presented before the GCB. Participants were instructed to complete all 
questionnaires as quickly as possible; however, no time limit was given.  
 
Results 
Data screening. Cases missing data on more than one conjunction or GCB 
item were excluded from analyses (n = 1). Further screening revealed 6 multivariate 
outliers, which were also excluded (total valid N = 95). 
Belief in conspiracy theories. A mean GCB score was computed for each 
participant (potential range = 1 – 5; actual range = 1.47 – 4.33; median = 3.00). Mean 
GCB scores were approximately normally distributed. Males and females did not 
differ in terms of conspiracist beliefs (t(93) = .83, p = .41, d = 0.17), and there was no 
correlation between GCB scores and age (r(93) = -.07, p = .50).  
Susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The majority (93.7%) of the 
sample made at least 1 conjunction fallacy error among the 16 M-SJQ items. The 
average number of conjunction errors made by participants across all 16 items was 
7.73 (SD = 3.89). Inspection of individual M-SJQ items showed that some proportion 
of the sample made conjunction errors for each of the 16 items (range 17.9 – 64.2%). 
A large proportion (92.6%) of the sample made at least 1 conjunction error for 
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neutral items (M = 3.99; SD = 2.02), with a slightly lower proportion (90.5%) for 
conspiracy items (M = 3.75; SD = 2.27). 
Total number of conjunction errors correlated significantly with GCB scores 
(r(93) = .29, p < .01); stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories was associated 
with a greater number of conjunction errors. Looking at conjunction vignette types 
individually, GCB scores correlated significantly (and positively) with both neutral 
conjunction errors (r(93) = .21, p < .05) and conspiracist conjunction errors (r(93) = 
.30, p < .01).  
To investigate the relationships further, including the potential interaction 
between conjunction type and conspiracist ideation, and to reproduce the analysis 
performed by Rogers et al. (2009), a 2 conspiracy belief group (believer vs. 
nonbeliever) x 2 event type (neutral vs. conspiracy) mixed ANOVA was performed 
on the number of conjunction errors made. Median split analysis was used to 
reclassify participants as either conspiracy ‗believers‘4 (n = 49; M = 3.42; SD = 0.38) 
or ‗nonbelievers‘ (n = 46; M = 2.41; SD = 0.39). The main effect of conspiracy belief 
group was significant (F(1, 93) = 5.62; p < .05; η2p = .06), with believers making 
slightly more conjunction errors in total (M = 8.61; SD = 3.72) than nonbelievers (M 
= 6.78; SD = 3.88). The main effect of conjunction event type was not significant 
(F(1, 93) = 1.83; p = .18; η2p = .02); while slightly fewer errors were made on 
conspiracy-themed items (M = 3.75; SD = 2.27) than neutral items (M = 3.99; SD = 
2.02) on the whole, this difference did not reach significance. The interaction 
between event type and belief group also emerged as not significant (F(1, 93) = 1.50; 
p = .22; η2p = .02). These effects are illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 It may be more appropriate to refer to ‗moderate‘ vs. ‗low‘ believers; however, the 
‗believer/nonbeliever‘ terminology is retained here for convenience, as per previous research (Rogers 
et al., 2009). 
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Note. Error bars: 95% CI. 
Figure 3.1. Average number of conjunction fallacy errors for each item type by 
belief group. 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of the present research was to test the hypothesis that people who 
endorse conspiracy theories are more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The data 
support this notion. Consistent with previous research (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; 
Fiedler, 1988; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996, 1997, 1998; Rogers et al., 2009, 2011; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1983; Wolford et al., 1990), people on the whole committed a sizeable 
number of conjunction errors, regardless of the context in which the conjunction was 
presented (neutral or conspiratorial). Crucially, individuals who indicated stronger 
endorsement of generic conspiracist ideas committed a greater number of 
conjunction violations than people who indicated lower conspiracist ideation.  
This trend was largely unaffected by context. The conjunction error rate 
among conspiracy-believers was higher to the same extent across neutral and 
conspiracy-themed conjunction scenarios. This implies that individual differences in 
susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy are domain general. It does not seem to be 
the case that some unique feature of conspiracist narratives preferentially invokes the 
fallacy in conspiracy-believers. Rather, it seems that individuals who are prone to 
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making conjunction errors in general are more accepting of conspiracy theories, 
perhaps because such theories often rely on a confluence of events being subsumed 
under a singular narrative. In this way, conspiracy theories may appear more 
representative of events in general to individuals who typically perceive conjunctions 
as being more representative than singular events. 
Previous research found lower conjunction violation rates for paranormal 
scenarios as compared to nonparanormal conjunction items, regardless of 
participants‘ level of endorsement of the paranormal (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011). 
Unexpectedly, the present study found no difference in conjunction error rates 
between neutral and conspiracy-themed items – both invoked similar numbers of 
fallacies. One possible explanation for this is that paranormal scenarios are perceived 
to some extent as inherently implausible, as they contradict mainstream materialist 
views of reality. Consistent with this suggestion, previous research has found that 
supernatural attributions are invoked less frequently than naturalistic explanations 
(Lupfer & Layman, 1996). Conspiratorial scenarios, however, do not possess the 
same obvious implausibility. Real conspiracies take place in the world routinely. As 
the working definition provided in Chapter 1 illustrated, the kinds of claims 
commonly referred to as ‗conspiracy theories‘ diverge from real, mundane 
conspiracies in less obvious ways, such as in postulating preternaturally powerful 
and evil conspirators, dismissing more plausible explanations, and distorting contrary 
evidence (Aaronovitch, 2009; Bale, 2007; Barkun, 2003; Keeley, 1999).  
However, it is possible that the conspiracy-themed conjunction items used in 
the current study did not clearly differentiate between mundane conspiratorial 
activity and the kinds of implausible machinations postulated by typical conspiracy 
theories. The novel conspiracy-themed items used in the present research were 
designed such that the conjunction response option implied that some kind of sinister 
conspiracy had taken place. Efforts were made to ensure that these items reflected 
the themes evident in prototypical popular conspiracy theories – primarily the 
covering up (in some cases by lethal means) of inconvenient truths. The actors 
behind the various implied conspiracies were the kinds of groups typically guilty of 
such misdeeds according to popular conspiracy theories, such as government 
officials, the pharmaceutical industry, and secret societies. Future research may seek 
to systematically vary factors such as the implied perpetrators or the scale of the 
alleged conspiracy and its consequences to see if such variables have an effect on 
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conjunction violation rates. At any rate, the increased rate of conjunction violations 
across neutral and conspiracy-themed items suggests that the relationship between 
conspiracist ideation and the conjunction fallacy is reliable. 
The power of the study may have been slightly reduced by the lack of 
variation in GCB scores. For the purposes of median-split analyses, only one scale 
point separated the ‗believers‘ group from the ‗nonbelievers‘ group. This is likely a 
result of the relatively homogenous sample of undergraduate students used. A 
stronger effect may have been seen with a more heterogeneous group of participants 
in terms of beliefs about conspiracy theories. That a difference between the believers 
and nonbelievers group in terms of number of conjunction errors made was still 
observed despite the homogeneity of the current sample suggests that it is a robust 
effect. 
One possible explanation for greater susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy 
among people who believe conspiracy theories is that, like those who believe in the 
paranormal (e.g. Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger & Taylor, 
2003), conspiracy-believers have a biased conception of randomness, according to 
which coincidences are rarely mere chance occurrences. Rather, causal relationships 
are inferred, which render conjunctive events more subjectively representative, and 
thus more plausible, than singular events (Nestler, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983; see also Koslowski, Marasia, Chelenza, & Dublin, 2008). Conspiracy theories 
often hinge on the idea that many disparate and ostensibly unrelated observations are, 
in fact, causally related by a conspiratorial plot. Thus, the tendency to perceive such 
conjunctions as being typical, or representative, may imbue such theories with 
plausibility. 
Yet, the current study is correlational and thus cannot confirm this speculated 
causal relationship; it remains unclear whether susceptibility to the conjunction 
fallacy causes, or conversely is caused by, endorsement of conspiracy theories. 
Given that susceptibility does not appear to be domain specific, and that other 
products of the representativeness heuristic have been implicated in the formation of 
conspiracist beliefs (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; see also 
Chapter 4 of this thesis), the former seems plausible. However, it is worth noting that 
the two causal directions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A reciprocal process 
may occur, whereby a biased conception of randomness predisposes an individual 
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towards accepting conspiracy theories, which in turn reinforces a worldview in 
which ostensibly unrelated events have hidden causal connections. 
 
General discussion 
The two studies described in this chapter contribute to the small body of 
findings concerning the role of nonconscious cognitive biases in the evaluation of 
conspiracist claims. Given evidence that the representativeness heuristic can 
influence the adoption of anomalous beliefs (e.g. Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002), the 
current research aimed to explore the heuristic‘s role in conspiracism. Specifically, 
the studies reported in this chapter focused on two biases, the conjunction fallacy and 
the proportionality bias, which are thought to result from the representativeness 
heuristic. Both biases have previously been found to influence anomalistic beliefs 
(Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Rogers et al., 2009, 2011). It was argued that certain 
characteristics of conspiracy theories – in particular, the focus on events of large 
magnitude and the tendency to incorporate conjunctive events into a coherent 
narrative – make these biases promising candidates in the search for cognitive factors 
underlying belief in conspiracy theories. Support for the hypotheses that conjunction 
and proportionality biases serve to make conspiracy theories appear more plausible 
was, however, mixed.  
Study 5a focused on the proportionality bias. Research suggests that this bias 
can make certain anomalous claims appear plausible for significant events, such as 
declaring a life-changing event to be an act of God (Lupfer & Layman, 1996). 
Research suggests that the proportionality bias may also make conspiracy theories 
seem plausible for significant world events because they offer to explain events in 
terms of an equally significant conspiracy (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & 
Cinnirella, 2007; McCauley & Jacques, 1979). The current study, however, failed to 
replicate this effect. According to the current data, there was no relationship between 
the magnitude of the event and the likelihood of a conspiracist explanation being 
favoured. Instead, conspiracy theorising about a novel event was associated only 
with generic conspiracist ideation; novel conspiracist attributions were determined by 
the degree to which an individual tended to entertain conspiracy theories in general 
(see Goertzel, 1994; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Swami et al., 2010). This suggests that 
the vignettes used in the current study may have simply failed to invoke the 
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proportionality bias, leaving conspiracist attributions to be determined by stable 
individual differences in conspiracism. 
Study 5b concerned the conjunction fallacy. Under conditions of uncertainty, 
people‘s statistical intuitions are often at odds with objective laws of probability. In 
particular, people often misperceive the co-occurrence of ostensibly unrelated events 
as being more likely than the occurrence of either component event alone. The 
current findings suggest that people who endorse conspiracy theories are particularly 
susceptible to this conjunction fallacy. While the current study cannot directly 
establish causality, taken together with previous research (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011), 
the findings suggest that the representativeness heuristic can render conjunctive 
events as more plausible than the singular, constituent events alone, and that 
individual differences in susceptibility to this conjunction fallacy predict beliefs 
about real-world events. As conspiracy theories often rely upon the conjunction of 
otherwise unrelated details being attributed to a unifying conspiracist narrative, those 
who are more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy in general may be more open to 
the possibility that conspiratorial activity is ubiquitous.  
In sum, despite the failure to replicate previous findings concerning 
conspiracist ideation and the proportionality bias, the current findings suggest that 
representativeness can play a role in the adoption of conspiracist beliefs, including 
via the conjunction fallacy. However, the relationships, particularly in the case of the 
proportionality bias, may be more complex or more difficult to invoke than initially 
hypothesised. Future research must consider carefully the manipulations and 
measurement devices used in an attempt to elicit biases in order to further examine 
the conditions under which biases influence reasoning about novel events. The next 
chapter aims to continue this line of research, focusing on another bias which may 
result from the representativeness heuristic – a preference for attributions of 
intentionality. 
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Chapter 4 
Representativeness Continued: Conspiracist Ideation and 
Judgements of Intentionality 
 
Introduction 
As the introduction to the previous chapter outlined, the representativeness 
heuristic dictates that the greater the correspondence between salient features of an 
event and a potential explanation, the more plausible the explanation will appear. 
Salient features can include physical properties such as size or volume, as well as 
psychological attributes such as emotional valence or magnitude (e.g. Ebel-Lam et 
al., 2010; Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; LeBoeuf & 
Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Lupfer & Layman, 1996; McClure et al., 
1991; Spina et al., 2010; Teigen, 2004). The current chapter presents a series of 
studies examining the role of another psychological attribute – intentionality. This 
chapter is guided by the hypothesis that, to the extent that an individual tends to 
regard ambiguous events or situations as having been intended, the 
representativeness heuristic may make intentional explanations – and thus conspiracy 
theories – appear more plausible than unintentional explanations. 
 
Inferring intent 
 Everyday social interaction depends on judgements of intentionality. This 
refers to the ability to distinguish intentional actions and consequences from 
unintentional acts or outcomes, and to infer the specific intentions motivating 
people‘s actions. Judgements of intentionality are integral to understanding and 
participating in routine social interactions such as conversation (Holtgraves, 2008), 
interpreting a particular individual‘s behaviour over time (for example, how a 
doctor‘s various actions are united by the common goal of healing patients) (Baldwin 
& Baird, 2001), as well as understanding more abstract social enterprises such as 
theatre or literature (Bower & Rinck, 1999; Trabasso & Nickels, 1992). Deficits in 
the ability to comprehend the mental states of others are characteristic of autistic 
spectrum disorders (Baron-Cohen, 1997, 2009; however, see Channon, Lagnado, 
Fitzpatrick, Drury, & Taylor, 2011) and damage to certain brain regions (Channon, 
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Lagnado, Drury, Matheson, & Fitzpatrick, 2010), and can lead to severe difficulties 
in everyday life (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). 
Clearly, interpreting the intentions of those around us is not a trivial 
intellectual exercise. Interpretation of an actor‘s intentions guides beliefs about, and 
behaviour towards, the actor. Dodge, Murphy, and Buchsbaum (1984) examined 
children‘s reactions to observed schoolroom altercations involving an ambiguous act, 
such as one child knocking over a tower of blocks that another child had constructed. 
Such an act might be a deliberately hostile act of provocation, an accident, or may 
even be a prosocial act – the child may have been helping to dismantle the tower in 
order to tidy up. The authors found that when the ambiguous action was interpreted 
as hostile the observer was more likely to respond with aggression aimed at the 
perpetrator. In adulthood, too, ambiguous provocative actions judged to be 
intentional generate more hostile or punitive reactions (Buon, Jacob, Loissel, & 
Dupoux, 2013; Lagnado & Channon, 2008). The consequences of attributing intent 
can be severe. In criminal trials, juries may be tasked with determining whether a 
criminal act was intentional or unintentional; the distinction can mean the difference 
between a verdict of first-degree murder and one of manslaughter (Malle & Knobe, 
1997). 
Given the importance of inferring the intentions of others, it is not surprising 
that the cognitive system is keenly attuned to intentionality cues. The ability to 
perceive and infer intentionality appears to be driven by low-level, automatic 
processes (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Rosset, 2008). Just 
observing another person carrying out a simple action, such as raising a glass of 
water to their mouth, evokes judgements of whether the behaviour is intended and 
what goals the actor may be hoping to achieve (in this case, it may be inferred that 
the person is thirsty and plans to take a drink). The perceiver‘s cognitive system does 
not encode every intricate detail of the actor‘s physical motion in space; rather, the 
information that gets encoded is the perceiver‘s interpretation of the actor‘s actions 
in terms of these automatic inferences about the actor‘s mental state (Blakemore & 
Decety, 2001). When a specific intention has been ascribed, actions relevant to that 
intention are preferentially encoded, while intent-irrelevant actions are more likely to 
be disregarded and forgotten (Zadny & Gerard, 1974).  
The cognitive architecture underlying the ability to discern intentionality 
begins development in early infancy. Infants as young as 3 months appear able to 
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discriminate ostensibly intentional from unintentional motion (Rochat, Morgan, & 
Carpenter, 1997), and by 14 months children preferentially imitate apparently 
intended actions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). The ability to accurately 
infer the specific content of another person‘s intentions – what exactly they might 
hope to achieve through their actions – develops throughout childhood (Dodge et al., 
1984). By adulthood, most neurotypical individuals share a common understanding 
of the concept of intentionality, even in lieu of an explicit definition (Malle & 
Knobe, 1997). 
 
Overattribution of intentionality 
 The fast and automatic operation of intentionality-seeking cognitive 
processes allows us to quickly make inferences about the mental states of those 
around us – an important evolutionary adaptation (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). 
However, as is the case with other low-level cognitive processes (e.g. Gilovich et al., 
2002; Pohl, 2004), inferences of intentionality may be subject to biases and 
heuristics. Not only are we sensitive to the intentions of others, but we may be overly 
sensitive, biased towards perceiving or inferring intentionality where it is not 
warranted. 
Of course, an adult who observes another person sneeze, for example, may be 
explicitly aware that the action was unintended. However, research suggests that this 
awareness is only arrived at secondarily through effortful application of the acquired 
knowledge that intentions are not the only possible causes of actions (Bègue, 
Bushman, Giancola, Subra, & Rosset, 2010; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Rosset, 
2008). In particular, Rosset (2008) reports a series of studies suggesting that the low-
level processes governing attributions of intentionality may be biased towards 
interpreting all actions as intentional, rather than accidental – even actions which are 
never performed intentionally, such as catching a cold. Only after the initial 
automatic attribution of intentionality has been made can higher-level cognitive 
processes evaluate this involuntary assumption. Thus, judging an action to be 
unintentional requires more cognitive resources, takes longer, and results in 
increased ease of recall compared to judging the same action to be intentional. Rosset 
(2008) refers to this irresistible inclination towards intentional attributions as the 
intentionality bias. 
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It must be noted that one attempted replication failed to find the same pattern 
of results (Hughes, Sandry, & Trafimow, 2012). However, the notion of an intrinsic 
intentionality bias is consistent with the wider body of research suggesting that 
intentional explanations are often preferred over unintentional or situational 
explanations, even when a more tenable unintentional explanation is available (e.g. 
Hughes & Trafimow, 2012; Jones & Harris, 1967; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Langer, 
1975; P. H. Miller & Aloise, 1989; Sripada, 2012). Moreover, anthropomorphic 
intentions are often readily attributed to nonhuman animals, or inanimate objects and 
entities (e.g. Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, 2004; Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 
2010). Even abstract two-dimensional shapes moving around a screen are 
automatically imbued with human-like characteristics and intentions when they move 
in ways consistent with our expectations of intentional agency (Barrett & Johnson, 
2003; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). There appear to be stable 
individual differences in the tendency to favour intentional claims and explanations 
(Waytz et al., 2010). Further, attributions of intentional agency become more likely 
when processing time is limited or disrupted by consumption of alcohol (Bègue et 
al., 2010; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; however, see Buon et al., 2013). 
Some findings suggest that overattribution of intentionality may be associated 
with anomalistic beliefs. People who believe supernatural religious ideas are more 
inclined to find unwarranted signs of agency in the world around them, such as 
seeing faces in cloud formations or attributing agency to inanimate objects (Atran & 
Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2003; Evans & Wellman, 2006; Kelemen, 2004; Petrican 
& Burris, 2012; Riekki et al., 2013). Moreover, the tendency to endorse statements 
postulating some form of supernatural intentionality (such as ―The sun radiates heat 
because warmth nurtures life‖) increases under cognitive strain (Kelemen & Rosset, 
2009), and when participants are made to feel powerless (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, 
& Nash, 2010; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Norenzayan & Hansen, 
2006). These findings suggest that individuals who are inclined towards attributions 
of intentionality, either as a stable trait or due to situational factors, may see 
anomalous claims postulating supernatural agency as relatively more representative, 
and thus more plausible, than claims which do not entail intentionality. 
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Intentionality and conspiracy theories 
So far this chapter has discussed research suggesting that inferences of 
intentionality are governed by low-level, automatic processes which are biased 
towards interpreting actions or events as having been caused intentionally. This can 
give rise to promiscuous and unwarranted judgements of intentionality. It was noted 
that the representativeness heuristic may lead to anomalous claims regarding 
supernatural intentionality being evaluated favourably because the claims are 
representative of a world in which intentionality is ubiquitous. The remainder of this 
chapter will examine the idea that conspiracy theories may also be, in part, a product 
of overdetection of intentionality.  
This seems a reasonable speculation given that conspiracy theories invariably 
explain events in terms of intentional agency, offering a greater degree of 
intendedness – the amount of information that can be construed as intentional – than 
the mainstream explanations with which the theories compete. As the definition 
section of Chapter 1 noted, conspiracy theories characteristically portray the 
postulated conspirators as preternaturally competent in their ability to plan and 
control events, discounting the role of chance or unintended consequences. 
According to conspiracy theories nothing happens by accident.  
The working definition also noted that a conspiracy theory invariably 
competes with a mainstream explanation. These mainstream accounts may or may 
not postulate an intentional explanation; in either case, the conspiracy theory usually 
offers a greater degree of intendedness. In some cases, a conspiracy theory competes 
with a mainstream explanation which casts the event as an unintended consequence, 
or the product primarily of chance. Such is the case with conspiracy theories of the 
death of Princess Diana or the catastrophic failure of TWA flight 800, for example 
(see McConnachie & Tudge, 2008). Here it is clear that a conspiracy theory 
explaining the event as the product of the conspirators‘ intentions offers more 
intendedness. 
In other cases, however, both conspiracy theory and mainstream account 
explain the event in question as intentional. Take, for example, the terrorist attacks of 
9/11. The mainstream account proposes that al-Qaeda hijackers acted successfully on 
their intentions to crash airliners into the World Trade Center towers. Likewise, 
conspiracy theories of the event allege that conspirators within the US government 
intentionally perpetrated the attacks. Why might a conspiracy theory be preferred in 
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this case, when both mainstream and conspiracist accounts offer intentionality? On 
closer examination, the mainstream account inherently involves unintended 
consequences: the government agencies tasked with identifying terrorist threats 
certainly did not intend for the attacks to occur. The conspiracy theory, in contrast, 
offers a surplus of intendedness. Not only were the buildings attacked on purpose, 
but the government agencies were in on the entire plot, purposefully failing to 
prevent the attacks. Viewed in this way, mainstream explanations of events like 9/11, 
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and similar events inherently entail 
unintentional consequences, whereas conspiracy theories offer to explain almost all 
consequences as intended. 
With this in mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that individuals who are 
more susceptible to the intentionality bias
5
 in general will find conspiracy theories to 
be more plausible than their corresponding mainstream explanations. In the same 
way that the representativeness heuristic can make large causes seem plausible for 
large events (see Chapter 3, Study 5a), so too might intentional explanations appear 
more plausible to an individual who sees events in general as being suffused with 
intentionality.  
As the previous section noted, this bias appears to make explanations 
postulating supernatural intentionality appear more plausible to certain people in 
certain circumstances (e.g. Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; 
Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Petrican & Burris, 2012). Conspiracy theories, too, 
may be evaluated favourably to the extent that they are consistent with an 
individual‘s conceptions of intentionality. Endorsement of both supernatural claims 
and conspiracy theories has been found to increase under conditions of diminished 
self-efficacy (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008). Together with reliable correlations between conspiracism and supernatural 
beliefs (e.g. Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011), these 
findings suggest potential psychological similarities between reasoning about 
conspirators and supernatural agents. Both forms of anomalous beliefs may result 
from a preference for explanations which posit intentional agency as the primary 
cause of events in the world. 
                                                 
5
 Or, put another way, individuals who are less able or inclined to over-ride the intentionality bias, 
either as a result of stable individual differences or temporary situational factors. 
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One potential difference between reasoning about conspiracies versus 
supernatural or everyday agents is that intentionality, as it is usually conceived, 
applies to lone agents. Whether they are gods, ghosts, or humans, intentional agents 
are usually discrete individuals. A conspiracy, on the other hand, is a collective 
working together towards a common goal. It is possible that reasoning about a 
conspiracy would not invoke the same cognitive processes which deal with 
judgements of intentionality. However, research suggests that, in some 
circumstances, people attribute intentionality to a group entity (such as a sports team, 
a country, or even a group of simple geometric shapes moving around a screen in 
formation) to the same extent as to individual entities (Bloom & Veres, 1999; Waytz 
& Young, 2011). Thus, there is reason to suspect that intentionality judgements 
concerning a conspiracy, a supernatural agent, or a mere human, rely upon the same 
underlying cognitive processes. 
To date, just three studies have touched upon this speculation, providing 
preliminary support. Imhoff and Bruder (2013) report that people who indicated 
stronger beliefs in conspiracies in general were more likely to blame a specific real-
world disaster – the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant catastrophe – on 
intentional misconduct rather than chance. Bost and Prunier (2013) found that people 
were more accepting of conspiracist claims when presented with an obvious motive 
for the alleged conspiracy, suggesting that the conspirators were intentionally 
working towards a desirable goal. Additionally, generalised conspiracist ideation has 
been found to correlate positively with individual differences in anthropomorphism 
(Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013). Both findings point towards a link 
between conspiracist ideation and promiscuous attributions of intentionality. 
 
Overview of studies 
In sum, there is reason to suspect that a claim postulating a conspiracy may 
invoke cognitive processes governing attributions of intentionality. Research 
suggests that these processes attribute intent automatically, and that replacing 
judgements of intent with an unintentional attribution is a cognitively effortful 
process (Rosset, 2008). Further, individuals appear to vary in their capacity to 
override this intentionality bias, either as a stable disposition (Waytz et al., 2010), or 
due to situational factors (Bègue et al., 2010; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Norenzayan 
& Hansen, 2006); that is, everyone is subject to the intentionality bias, but some 
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individuals tend to favour intentional explanations, while others are more inclined to 
replace automatically generated intentional attributions with unintentional 
explanations. Those who favour attributions of intentionality appear to be more 
accepting of anomalistic claims postulating powerful supernatural agents, as such 
claims will appear representative (e.g. Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Kelemen & 
Rosset, 2009; Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Petrican & Burris, 2012). 
The four studies reported here were each driven by the hypothesis that 
individuals who generally favour intentional explanations for ambiguous events or 
outcomes may see conspiratorial explanations, which paint events as the product of 
powerful hidden agents‘ intentions, as being more subjectively representative, and 
thus more plausible, than nonconspiracist explanations. That is, conspiracist ideation 
is predicted to be stronger among individuals who are more prone to promiscuous 
inferences of intentionality. Attributions of intentionality are examined in the context 
of imagined actions (Study 5c and 8), perceived actions (Study 6), and 
anthropomorphism (Study 7 and 8).  
 
Study 5c: Conspiracist ideation and inferences of intentionality 
 This first study aimed to provide an initial test of whether there is an 
association between conspiracist ideation and the extent to which an individual is 
biased towards inferences of intentionality – that is, attributions of intentionality in 
the context of ambiguous imagined actions. Previous research suggests that people 
high in conspiracist ideation are more likely to explain a real-world event as the 
result of intentional conspiratorial misconduct (Imhoff & Bruder, 2013). The current 
study, however, presents the first examination of whether people high in conspiracist 
ideation tend to prefer intentional attributions for ambiguous scenarios in general – 
that is, beyond the context of conspiracy. It is hypothesised that, since conspiracy 
theories offer to explain ambiguous events primarily in terms of agents‘ intentions, 
people who are generally inclined towards interpreting ambiguous actions or 
scenarios as having been intended will display higher levels of conspiracist ideation. 
 
Method 
Participants. Studies 5a, 5b, and 5c employed the same sample of 102 first-
year psychology undergraduate students (81 females and 21 males). The majority 
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were of British (62.7%) or other European nationalities (27.5%). Participant age 
ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 21.0, SD = 5.2). 
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were 
individual differences in conspiracist ideation, and inferences of intentionality. 
Materials. 
Generic conspiracist beliefs (GCB). General conspiracist beliefs were 
measured using the novel measure of generic conspiracist ideation described in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Cronbach‘s alpha for the scale was high (.88). 
Inferences of intentionality. To measure individual differences in bias 
towards inferences of intentionality, a measure was adapted from previous research 
looking at the intentionality bias. Rosset (2008) created a list of 34 sentences, each 
describing an action that can be done either on purpose or by accident, such as ―He 
set the house on fire,‖ and, ―She kicked the dog.‖ Pretesting allowed the author to 
rank order the statements in terms of the percentage of participants who offered an 
intentional explanation for each. Some statements were almost never interpreted as 
intentional, such as ―She burnt the meal.‖ Some were almost always given 
intentional explanations, such as ―She averted her eyes.‖ Crucially, however, 12 
sentences were more ambiguous, with between 27% and 69% of participants offering 
intentional interpretations. These 12 sentences were selected as test items for the 
current study. 
Following Rosset‘s (2008, Study 2) methodology, each sentence was 
presented together with a space in which participants were asked to write ―A brief 
description of the image that comes to mind when reading each sentence‖. As in 
Rosset (2008), two example sentences and potential responses were provided before 
participants began the task – one describing an intentional act (―He looked for his 
key: ‗A guy is in front of his car and he‘s feeling his pockets for his keys, looking 
confused‘‖), and one describing an unintentional act (―She tripped on the curb: ‗I see 
a girl on Oxford Street talking on her cell phone and tripping over the curb as she 
crosses the street‘‖).  
On turning the page after writing descriptions for all 12 sentences, 
participants received additional instructions asking them to ―Go back to each of your 
responses and clarify whether the event you described was done on purpose or by 
accident.‖ Participants were required to write the words ‗on purpose‘ or ‗by accident‘ 
after each of their descriptions on the previous page. This step was included in order 
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to avoid subjectivity in the coding of descriptions in which the intentions of the actor 
may be unclear – Rosset (2008) gives the example of the following response to the 
sentence ―He dripped paint on the canvas‖: ―I see a guy in overalls holding a paint 
brush and looking down at a large canvas on the floor in a loft like building.‖ Here it 
is unclear whether the actor intended to drip the paint or not. As per Rosset (2008), 
participants were not asked for this clarification until after they had completed the 
open-ended description phase of the task so as to avoid priming participants to think 
of unintentional explanations which they may not have otherwise considered. 
Procedure. Undergraduate students were asked to take part in research 
following a lecture on an unrelated topic in return for course credit. Volunteers were 
given the current questionnaire as part of a larger questionnaire package (see Studies 
5a and 5b). To avoid priming the idea of conspiracy theories, the word ‗conspiracy‘ 
was not mentioned in the information sheet given to participants prior to filling in the 
questionnaire. Two versions of the questionnaire pack, with the order of 
intentionality items counterbalanced, were randomly distributed. The intentionality 
measure was presented before the GCB. No time limit was given, though participants 
were asked to work quickly, answering with their first instincts. 
 
Results 
Data screening. Despite asking participants to clarify whether their 
descriptions of the ambiguous actions were on purpose or by accident in order to 
avoid experimenter subjectivity, initial examination revealed some seemingly 
incongruous responses; in some cases a participant‘s description of an item suggested 
an action which was unambiguously accidental, yet they indicated that the action was 
purposeful, or vice versa. For example, one participant responded to the item ―He set 
the house on fire‖ with the following description: ―I see a man standing outside a 
burning building holding a petrol can and laughing maniacally.‖ This would 
ostensibly appear to describe an intentional act of arson; however, the participant 
rated the action as accidental. 
Out of 1,224 (102 participants multiplied by 12 items each) items total, the 
author identified 30 ambiguous items (2.45%) such as these across 10 participants. 
These 30 ambiguous items, as well as 15 randomly chosen unambiguous control 
items, were presented to an independent rater who blindly coded each item as 
ambiguous or unambiguous. An interrater reliability analysis using the Kappa 
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statistic was performed to determine consistency between raters, revealing 
substantial agreement (Kappa = 0.63; p < .001). An item was excluded from 
subsequent analyses when both raters agreed that the item was ambiguous (24 items 
in total). 
 In addition to excluding individual ambiguous items, a participant‘s data were 
excluded entirely if more than one item was missing (n = 5) or ambiguous (n = 7). 
Four additional multivariate outliers were excluded from analyses (total valid N = 
86). 
Descriptive data. An intentionality score was computed for each participant 
by summing the number of intentional explanations each participant offered across 
the 12 items. Where a participant had a missing or excluded item, their total was 
adjusted by dividing by 11 and then multiplying by 12 to give a score equivalent to 
participants with complete data for all 12 items. On the whole, participants tended to 
offer intentional attributions for significantly more than half (M = 7.47; SD = 1.52) of 
the 12 items (t(85) = 9.14, p < .001, d = 0.99). The data was approximately normally 
distributed about the mean, with slight negative skew; scores ranged from 4 to 10 
(median = 7; skew = -.14). 
In addition, a mean conspiracist ideation score was computed for each 
participant by averaging their responses to the 15 GCB items. On the whole, 
participants demonstrated modest conspiracist ideation; the overall mean score was 
2.90 (SD = 0.64), close to the mid-point of the scale. GCB scores were 
approximately normally distributed about the mean (range = 1.47 to 4.27; median = 
2.97; skew = -.14). 
Association between conspiracist ideation and intentional inferences. 
There was a weak but significant positive correlation between GCB scores and the 
number of intentional inferences participants offered (r(84) = .22, p < .05); that is, 
participants who endorsed generic conspiracist claims more strongly tended to offer 
slightly more intentional interpretations. 
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Figure 4.1. Scatterplot of number of inferences of intentionality against conspiracist 
ideation (GCB scores). 
 
To explore the linearity of the relationship, GCB scores were divided into 
quartiles. Figure 4.2 illustrates the group means. A small upward trend is evident, 
with fewest intentionality inferences within the lowest quartile (strong nonbelievers), 
the greatest number of intentionality inferences within the highest quartile (strong 
believers), and the middle quartiles scoring in between. Comparing the highest 
quartile of the sample in terms of conspiracist ideation (n = 21; M = 3.72; SD = 0.26) 
with the lowest quartile (n = 21; M = 2.03; SD = 0.27), strong believers made a larger 
number of intentional attributions (M = 8.25; SD = 1.46) than strong nonbelievers (M 
= 7.05; SD = 1.47). This difference of just over 1 item emerged as statistically 
significant (t(40) = 2.63, p < .05; d = 0.82). 
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Note. Error bars: 95% CI. 
Figure 4.2. Average number of inferences of intentionality among quartile groups 
derived from GCB scores (lowest to highest). 
 
Discussion 
 The present study aimed to investigate the hypothesis that individuals who 
are more inclined to infer intentionality when presented with descriptions of 
ambiguous actions will view conspiracy theories more favourably. The data were 
consistent with this hypothesis. Participants who endorsed generic conspiracist 
claims more strongly tended to offer a greater number of intentional attributions in 
response to ambiguous actions such as ―He set the house on fire.‖ However, the 
relationship was small; comparing the lowest quartile of the sample in terms of 
conspiracist ideation with the highest quartile reveals a difference of just over 1 item 
out of 12. 
The study raises some issues concerning the operationalisation of individual 
differences in intentionality inferences that future research using the current measure 
might take into consideration. Particularly, cases of apparent incongruence between 
the description a participant offered for an item and their explicit rating of ‗on 
purpose‘ or ‗by accident‘ suggests that a small minority of participants may not have 
interpreted the task instructions in the same way as other participants. Ambiguous 
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cases such as these may reflect differing interpretations of the concept of intent. For 
instance, a pyromaniac may be deemed to not be legally responsible for their actions 
by virtue of temporary insanity. As far as the current research is concerned, though, 
the act was intentional: the actor intended to bring about the observed consequences 
through their actions. Alternatively, some ambiguous responses may simply reflect 
misunderstanding of the task. Of potential relevance is the fact that 8 of the 9 
participants with ambiguous responses indicated non-British nationality or non-
Caucasian ethnicity. It is possible that cultural differences or language barriers 
affected some participants‘ performance on the task. Study 8, which uses the same 
ambiguous sentences task, was designed with these issues in mind. First, however, 
Studies 6 and 7 sought to examine promiscuous attributions of intentionality in 
differing contexts. 
 
Study 6: Conspiracist ideation and perceived intentionality  
The previous study concerned inferred intentionality; that is, judgements of 
intentionality in response to imagined hypothetical events. The current study turns to 
intentionality judgements in the context of perceived intentionality. This refers to 
situations in which an ambiguous event is observed, rather than imagined. Evidence 
suggests that judgements of intentionality are automatically evoked when observing 
an actor in motion (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Blakemore & Decety, 2001), and can 
even actively shape the perception of action (Zadny & Gerard, 1974). It is unclear, 
however, whether the cognitive processes underlying perceptions of intentionality 
are subject to the same intentionality bias as those underlying inferences of 
intentionality (Rosset, 2008). If the intentionality bias pervades both perceptual and 
inferential intentionality-oriented processes, it is expected that, like inferences of 
intentionality, a bias towards perceiving intentionality will be associated with 
stronger conspiracist ideation. 
 
Method 
Participants. One-hundred-and-twenty-nine adults completed the study (57 
females and 71 males; no gender data for 1 participant). Age ranged from 21 to 75 
(M = 42.8, SD = 13.0). The majority of participants were British or Irish (74.4%); the 
remainder of the sample was of European (10.9%), North American (9.3%), or other 
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nationalities (5.4%). Participants were primarily in employment (66.7%), students 
(13.2%), or unemployed/retired (13.9%). 
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were 
general conspiracist ideation, and bias towards perceiving intentionality when 
observing another person performing an ambiguous movement. 
Materials. 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. General conspiracist beliefs were again 
assessed using the measure of generic conspiracist ideation described in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. Cronbach‘s α for the scale was again high (.92). 
Perceived intentionality. The ambiguous intentionality stimuli consisted of a 
series of 16 videos showing a close-up shot of a person‘s hand resting on a computer 
keyboard. The index finger is attached to a keyboard key via a Velcro strap, and the 
key itself is attached to a pulley system (see Figure 4.3). The pulley system is 
operated by an unseen motor which pulls the key (and finger) down, simulating a 
normal key-press. Thus, a key-press could either be actively carried out by the actor 
(intentional), or passively operated by the pulley system (unintentional). Participants 
were led to believe that each video in the series would show a different movement, 
and that each could be either intentional or unintentional. In actual fact, all videos in 
the series show an identical unintentional movement driven by the pulley system. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Schematic illustration of key-pressing apparatus. 
 
Four versions of the video were created, differing only in the duration of the 
lead-in time before the movement is initiated (25 frames, 36 frames, 49 frames, 60 
frames). The movement itself occupies 9 frames (approximately 360ms). All videos 
were 100 frames long (4-seconds at 25 frames-per-second).  
 127 
In order to familiarise participants with the video stimuli and procedure, 
participants were shown a schematic representation of the apparatus (Figure 4.3) 
along with a written explanation. Following this, an example video was presented. 
This example page contained the instructions, ―We ask that you watch each video 
just once all the way through, though please replay the video if you aren't able to see 
the finger movement for any reason. After each video, you'll be asked whether you 
thought the movement was made deliberately by the person (intentional), or made by 
the pulley system pulling the finger down (unintentional). Try to answer quickly, 
going with your first instinct.‖  
Participants were then asked to click a button to advance to the test phase. 
The test phase sequentially presented each of the 4 videos 4 times, for a total of 16 
trials. The 4 videos repeated in a fixed pseudorandom pattern. After viewing a video, 
participants were asked to select one option from two buttons labelled ‗Intentional‘ 
and ‗Unintentional‘. Once participants had viewed a video and selected their 
response, they clicked a button in order to load a new webpage containing the next 
video. 
Procedure. Participants were solicited online by emailing lists of people 
interested in taking part in anomalistic psychological research. Self-selected 
volunteers completed the survey remotely via a web-based interface. Participants 
were asked to work alone in an environment free from distractions and to complete 
the study in a single sitting. To avoid priming ideas of conspiracy theories, the word 
‗conspiracy‘ was not mentioned in the information given to participants prior to 
filling in the questionnaire. To disguise the fact that all videos were identical, the 
study was presented as a survey looking at people‘s ability to perceive subtle 
differences between intentional and unintentional movements. No time limit was 
given, though participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible, going with 
their first impressions.  
 
Results 
Data screening and descriptives. No cases were missing data for more than 
one item; thus, none were excluded. No bivariate outliers were identified. 
 A mean GCB score was calculated for each participant. GCB scores were 
approximately normally distributed. On the whole, participants demonstrated modest 
scepticism towards conspiracist ideas (M = 2.11; SD = 0.79). Males and females did 
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not differ significantly in terms of conspiracist ideation (t(126) = 1.48,  p = .14, d = 
0.26); nor did the two major nationality groups (British & Irish/Other nationalities) 
represented by the sample (t(127) = 1.58, p = .66, d = 0.28). There was no significant 
correlation between conspiracist ideation and age (r(127) = -.12, p = .18). 
Second, a perceived intentionality score – the number of intentional 
attributions made by each participant in response to the ambiguous videos – was 
calculated for each participant. Where participants were missing an item, their total 
was adjusted by dividing the number of intentional attributions by 15 and 
multiplying by 16, to give a score comparable to participants with valid data for all 
16 items. On the whole, participants interpreted significantly more than half (M = 
9.15; SD = 3.22) of the 16 ambiguous videos as being intentional (t(128) = 4.06, p < 
.001, d = 0.36). Scores covered the entire spectrum, ranging from 0 to 16, however 
slight negative skew was evident (skewness = -.13). 
Association between conspiracist ideation and perceived intentionality. 
The correlation between mean GCB scores and perceived intentionality scores was 
nonsignificant (r(127) = -.13, p = .16). That is, there was no readily apparent 
association between conspiracist ideation and the number of intentional attributions a 
participant offered. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Scatterplot of GCB scores against number of intentional attributions. 
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Discussion 
This study aimed to examine whether biases in the perception of 
intentionality are associated with conspiracist ideation. It was predicted that a bias 
towards perceiving intentionality would be associated with stronger endorsement of 
generic conspiracist beliefs. The data did not support this hypothesis, however; no 
reliable linear correlation was apparent. There was a slight trend towards a negative 
correlation, contrary to expectations, but this trend failed to reach statistical 
significance. Therefore it is not possible, on the basis of the current findings, to say 
that a bias towards interpreting perceived actions as intentional is associated with 
belief in conspiracy theories. 
This failure to find a relationship is seemingly at odds with findings from the 
previous study, in which a bias towards interpreting imagined actions as intentional 
was found to correlate with greater endorsement of conspiracist beliefs (see also 
Imhoff & Bruder, 2013). It is perhaps worth noting that the current sample, on the 
whole, was slightly more sceptical towards conspiracy theories than the samples used 
in the other studies in this chapter. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the sample consisted of 
many individuals with low conspiracist ideation, but few high in conspiracist 
ideation. This may be a result of the recruitment methods used in the current study. 
Unlike Study 5c, which sampled university students, the current study solicited 
volunteers from databases of people interested in anomalistic psychological research. 
It is possible that this approach resulted in a sample biased towards disbelief in 
conspiracy theories and other anomalous beliefs. Chapter 2 suggested that the GCB 
retains acceptable psychometric properties when used with self-selected samples of 
the general public; however the possibility remains that the skew of the current 
sample resulted in less statistical power than other studies, obscuring any genuine 
relationship. Future research should take care to recruit samples representative of a 
range of conspiracist beliefs. 
Assuming that the current findings are not simply a result of a biased sample 
or low statistical power, one possible explanation for the disparity is that the 
ambiguous videos task employed in the current study failed to successfully capture 
individual differences in participants‘ bias towards intentional attributions. However, 
like the previous study, responses to the current task did suggest the presence of an 
intentionality bias. If participants were merely guessing in an unbiased fashion, half 
of the ambiguous key-presses ought to have been seen as intentional, and half as 
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unintentional. On the whole, however, participants interpreted slightly more than half 
of the key-presses as having been intentional. It is possible that some feature of the 
videos themselves, rather than an automatic cognitive bias, inclined participants 
towards attributions of intentionality; however, the fact that in reality all videos 
depicted an unintentional movement makes this explanation somewhat implausible. 
It is also possible that the unusual nature of the task may have caused participants to 
become suspicious, and to question their initial attributions more than they would in 
a more naturalistic setting, thereby disrupting the underlying individual differences 
which the measure hoped to assess. Indeed, in post-questionnaire comments, some 
participants anecdotally indicated suspicion that all videos were identical. Future 
research may consider using a more naturalistic task. 
A second possibility is that reasoning about the intentionality of perceived 
events is different in some way from inferring the intentionality of imagined events, 
such that only biases in inferences are associated with beliefs about conspiracies. 
Lending plausibility to this suggestion, some research indicates that factors which 
influence the perception of physical causality do not necessarily influence inferences 
of physical causality (Johnston, 2013; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992). It is possible 
that the same dissociation exists when reasoning about social causality – that is, 
whether an observed event was intended or unintended. This possibility is considered 
at greater length in the general discussion. 
A final possibility is that Study 5c produced a spurious correlation, and in 
fact there is no relationship between biased judgements of intentionality and belief in 
conspiracy theories. With this possibility in mind, it is important to replicate the 
finding, and to look at biased judgements of intentionality in another context. The 
next two studies aimed to achieve these goals. 
 
Study 7: Individual differences in anthropomorphisation 
Overattribution of intentionality is not limited to ambiguous actions 
performed by humans. As mentioned in the chapter introduction, nonhuman animals 
or inanimate objects and entities are often attributed human-like intentionality (e.g. 
Barrett & Johnson, 2003; Bloom & Veres, 1999; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Scholl & 
Tremoulet, 2000; Waytz & Young, 2011). This tendency is referred to as 
anthropomorphisation. Individuals differ in their proclivity to anthropomorphise, and 
these individual differences have been found to influence more specific beliefs, 
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including attributions of responsibility and blame, and feelings of care and concern 
toward anthropomorphised entities (Waytz et al., 2010).  
Some findings indicate that religious beliefs are associated with 
anthropomorphism (Petrican & Burris, 2012), suggesting that anomalous beliefs 
about supernatural agents may appear especially plausible to those who generally see 
the world as suffused with intentionality. Likewise, two studies have found evidence 
of a modest but reliable positive association between individual differences in 
anthropomorphism and conspiracist ideation (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 
2013). The current study aimed to replicate the relationship between conspiracist 
ideation and anthropomorphism using the measure created in Chapter 2. A positive 
association would bolster support for the hypothesised more general link between 
promiscuous attributions of intentionality and conspiracism. 
 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-four undergraduate psychology students at two London-
based universities completed the study. Gender, age, and nationality were not 
recorded. No reward was offered for taking part. 
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were 
individual differences in conspiracist ideation and anthropomorphism. 
Materials. 
Generic conspiracist beliefs (GCB). General conspiracist beliefs were again 
assessed using the measure of generic conspiracist ideation described in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. Cronbach‘s alpha for the scale was high once again (.90). 
Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ: Waytz 
et al., 2010). Anthropomorphism refers to the attribution of human characteristics, 
including intentions, to nonhuman entities. The IDAQ consists of 15 items assessing 
the degree to which individuals tend to anthropomorphise nonhuman animals and 
inanimate objects (example item: ―To what extent does a television set experience 
emotions?‖). Participants respond on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (―Not at all‖) 
to 10 (―Very much‖). Internal reliability in the current study was high (.88). 
Procedure. Students were approached to take part in research following 
lectures on unrelated topics. Volunteers were given printed questionnaire packs. The 
IDAQ was always presented before the GCB. Again, the word ‗conspiracy‘ was not 
mentioned in the information sheet presented to participants prior to filling in the 
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questionnaire. No time limit was given, though participants were asked to work 
quickly, answering with their first instincts.  
 
Results 
Data screening and descriptives. No cases were missing data for more than 
one item; thus, none were excluded. Mean GCB and IDAQ scores were calculated 
for each participant. One bivariate outlier was excluded from analyses (total valid N 
= 83). 
 GCB scores were approximately normally distributed. On the whole, 
participants demonstrated modest scepticism towards conspiracist ideas (M = 2.43; 
SD = 0.76). IDAQ scores showed slight positive skew (skewness = 0.70). 
Participants were generally somewhat disinclined to anthropomorphise, evident from 
a grand mean somewhat below the mid-point of the scale (M = 3.33; SD = 1.39).  
Association between conspiracist ideation and anthropomorphisation. 
The correlation between mean GCB scores and mean IDAQ scores was moderate 
and positive (r(81) = .39, p < .001). That is, people who endorsed generic 
conspiracist ideas more strongly tended also to endorse anthropomorphic statements 
more strongly. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Scatterplot of anthropomorphism (IDAQ scores) scores against 
conspiracist ideation (GCB scores). 
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Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to replicate previous research indicating a 
relationship between individual differences in anthropomorphisation and conspiracist 
ideation (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013). The data support the 
relationship; a modestly sized positive correlation was found, with stronger 
endorsement of conspiracy theories associated with greater anthropomorphism. 
Together with the findings of Study 5c, this appears to add further support to the 
notion guiding this chapter – that conspiracist ideation is associated with 
promiscuous inferences of intentionality. However, the inter-relationship between the 
constructs of anthropomorphism and intentionality biases must be established to be 
sure that anthropomorphism represents a product of the bias towards inferences of 
intentionality. The next study was conducted to examine anthropomorphism and 
intentionality inferences in conjunction. 
 
Study 8: Associations between anthropomorphisation and intentional inferences 
Having gathered tentative evidence of relationships between conspiracist 
ideation and a bias towards inferences of intentionality (Study 5c), as well as 
anthropomorphism (Study 7), the current study aimed to replicate these relationships 
using an independent sample. Further, the study aimed to explore the inter-
relationship between intentionality inferences and anthropomorphism. This chapter is 
guided by the supposition that a proclivity towards overattribution of intentionality in 
general, as a result of failure to overcome the intentionality bias, promotes 
acceptance of conspiracy theories. The current study aims to examine whether 
anthropomorphisation is another product of the same bias; that is, inferring 
nonhuman intentionality may simply be an extension of biased judgements of 
intentionality concerning other humans. If that is the case, then anthropomorphism 
and biased intentionality inferences should be positively related, and the association 
between anthropomorphism and conspiracism ought to be mediated by biased 
inferences of intentionality.  
 
Method 
Participants. Study 5c suggested that the ambiguous sentences task is 
sensitive to participants‘ interpretation of the task instructions. With this in mind, the 
current study solicited data only from participants whose first language was English. 
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Eighty-six psychology students (74.4% female), ranging from A-Level (55.8%) 
through to Postgraduate level (16.3%), completed the study in return for entry into a 
prize draw for a £15 gift voucher. Participants were aged between 16 and 58 years 
(M = 23.5, SD = 9.7), and the majority indicated British or Irish nationality (90.7%).  
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were 
individual differences in conspiracist ideation, anthropomorphism, and intentional 
inferences. 
Materials. 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. General conspiracist beliefs were again 
assessed using the measure of generic conspiracist ideation described in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis. Cronbach‘s alpha for the scale was high (α = .92). 
Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ: Waytz 
et al., 2010). Anthropomorphism was assessed using the 15-item IDAQ (example 
item: ―To what extent does a television set experience emotions?‖). Internal 
reliability in the current study was high (α = .90). 
Individual differences in intentional inferences (Rosset, 2008). The 12 
ambiguous sentences used in Study 5c to measure individual differences in bias 
towards intentional inferences were used again in the current study. The general 
procedure and instructions remained the same. However, minor modifications were 
made to reflect the web-based interface, and to avoid the problem of ambiguous 
responses encountered in Study 5c. 
First, an initial web-page presented the 12 sentences in randomised order. 
Each sentence was accompanied by a small text input field in which participants 
were asked to type a brief description of the image that came to mind when reading 
the sentence. On completing this phase of the task, participants clicked a button to 
move on to a new page, which reiterated the 12 sentences together with the 
descriptions the participant had entered for each. Participants were instructed, 
―We‘re now going to remind you of the sentences you just read and the answers that 
you provided. For each of the answers you gave, all we would like you to do is 
clarify whether the event or action that you imagined was done on purpose or by 
accident.‖ To do so, participants selected the appropriate option from a list of options 
labelled ‗on purpose‘ and ‗by accident‘. Unlike in Study 5c, in the current study a 
‗not sure / cannot decide‘ option was also provided. This additional response option 
was included so that participants were not forced to choose one of the former options 
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if they felt unsure of their response, or of the task instructions. ‗Not sure‘ responses 
were excluded from analyses, avoiding the potential introduction of experimenter 
subjectivity in identifying or coding ambiguous items. 
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age, level of study, 
nationality, and whether English is their first language (data from non-native-
English-speakers were discarded). 
Procedure. The survey was administered via a computer-based interface. 
Some participants (approximately one-third of the sample) were tested in person 
using computer facilities at Goldsmiths, University of London. The remaining 
participants were recruited using emailed volunteer requests directed to current A-
Level and Postgraduate psychology students, with participants completing the study 
remotely by accessing the survey online. To avoid priming ideas of conspiracy 
theories, the word ‗conspiracy‘ was not mentioned in the information sheet presented 
to participants prior to filling in the questionnaire. No time limit was given, though 
participants were asked to work quickly, answering with their first instincts. 
 
Results 
Data screening and descriptives. No cases were missing data for more than 
two items on the GCB, IDAQ, or intentional inferences measures; thus, none were 
excluded. No multivariate outliers were identified. 
 A mean GCB score was calculated for each participant. Scores were 
approximately normally distributed. On the whole, participants demonstrated slight 
scepticism towards conspiracist ideas (M = 2.71, SD = 0.86). Males and females did 
not differ in terms of conspiracist ideation (t(83) = 0.76, p = .45, d = 0.17). There was 
no significant correlation between conspiracist ideation and age (r(84) = -.19, p = 
.09). 
In addition, a mean IDAQ score was calculated for each participant. Scores 
showed slight positive skew (skewness = 0.42). Participants were generally 
somewhat disinclined to anthropomorphise, evident from a grand mean slightly 
below the mid-point of the scale (M = 3.54, SD = 1.55). 
Finally, an intentionality score was calculated for each participant by 
summing the number of intentional inferences made in response to the 12 ambiguous 
sentences. Where participants were missing an item or had selected the ‗not sure‘ 
response option for an item their total was adjusted by dividing the number of 
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intentional attributions by the total number of valid items and multiplying by 12, to 
give a score comparable to participants with valid data for all 12 items. Again, 
participants generally interpreted significantly more than half (M = 7.75, SD = 2.41) 
of the ambiguous sentences as being intentional actions (t(85) = 6.70, p < .001, d = 
0.65). The data were approximately normally distributed about the mean, with scores 
ranging from 1 to 12. 
Associations between conspiracist ideation, anthropomorphisation, and 
intentionality inferences. There was no significant association between intentional 
inferences and anthropomorphism (r(84) = -.10, p = .37); participants who indicated 
higher levels of anthropomorphism were no more likely to interpret the ambiguous 
sentences as intentional. 
To examine the relationships between these two variables and conspiracist 
ideation, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with anthropomorphism and 
intentional inferences as predictors and GCB scores as the criterion. Overall, the 
model was significant and explained a considerable amount of variance (F(2, 83) = 
27.72, p < .001, Adj. R
2
 = .39). Both predictors contributed significantly to the model 
(see Table 4.1). The relationship between intentional inferences and conspiracist 
ideation was positive and weak, while the relationship between anthropomorphism 
and conspiracist ideation was positive and more substantial.  
 
Table 4.1. Results of multiple regression with intentional inferences 
and anthropomorphism predicting conspiracist ideation. 
Predictor β t p 
Anthropomorphism .62 7.29 < .001 
Intentional inferences .19 2.22 < .05 
 
Discussion 
 This study aimed to investigate the inter-relationships between conspiracist 
ideation, individual differences in anthropomorphism, and bias towards inferences of 
intentionality. Contrary to expectations, no association was found between individual 
differences in anthropomorphism and biased intentionality inferences. Individuals 
who offered a greater number of intentional interpretations in response to imagined 
ambiguous scenarios were not more inclined towards anthropomorphism. 
Conversely, individuals relatively low in trait-anthropomorphism were not more 
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likely to interpret the ambiguous scenarios as accidental. The absence of a direct 
relationship between anthropomorphism and biased inferences of intentionality 
suggests that anthropomorphism is not simply a product of biased inferences of 
intentionality. Rather, the two measures appear to reflect conceptually distinct traits. 
Neither is the relationship between anthropomorphism and conspiracism 
mediated by biased intentionality inferences, or vice versa. Multiple regression 
analysis suggested that both traits independently predicted conspiracist ideation, with 
higher scores on both measures predicting stronger conspiracist ideation. The 
relationship between intentionality inferences and conspiracism was small, only 
verging on statistical significance. However, the successful replication and 
comparable effect size to that observed in Study 5c suggest that the relationship, 
while small, is reliable. The relationship between anthropomorphism and 
conspiracism, on the other hand, was stronger. The magnitude of the relationship is 
consistent with Study 7, as well as previous research (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2013), again suggesting that this relationship is reliable. 
Given the lack of association between biased intentionality judgements and 
anthropomorphism, and the independent predictive value of each in regards to 
conspiracist ideation, it appears that anthropomorphism, as measured in the current 
study, reflects something other than a general preference for attributions of 
intentionality. One possibility is that, rather than invoking low-level processes 
relevant to judgements of intentionality, anthropomorphisation (or at least explicit 
endorsement of anthropomorphic statements) is more closely related to general trait-
openness, particularly towards certain kinds of New Age beliefs (Newheiser et al., 
2011). This possibility is discussed in more detail in the General discussion section 
of the current chapter. 
In sum, the findings of the current study provide additional support for the 
existence of an association between conspiracism and biased inferences of 
intentionality, as well as between conspiracism and anthropomorphisation. However, 
the latter relationship cannot be explained in terms of a general bias towards 
inferences of intentionality. This study is not equipped to fully elucidate the factors 
underlying these relationships, or the absence of a relationship between 
anthropomorphism and intentionality inferences. Further research is required to 
investigate what other cognitive or personality factors might influence these inter-
relationships. 
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General discussion 
This series of studies was guided by the speculation that the 
representativeness heuristic may serve to make claims postulating intentionality more 
plausible to individuals who are biased towards seeing intentionality as the primary 
cause of events in the world in general (see Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Petrican & 
Burris, 2012; Rosset, 2008). Thus, it was hypothesised that conspiracy theories, 
which paint events almost exclusively as the product of the conspirators‘ intentions, 
may appear especially plausible to individuals who are prone to promiscuous 
attributions of intentionality. The findings of the four studies offer some support for 
this hypothesis, but suggest important caveats.  
First, the findings of Studies 5c and 8 indicate an association between 
conspiracist ideation and inferences of intentionality – that is, attributions of 
intentionality in response to imagined ambiguous actions, such as ―He set the house 
on fire.‖ Both studies revealed a small but seemingly reliable association, whereby 
individuals who are relatively more inclined to interpret ambiguous imagined actions 
as intentional are more likely to endorse generic conspiracist statements. Conversely, 
individuals more inclined to interpret ambiguous actions as accidental are more 
likely to reject conspiracist ideas. This is consistent with the speculated relationship 
between promiscuous attributions of intentionality and belief in conspiracy theories. 
However, Study 6 suggests that the same is not true of perceived 
intentionality – that is, attributions of intentionality in response to observed actions. 
When bias towards perceiving an observed action as intended was measured by way 
of an ambiguous videos task, in which participants viewed a person performing an 
ambiguous movement, the number of intentional attributions a participant offered 
was not associated with their endorsement of conspiracist statements. 
One potential explanation for these seemingly incongruous findings is that 
the relationship between attitudes towards conspiracy theories and judgements of 
intentionality is more nuanced than initially hypothesised. There may be crucial 
differences between perceptions and inferences of intentionality. While research to 
date has not explicitly addressed this possibility, there is some potentially relevant 
evidence suggesting that perceptions and inferences are dissociable when it comes to 
judgements of physical causality. Using stimuli which produce an illusion of 
physical causality (see Michotte, 1963), Schlottmann and Shanks (1992) report that 
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participants were able to correctly infer the true cause of a simple action; however, 
these inferences did not alter their perception of what caused the action. That is, 
factors which influence inferences of physical causality do not necessarily affect 
perceptions of what caused an action (see also Johnston, 2013). 
These findings lend some plausibility to the speculation that inferences and 
perceptions of intentionality – a form of social causality – might also be dissociable. 
That is, factors which influence perceptions of intentionality may not influence 
inferences of intentionality, and vice versa. The current studies suggest that, while 
both perceptions and inferences of intentionality appear to be biased towards 
intentional attributions, only inferences were associated with elevated conspiracist 
ideation. Given that reasoning about conspiracies necessitates inferring the 
conspirators‘ actions and motives, rather than directly observing their behaviour6, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that, if inferences and perceptions of intentionality are 
dissociable, only the former would be associated with conspiracist beliefs.  
Moreover, the measurement devices used in the current research may have 
accentuated any differences between inference and perception. The task of observing 
and reasoning about a simple finger movement (Study 6) offers few potential clues to 
base judgements upon. On the other hand, asking participants to imagine a more 
complex scenario, such as a person setting fire to a house (Studies 5c and 8), affords 
scope for more detailed speculation about the actor‘s potential motives. These 
speculations may be more susceptible to influence by the participant‘s prior views on 
the world, such as whether people‘s motives are generally malicious or benevolent, 
for example. With this in mind, perhaps the perceptual bias measured in Study 6 is 
relatively indiscriminate, and thus unrelated to other personality factors or abstract 
attitudes, while the inferential bias measured in Studies 5c and 8 is more open to 
influence by confounding factors.  
In this way, the relationship between conspiracism and inferences of 
intentionality may not be as simple as this chapter initially hypothesised. Rather than 
simply reflecting an automatic representativeness heuristic, the relationship between 
inferences of intentionality and conspiracism may be mediated by other 
                                                 
6
 Though the consequences of their actions may be observed. For instance, the collapse of World 
Trade Center buildings 1, 2, and 7 was broadcast on live television news, and has since been viewed 
by millions of people via video recordings. However, the postulated conspiratorial behaviour which 
brought about those consequences can, by definition, not have been observed by anyone not involved 
in the conspiracy. Thus, the actual behaviour of the alleged conspirators must be imagined.  
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psychological variables. However, this postulated dissociation between perception 
and inferences is meant only as a tentative conjecture meant to guide future research, 
rather than to definitively explain the current findings. The current studies do not 
allow this hypothesis to be either confirmed or rejected.  
Another possibility is that the measure of biased perceptions of intentionality 
employed by Study 6 simply failed to produce a valid assessment of individual 
differences in preference for intentional explanations. Moreover, the power of the 
statistical analyses may have been reduced by the sample, which was somewhat 
skewed towards disbelief in conspiracy theories. To investigate these possibilities, 
future research must first assess perceived and inferred intentionality in conjunction. 
If the two are truly dissociable, then the measures should not correlate, and should 
predict different outcomes. Going further, research may aim to study intentionality 
inferences in conjunction with other potentially relevant motivational, personality, or 
situational factors in order to reveal any moderating or mediating variables. To take 
one example, research suggests that the motivation to seek forms of compensatory 
control may influence judgements of intentionality (Kay et al., 2010, 2009; Whitson 
& Galinsky, 2008). 
Looking beyond the measures of inferred and perceived intentionality, Study 
7 found evidence that individuals relatively high in trait-anthropomorphism are more 
likely to entertain conspiracy theories. This is consistent with previous studies, which 
have found a similarly sized moderate correlation (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2013). It was initially speculated that this may be a result of 
anthropomorphism merely reflecting another product of the bias towards inferences 
of intentionality. However, Study 8, which looked at the two measures in 
conjunction, found no evidence of a relationship between the measures of 
anthropomorphism and biased inferences of intentionality. Both traits independently 
predicted conspiracist ideation. Thus, anthropomorphism cannot be explained as a 
product of biased inferences of intentionality.  
One potential explanation for this is that anthropomorphism, as measured in 
the current studies, reflects an individual‘s broad attitude towards the world and 
people‘s place in it, as opposed to reflecting a low-level bias towards seeking 
intentionality. Previous studies have found conspiracism to correlate with traits 
reflecting openness to unusual ideas (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011, 2013). 
In particular, one study reports an association between conspiracism and 
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endorsement of New Age ideas (Newheiser et al., 2011). There is some possible 
conceptual overlap between measures of New Age beliefs and anthropomorphism. 
The IDAQ (Waytz et al., 2010), used in the current research, asks ―To what extent 
does the wind have intentions,‖ for example. Participants may interpret this as 
reflecting the same sentiment as some New Age beliefs, such as ―The whole cosmos 
is an unbroken living whole…‖ (Newheiser et al., 2011, p. 1009). Future research 
may examine anthropomorphism in conjunction with a variety of other beliefs, such 
as New Age beliefs and religiosity, in order to establish the inter-relationships 
between these belief systems. 
In considering the limitations of the current research, it is important to note 
the size of the reported relationships. The association between anthropomorphism 
and conspiracism was reasonably strong (Studies 7 and 8). However, the relationship 
between conspiracism and biased inferences of intentionality, at least using the 
ambiguous sentences task adapted from Rosset (2008), was small (Studies 5c and 8). 
Both effects only bordered on the traditional statistical significance criterion of p < 
.05. However, the fact that the effect was replicated using an independent sample 
suggests that it is reliable. 
Even if the relationship is reliable, however, the question of whether it is 
meaningful remains. Comparing the strongest believers with the strongest 
nonbelievers, Study 5c found a difference of just over 1 item out of 12 on the 
ambiguous sentences task. The effect size observed in Study 8 was of a similar 
magnitude. This would seem to indicate that biases in inferring intentionality play a 
role in conspiracist ideation, but perhaps not a prominent role. Indeed, the current 
findings indicate that the relationship might be relatively less meaningful when 
considering only people who fall in the middle of the normal distribution, somewhere 
between mild scepticism and mild acceptance of conspiracy theories. Study 5c 
showed that the middle two quartiles of the sample did not differ substantially in the 
likelihood of intentional attributions. The difference was only meaningful when 
comparing the subset of the sample at the extreme ends of the bell-curve – those who 
profess stronger belief or disbelief. Yet, it must be borne in mind that the measure of 
biased inferences employed in the current research merely presented 12 opportunities 
to infer intent. Daily life, on the other hand, presents many opportunities to infer 
intentionality on a daily basis. Thus, if the observed bias pervades reasoning about all 
ambiguous imagined actions, then even a small bias could amount to an important 
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difference. Further research using more sensitive measures of intentionality biases is 
recommended. 
A final significant limitation of the current research is that it is entirely 
correlational, and therefore cannot establish the causal direction of the relationships. 
This chapter was based on the speculation that a domain-general bias towards 
attributions of intentionality causes conspiracy theories to be evaluated more 
positively, due to the representativeness heuristic making explanations which offer 
the most intendedness appear especially plausible. This seems a reasonable 
speculation, given evidence that the intentionality bias is a low-level, intrinsic aspect 
of the cognitive system (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Rosset, 2008). However, the 
current research does not demonstrate this causal relationship; it merely demonstrates 
an association between an inferential bias and conspiracist ideation. An alternative 
possibility is that believing that the world is dominated by conspiracy primes an 
individual to evaluate any imagined scenario, even outside the context of conspiracy, 
in terms of intentional agency. Only research taking an experimental approach can 
establish the direction of causality. Future research may seek to establish whether 
manipulating the intentionality bias, perhaps via cognitive load (see Bègue et al., 
2010; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Rosset, 2008), has a direct effect on endorsement of 
conspiracy theories. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
The studies reported in this chapter provide qualified support for the 
hypothesis that endorsement of conspiracy theories is associated with promiscuous 
attributions of intentionality. While biased attributions based on perceived actions 
did not correlate with conspiracism, biased attributions based on inferred actions did 
reliably correlate with conspiracism in two studies. Anthropomorphism, too, was 
found to reliably correlate with conspiracist ideation; however, anthropomorphism 
does not appear to simply reflect the same bias towards intentional attributions.  
Together with the results of Study 5b, as well as several prior studies (Douglas & 
Sutton, 2011; LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; McHoskey, 
1995; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), the current studies provide further evidence for 
the role of cognitive biases – particularly the representativeness heuristic – in the 
formation or maintenance of conspiracist beliefs. It would be premature and 
reductive to say that endorsement of conspiracy theories is driven primarily by low-
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level cognitive biases or heuristics. However, this research suggests that such biases 
may play a small role in making conspiracy theories appear more plausible. In this 
way, conspiracy theorising may not be a deviation from normal thinking, but rather 
an inevitable byproduct of normal cognitive processes. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
 
Purposes and key findings of the present research 
 
Background and rationale 
 Much of the contemporary academic literature on the phenomenon of 
conspiracy theorising stems from Hofstadter (1964). In a seminal essay, Hofstadter 
describes the key features of what he refers to as ‗the paranoid style in American 
politics‘. He argues that this is a style of thinking specific to fringe movements, and 
characterised by extreme paranoia, delusional thinking, ―heated exaggeration, 
suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy‖ (p. 77). Much of the ensuing academic 
literature emanated from the fields of sociology and, more recently, social 
psychology. Inspired by Hofstadter (1964), this work largely views endorsement of 
conspiracy theories as a product of social and motivational factors, assuming 
conspiracist ideation to be limited to a relatively small number of people on the 
margins of respectable society.  
According to this view, conspiracism results from an imbalance of social 
power and lack of knowledge or understanding. Individuals or groups who feel 
ostracised or persecuted by mainstream society, or find themselves unable to exercise 
political influence or achieve personal goals, may be drawn towards conspiracy 
theories as a means of rationalising their circumstances, maintaining self-esteem, 
fostering in-group solidarity, and expressing negative sentiment towards out-groups 
(see Bartlett & Miller, 2010; Swami & Furnham, 2014). In this way, conspiracism 
reflects an attempt to make sense of the complex and chaotic reality of everyday life. 
By offering disenfranchised individuals the potential to identify and personify the 
source of otherwise inexplicable and troubling events, conspiracy theories might 
appeal to powerful psychological needs, negating the aversive feelings which can 
accompany powerlessness and lack of comprehension (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).  
These ideas are supported by empirical data. As the literature review in 
Chapter 1 detailed, conspiracy theories appear to be endorsed more strongly by racial 
minorities, suggesting that such theories can help members of disadvantaged 
populations to make sense of their marginalised position in society (e.g. Abalakina-
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Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Stempel et al., 2007). Likewise, correlational and 
experimental findings demonstrate that people experiencing diminished self-efficacy 
may entertain conspiracy theories in order to restore their sense of understanding and 
control (e.g. Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008). 
Thus, Hofstadter‘s (1964) treatise on conspiracy theories, and the ensuing 
sociological and social psychological research (see Swami & Furnham, 2014), has 
doubtless elucidated many important facets of conspiracism. However, as Walker 
(2013) points out, this conception of conspiracy theories fails to grasp the scale of the 
phenomenon. Far from being the purview only of a small handful of powerless, 
delusional paranoiacs on the margins of society, conspiracy theories are a 
mainstream pursuit. While those on the outskirts of respectable society do engage in 
conspiracy theorising, just as often it is those in the relative position of power and 
privilege who cast allegations of conspiracy against those around them. Likewise, 
conspiracy theories are prevalent not only during times of social inequality and 
hardship, but also during times of relative comfort and equality (see Walker, 2013). 
Consistent with this, surveys show that substantial numbers of people endorse 
various conspiracy theories, amounting in some cases, such as in relation to the 
assassination of President Kennedy, to the majority of the population (Goertzel, 
1994). 
The ubiquity and pervasiveness of conspiracy theories suggests that they 
cannot be explained solely as a result of social inequality, powerlessness, and the 
desire to rationalise adversity (though these factors doubtless play a role in some 
conspiracist beliefs). Rather, the genesis of conspiracism may lie in more universal 
aspects of human cognition. Theories about conspiracies may be plausible and 
appealing to so many people, both as potential explanations for real world events and 
simply as entertaining narratives in mainstream fiction (Knight, 2000), because they 
resonate with cognitive biases and illusions to which everyone is susceptible.  
Given the relative dearth of psychological research investigating this 
question, it was this possibility that the current thesis aimed to investigate. The few 
studies which have broached this hypothesis to date provide preliminary support for 
the role of cognitive biases in conspiracist ideation. As detailed in Chapter 1, 
proportionality (Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; McCauley & 
Jacques, 1979), projection (Douglas & Sutton, 2011), pattern recognition (Whitson & 
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Galinsky, 2008), and confirmation biases (McHoskey, 1995) have all been 
demonstrated to aid in the formation or maintenance of conspiracist beliefs.  
Aiming to extend upon these findings, and given the conceptual overlap 
between conspiracy theories and other anomalous beliefs, such as supernatural, 
pseudoscientific, and religious beliefs, the present thesis elected to take prior 
research into anomalous beliefs as a starting point. In particular, research suggests 
that one cognitive factor underlying some anomalous beliefs is the 
representativeness heuristic (Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002). The representativeness 
heuristic is an automatic cognitive rule of thumb whereby it is assumed that ‗like 
causes like‘. This can result in a number of distinct systematic biases. One such bias 
is the proportionality bias, referring to the assumption that significant events have 
proportionally significant causes (see Ebel-Lam et al., 2010; LeBoeuf & Norton, 
2012; Spina et al., 2010). A second bias is known as the conjunction fallacy, 
referring to the misperception that the co-occurrence of two events is more probable 
than either event occurring alone (Fisk, 2004). Finally, representativeness may cause 
intentional explanations for ambiguous events to appear more plausible than 
nonintentional explanations (see Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, 2004), due to 
the intentionality bias (Rosset, 2008). 
Evidence indicates that each of these biases may make supernatural 
explanations appear more plausible than naturalistic explanations in certain 
circumstances or for certain people, particularly for events of large magnitude, 
conjunctive events, and explanations invoking supernatural intentionality (Gilovich 
& Savitsky, 2002; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, 2004; Lupfer & Layman, 
1996; Rogers et al., 2009, 2011). As noted, a small amount of research indicates that 
the proportionality bias may play a similar role in reasoning about the existence of 
conspiracies; conspiracy theories pertain to events of large magnitude, offering a 
proportionally large, and thus intuitively plausible, causal attribution (LeBoeuf & 
Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). Given that conspiracy theories concern 
conjunctive events and postulate intentional agency as a primary cause, there is 
reason to suspect that the conjunction fallacy and biases concerning attributions of 
intentionality may also play a role in the adoption of conspiracist beliefs. With this in 
mind, Chapters 3 and 4 aimed to provide a systematic investigation of the role of the 
representativeness heuristic and several of its resultant biases in conspiracist ideation. 
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Before embarking upon this series of studies, however, it was necessary to 
explore the issue of measuring belief in conspiracy theories. Several scales 
measuring conspiracist ideation exist in the literature; however, the various measures 
entail several practical and theoretical limitations. The item selection process for 
existing measures has been seemingly arbitrary and, with only one recent exception 
(Bruder et al., 2013), no measure has been subjected to the extensive psychometric 
validation required of psychological measurement devices. Further, no measure has 
been adopted by researchers other than its creators. Moreover, most existing 
measures take the approach of assessing endorsement of a small selection of specific 
event-based conspiracy theories, such as the death of President John F. Kennedy and 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This approach compromises content validity and potentially 
restricts the practical utility of such scales to certain geopolitical or temporal contexts 
where the chosen theories are culturally relevant. With this in mind, the series of 
studies reported in Chapter 2 aimed to design and validate a novel measure which 
would be suitable for use in a wide range of empirical contexts, including the 
subsequent studies in this thesis. Importantly, this novel measure was designed to 
assess generic conspiracist ideation – that is, endorsement of non-event-based 
conspiracist statements – thereby providing a measure of more practical utility than 
existing measures. 
 
Key findings 
In total, the studies reported in Chapter 2 suggest that the newly created 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale is a valid and useful measure of 
conspiracist ideation. Study 1 detailed the process of item selection. A large pool of 
generic conspiracist items was created, designed to reflect a wide variety of 
conspiracy theories. Crucially, however, each item was removed from the context of 
any specific real-world events or entities by using generic descriptors such as 
―certain events‖ and ―the government‖. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) indicated 
that negatively worded items functioned differently from positively worded items. 
Following elimination of negatively worded items, EFA revealed five conceptually 
meaningful factors, thought to reflect the key generic assumptions which underlie 
beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. These factors were labelled Government 
Malfeasance, Malevolent Global, Extraterrestrial Cover-up, Personal Well-being, and 
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Control of Information. On the basis of these findings, the final 15-item GCB scale 
was created, with 3 items referring to each of the identified factors. 
Three subsequent studies provide evidence for the psychometric validity of 
the scale. First, Study 2 demonstrated that GCB scores reliably predict endorsement 
of specific event-based conspiracy theories, including a novel theory. In addition, 
this study showed that GCB scores are longitudinally reliable over an interval of five 
weeks. Study 3 demonstrated that the GCB possesses convergent validity. Consistent 
with previous findings (e.g. Darwin et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994), GCB scores were 
associated with distrust, anomie, delusional ideation, and belief in the paranormal. 
Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that the GCB possesses discriminant validity. As 
expected, GCB scores were not associated with Sensation Seeking, Emotional 
Intelligence, or the Big-5 personality facets of extraversion and neuroticism. Prior 
evidence regarding an association between conspiracism and the Big-5 facets of 
openness and agreeableness is somewhat mixed (see Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Swami 
et al., 2010, 2013); the current research did not find a relationship between these 
traits. A small relationship was found between conspiracist ideation and 
conscientiousness; in total, however, the findings demonstrate that conspiracist 
ideation cannot be explained purely in terms of the Big-5 or the other traits examined 
in this study. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present the first use of the GCB to examine the relationships 
between conspiracist ideation and cognitive biases, specifically focusing on the 
representativeness heuristic. Together, the studies reported in Chapters 3 and 4 
provide mixed evidence regarding three representativeness biases – the 
proportionality bias, the conjunction fallacy, and bias towards attributions of 
intentionality. 
First, Study 5a set out to extend upon previous research concerning the 
proportionality bias. Three previous studies have found that conspiratorial 
explanations are preferred for events of large magnitude, such as the successful 
assassination of a president (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; 
McCauley & Jacques, 1979). These prior studies all employed dichotomous 
manipulations (small vs. large magnitude events). The present study extended upon 
this by adding a third (intermediate) magnitude condition. The number of deaths 
resulting from a fictional terrorist bombing constituted the magnitude manipulation. 
It was hypothesised that conspiracist attributions would be more likely as the 
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magnitude of the alleged death toll increased. Contrary to expectations, however, no 
proportionality effect was observed; the magnitude of the reported consequences had 
no effect on endorsement of conspiracist attributions. However, endorsement of 
conspiratorial explanations correlated with prior conspiracist ideation. While this 
does not support the proportionality hypothesis, it is consistent with previous 
research indicating that endorsement of a novel conspiracy theory is predicted by an 
individual‘s general level of conspiracist ideation (Swami et al., 2011). It is unclear 
whether these findings represent a failure of the current stimuli to evoke the 
proportionality bias, or genuinely cast doubt upon prior findings. 
Study 5b centred on the conjunction fallacy. Previous research has shown 
individual differences in susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy to be associated 
with belief in the paranormal (Rogers et al., 2009, 2011). Given that conspiracist 
narratives depend upon conjunctive events being subsumed into a singular causal 
narrative, Study 5b aimed to examine whether susceptibility to the conjunction 
fallacy also correlates with belief in conspiracy theories. The results were consistent 
with this hypothesis. Conspiracy-believers made a greater number of conjunction 
errors, both for conspiracy-themed conjunction items, as well as neutral conjunction 
items. This suggests that susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy is domain general. 
Individuals generally susceptible to the fallacy may be more accepting of conspiracy 
theories because conspiracist explanations are representative of a world in which 
causally related conjunctive events are commonplace. 
Finally, Chapter 4 presented a series of studies guided by the hypothesis that 
individuals who tend to interpret ambiguous events as having been brought about 
intentionally will view conspiracy theories as more representative, and thus more 
plausible, than nonconspiracist explanations. Support for this hypothesis was mixed. 
First, Study 5c found a small relationship whereby individuals who tend to infer 
intentionality when reasoning about imagined events tend to endorse conspiracy 
theories slightly more strongly. Second, however, Study 6 found that the same was 
not true of perceived intentionality; no relationship was found between participants‘ 
tendency to explain an ambiguous observed event as intentional and their degree of 
conspiracist ideation. These seemingly incompatible findings may reflect a 
dissociation between inferential and perceptual intentionality-seeking processes. As 
conspiracies must be imagined, rather than perceived, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
only biases in inferential processes are reliably associated with conspiracist ideation. 
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However, this potential explanation remains speculative. Further, Study 7 found an 
association between individual differences in anthropomorphism and conspiracist 
ideation, consistent with previous findings (Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 
2013). However, Study 8 found that this relationship cannot be explained as a result 
of inferential intentionality biases causing both anthropomorphism and conspiracism. 
Rather, both anthropomorphism and biased inferences of intentionality appear to 
contribute independently towards conspiracist ideation. 
 
Summary and implications 
Measurement issues. The demonstration of content, criterion-related, 
convergent, and discriminant validity indicates that the GCB is as least as 
psychometrically valid as any existing measure. Together with one recently 
published similar scale (the CMQ: Bruder et al., 2013), the present findings prove 
that assessing generic conspiracist beliefs is a valid approach towards the 
measurement of conspiracist ideation. Further, the GCB is the only measure to date 
for which the entire item selection process, as well as psychometric validation, has 
been detailed in full. The practical advantages of taking a non-event-based 
assessment approach make the GCB a potentially preferable measurement device for 
researchers aiming to measure general conspiracist ideation, making the scale a 
valuable contribution to the literature on conspiracy theories. 
In addition, the measurement aspect of the present thesis advances theoretical 
understanding of the structure of conspiracist ideation. Recent research suggested 
that beliefs in specific conspiracy theories of real-world events are the product of 
more generic assumptions about the world (Wood et al., 2012). The current findings 
offer a more detailed insight into the key assumptions which drive endorsement of 
specific conspiracy theories. Specifically, Study 1 identified five fundamental facets 
of conspiracism – belief that governments routinely conspire against their own 
people; belief that small groups of people secretly manipulate world events; belief 
that the existence of extraterrestrials is being covered up; belief that one‘s own health 
and liberty is threatened by conspiratorial activity; and belief that important 
knowledge in the public interest is suppressed out of self-interest. These facets are 
not intended to reflect distinct varieties of real-world conspiracy theory – many 
theories merge aspects of all five components. Rather, the five factors are argued to 
reflect five key intercorrelated assumptions about how the world works which 
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together constitute an individual‘s level of conspiracist ideation. These assumptions 
then influence judgments about events that take place in the world; the likelihood of 
an individual endorsing any specific conspiracist account is determined by the degree 
to which they accept these underlying generic conspiracist assumptions. 
The data gathered using the GCB have potential implications for 
understanding of the prevalence of conspiracist ideation in the general population. 
The descriptive data for most studies in the current thesis indicate that generic 
conspiracist ideation is approximately normally distributed in the population, with an 
overall mean score just slightly below the mid-point of the scale. This indicates that, 
on average, people tend to be ambivalent towards the possible existence of grandiose 
conspiracies, neither strongly accepting nor strongly rejecting the possibility that 
insidious conspiratorial activity is routine. This is true of samples of university 
students, as well as the general public, suggesting that demographic characteristics 
and level of education matter little in determining an individual‘s proclivity to 
entertain conspiracy theories. Given that the majority of the population is inclined 
neither to uncritically accept nor outright dismiss the potential existence of grand 
conspiracies in general, it is perhaps unsurprising that popular opinion surveys find 
that large numbers of people express at least some degree of endorsement of many 
specific conspiracy theories, despite the fact that evidence in favour of the theories is, 
in many cases, scant (e.g. Birdwell & Littler, 2011; Gardiner & Thompson, 2012; 
Williams, 2013). 
The role of cognitive biases. The current findings regarding the role of the 
representativeness heuristic are somewhat mixed, but supportive of certain 
representativeness biases playing a role in conspiracist ideation. To summarise the 
findings, susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy was associated with conspiracist 
ideation; biased inferences of intentionality were associated with conspiracism, but 
biased perceptions of intentionality were not; and the proportionality bias was not 
found to influence novel conspiracist attributions.  
The positive findings regarding intentionality and the conjunction fallacy are 
correlational, and so cannot establish the direction of causality. However, given that 
such biases are thought to be low-level, automatic, and largely domain-general 
cognitive processes (Ebel-Lam et al., 2010; Fisk, 2004; Rogers et al., 2009), it seems 
reasonable to suggest a tentative causal explanation whereby the biases serve to 
make conspiracy theories appear more plausible. Specifically, it appears that there is 
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a small tendency for conspiracy theories to be considered more plausible by people 
who are more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy, and by those who are more 
biased towards inferring intentionality. It is unclear whether the failure to find a 
proportionality effect challenges previous findings (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman 
& Cinnirella, 2007) or whether the current experimental design simply failed to 
evoke the bias. Further research is required to fully elucidate the precise conditions 
under which the representativeness heuristic and its resultant biases are evoked. 
In total, the positive findings concerning the conjunction fallacy and biased 
attributions of intentionality tentatively imply that incorporating conspiracist ideation 
into the wider theoretical framework of anomalistic psychology is a promising 
approach. This framework may help to advance research into conspiracism by 
yielding productive hypotheses; the hypothesised links between conspiracism, the 
conjunction fallacy, and biased attributions of intentionality were novel predictions 
stemming from a theoretical framework in which conspiracist ideation is driven by 
the same underlying cognitive architecture that produces other anomalous beliefs 
(see French & Stone, 2014). The current research is not the first to suggest that 
conspiracy theories can be usefully conceptualised in terms of broader anomalistic 
beliefs. One recent article advocates a broader theoretical approach linking 
conspiracism and religiosity (Franks et al., 2013). However, the current thesis 
provides the first empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive factors which may 
lead to paranormal, supernatural, or religious beliefs are also associated with beliefs 
in conspiracy theories. 
These findings concerning the conceptual links between conspiracy theories 
and other anomalous beliefs perhaps go some way towards explaining the mixed 
findings concerning trait-openness which have emerged in the literature. Belief in 
conspiracy theories has been found to correlate reliably with superstitious, 
paranormal, and New Age beliefs (Darwin et al., 2011; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; 
Newheiser et al., 2011; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami et al., 2011). There are some 
suggestions that these relationships may be mediated by general trait-openness 
towards new and unusual ideas (e.g. Swami et al., 2010). However, research 
examining correlations between conspiracist ideation and the Big-5 inventory has 
produced somewhat mixed findings, with some studies reporting a small relationship 
with openness and other studies failing to find the same link (Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; 
Swami et al., 2013, 2010). The current findings suggest that the relationship between 
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conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs is perhaps explicable not in terms of 
domain-general trait-openness as assessed by the Big-5, but primarily in terms of the 
operation of automatic, nonconscious biases which serve to make certain kinds of 
anomalous claim appear more plausible. 
A broad perspective of cognitive biases suggests that being biased in certain 
systematic ways may be an evolved, adaptive trait (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). In 
evolutionary terms, the costs of being biased towards ‗false positives‘ (the detection 
of meaningful patterns or threats where none exist) are often lesser than the costs 
‗false negatives‘ (failure to detect real patterns or threats). Seen in these terms, the 
current findings imply that conspiracy theories, together with other anomalous 
beliefs, may be a byproduct of how the human cognitive system evolved to reason 
about the world. The occasional detection of an imagined conspiracy may be one 
(usually relatively minor) cost of a cognitive system which is hypersensitive to 
potential threats and meaningful relationships. Boyer (2003) argues that religiosity 
may reflect ―not a dramatic departure from, but a predictable byproduct of, ordinary 
cognitive function‖ (p. 119). The current findings suggest that the same may be said 
of conspiracy theories. 
 
Research limitations 
The research reported in this thesis is not without limitations. A primary 
limitation of the studies reported throughout this thesis concerns the 
representativeness of the participant samples, and thus the generalisability of the 
current findings. Due to the limited resources available to conduct the current 
research, it was not possible to randomly sample participants from the general 
population. In order to confidently generalise the current findings to the general 
population as a whole, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the participants who 
took part in the current research were representative of the wider population in all 
salient characteristics. However, some studies exclusively employed samples of 
university students. This is a common practice in psychological research, but one 
likely to lead to unrepresentative sampling. Other studies in the current thesis 
attempted to recruit a broader sample drawn from the general adult population. 
However, even in these cases, participants were ultimately self-selected, and various 
participant characteristics were not assessed.  
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Thus, it is not possible to say with certainty that the participant samples 
reflect the general population in terms of demographic characteristics such as race, 
ethnicity, level of education, socioeconomic status. Given that various studies have 
found that demographic characteristics such as these have little predicative power in 
respect to conspiracist ideation (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et al., 1999; 
Darwin et al., 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Herek & Capitanio, 1994; Jolley & Douglas, 
2013; Parsons et al., 1999; Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Stempel et al., 2007; Swami 
et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Swami & Furnham, 2012), this could perhaps be considered 
a limitation of minor importance. Indeed, when age, gender, or nationality 
differences were examined in the current studies, differences were small or 
statistically nonsignificant. 
Perhaps of more concern, it is not possible to say with certainty that the 
samples employed in the current research reflect the entire spectrum of variation in 
conspiracist ideation or familiarity with conspiracy theories. Concerning the studies 
which employed student samples, it is possible that university students differ from 
the general population in terms of conspiracist ideation. Moreover, several studies 
recruited self-selected participants via social media and emailing lists operated by 
psychologists engaged in anomalistic psychological research. It is possible that 
targeting individuals with an existing interest in anomalistic psychology introduced a 
bias among study participants towards disbelief in conspiracy theories. In order to 
counterbalance this potential bias, efforts were made in some studies to target 
recruitment messaging towards individuals potentially more sympathetic towards 
conspiracy theories, by posting messages on conspiracy theory web forums. 
However, whether because of biased recruitment messaging, biased self-selection 
responding, or a genuine bias towards disbelief in the population, disbelief was 
overrepresented within the current samples. This is likely to have weakened the 
statistical power of the studies to detect genuine relationships, and limits the 
generalisability of the findings. 
 A related limitation regards the meaningfulness of the findings presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4, concerning potential differences between ‗believers‘ and 
‗nonbelievers‘. The majority of participants indicated either mild disbelief, 
uncertainty, or mild belief. The relative under-representation of participants at the 
two extremes of belief – especially the lack of strong believers – may have limited 
the power of statistical analyses. In the case of the conjunction fallacy, inferences of 
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intentionality, and anthropomorphism, small but significant linear correlations with 
conspiracist ideation were observed. However, linear trends analysis in Study 5c 
suggested that the relationships may be driven by differences primarily between 
individuals at the extreme ends of the samples – that is, those who indicate relatively 
strong belief or disbelief. Thus, the observed relationships not may serve to 
distinguish mild believers from mild sceptics; rather, the relationships may apply 
most meaningfully to distinguishing stronger believers from stronger nonbelievers. 
Given the relatively small number of participants who fell into these categories, it is 
possible that the relationships observed in the current research are spurious, resulting 
from a small and unrepresentative self-selected group of responders. Likewise, it is 
not possible to confidently state that the observed effect sizes are a true 
representation of the magnitude of effects, if they exist, in the general population. 
Turning to methodological limitations of particular studies within the current 
thesis, a specific limitation of the research reported in Chapter 2, detailing the 
creation and validation of the GCB, is the lack of cross-cultural comparisons. A goal 
in creating the GCB was to produce a measure which, by referring to generic 
conspiracist assumptions rather than specific event-based conspiracy theories, would 
be suitable for cross-cultural use. To this end, the samples employed in Studies 1, 3, 
and 4 were composed of participants representing a range of nationalities and 
ethnicities. However, no specific efforts were made to target participants based on 
nationality or other demographic considerations, and no comparisons were made 
between nationalities or cultures. Moreover, the surveys were presented only in 
English, thus ruling out non-English speakers, and online, ruling out people without 
access to a computer and the Internet. 
The extent to which this compromises the validity of the GCB is difficult to 
gauge. One previous study, focusing on beliefs in anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in 
Malaysia, indicates that endorsement of certain specific conspiracist claims may be 
influenced by cultural context (Swami, 2012). However, cultural issues may be of 
relatively minor importance when assessing generic conspiracist ideation. Since 
completion of the research described in Chapter 2, one study has been published 
describing the creation of a similar measure of generic conspiracist ideation (Bruder 
et al., 2013). Unlike the GCB, Bruder et al.‘s Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire 
(CMQ) was subjected to cross-cultural validation. Findings showed the CMQ to 
retain acceptable psychometric properties in English, German, and Turkish. One item 
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of the five-item scale appeared to function slightly differently in the Turkish sample; 
however, the measure appeared to retain validity on the whole. It remains to be 
established whether the GCB retains acceptable psychometric properties when used 
with non-English speaking, non-Western samples. 
A significant methodological limitation of the program of research reported 
in Chapters 3 and 4 is that the stimuli used to assess or manipulate the various 
representativeness biases were novel, and thus have not been previously validated. 
The stimuli used to manipulate the proportionality bias in Study 5a were based on 
stimuli previous used by Leman and Cinnirella (2007); however, confounding 
variables may have been introduced by using the novel context of a terrorist 
bombing. In vignettes used in previous research, the scenario involved an 
assassination attempt which was either successful or unsuccessful. In the current 
vignettes, the ostensible terrorist attack was successful, in the sense that a bomb 
exploded in a crowded area, in all three vignettes; it is possible that the mere fact that 
a bomb exploded in a busy metropolis in all three scenarios overwhelmed any effect 
of the magnitude manipulation (the number of people killed by the explosion). 
The measure employed to assess susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy was 
likewise based on a previously used measure (Rogers et al., 2009); yet, novel 
conspiracy-themed items were created for the purposes of the current research. It is 
possible that the conspiracy-themed conjunction scenarios differ from neutral 
conjunction items in unanticipated ways, perhaps by invoking judgements based on 
motivations, ethics, or morality, rather than more dispassionate reasoning by 
representativeness.  
Likewise, the measures of biased attributions of intentionality used in Chapter 
4 have not previously been used to measure individual differences in preference for 
intentional attributions. It is possible that the measure used in Studies 5c and 8, 
adapted from Rosset (2008), lacks the sensitivity required to assess individual 
differences in susceptibility to the intentionality bias. While more sentences were 
judged to be intentional than unintentional on the whole, this may reflect semantic 
biases in the way that words are typically used to convey an actor‘s intent; a sentence 
such as ‗She kicked the dog‘ may be implicitly interpreted as conveying intention, 
regardless of a cognitive bias towards inferring intent. In this way, the observed 
relationship between conspiracist ideation and ratings of intentionality may reflect a 
third variable, such as reading comprehension or general intelligence, rather than 
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susceptibility to the intentionality bias itself. Likewise, the videos employed to assess 
bias towards perceiving intentionality in Study 6 may have contained some feature 
which prompted intentional attributions without invoking the intentionality bias; 
perhaps the finger-presses depicted in the videos were judged to be intentional more 
often than not simply because pressing a key on a keyboard is a prototypically 
intentional act. Thus, the psychometric properties of these measures warrant further 
investigation and validation. 
A final methodological limitation is that, with the exception of Study 5a, the 
studies in the current thesis were correlational in design, and thus cannot establish 
the direction of causality. In the case of the intentionality bias, for example, it is not 
possible to say conclusively that a bias towards interpreting ambiguous events as 
intentional causes an individual to view conspiracy theories more favourably. The 
direction of causality may be the reverse; that is, a proclivity towards conspiracy 
theorising may lead an individual to infer intentionality more generally. Each study 
makes a theory-based argument for causality; however, it must be reiterated that the 
current findings are novel, and that these proposed mechanisms remain to be verified 
by future experimental research. 
 
Future directions 
Consideration of the limitations of the current research suggests some 
productive avenues for future research. First, concerning the cross-cultural validity of 
the GCB, it is essential to examine the psychometric and predictive properties of the 
GCB across a range of languages and cultures. Like much of the literature on 
conspiracy theories, research in the current thesis remained primarily exclusive to 
English-speaking participants of Western nationality. To establish cross-cultural 
validity, the GCB should be translated into a range of languages, and the 
psychometric properties compared across cultures. In particular, it may be of interest 
to examine differences across Western versus non-Western, and democratic versus 
nondemocratic cultures (see Bruder et al., 2013; Swami, 2012). Second, much of the 
present research addressing the role of cognitive biases was correlational. 
Speculative causal explanations were offered; yet, the possibility that conspiracist 
ideation shapes more general cognitive processing cannot be ruled out. Experimental 
research is required to elucidate and quantify the precise nature of these 
relationships. 
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In addition, the current findings suggest other general directions for future 
research. First, progressive research may consider taking a more nuanced view of 
conspiracism, going beyond a simple division between ‗believers‘ and ‗nonbelievers‘ 
as the current research, and much previous research, has used. The current findings 
tentatively suggest that certain variables may only meaningfully predict extremes of 
belief, rather than differentiating milder sceptics from mild believers. Thus, future 
research may make efforts to selectively recruit participants with stronger prior 
attitudes towards conspiracy theories – either strong belief or strong disbelief. 
Moreover, a useful taxonomy of ‗conspiracists‘ may extend beyond simple degrees 
of belief. Bartlett and Miller (2011), for example, propose a more detailed 
categorisation of believers, differentiating between mere consumers of conspiracy 
theories, and generators of conspiracy theories. The current research focused 
primarily on conspiracy theories as they are consumed – that is, how individuals 
respond to existing conspiracy theories that they have been exposed to or have 
sought out. Future research may seek to compare the psychology of conspiracy-
consumers with that of conspiracy-generators – that is, the people who formulate 
novel conspiracy theories. It is possible that the psychological factors which 
contribute towards endorsement of existing conspiracy theories are different from 
those which drive certain individuals to generate and spread novel theories. 
The current thesis involved directly addressing conspiracist ideation via a 
self-report measure (the newly created GCB scale). This self-report methodology is a 
practically useful approach, and the findings indicate that the GCB is at least as valid 
as any existing measure. However, a productive approach for future research may be 
to address conspiracist ideation using indirect, implicit measures. The current 
findings suggest that conspiracist beliefs are, in part, a product of nonconscious 
biases and heuristics. In addition, previous studies show that mere exposure to 
conspiracist information can influence attitudes and behaviours (Butler et al., 1995; 
Jolley & Douglas, 2013; Swami et al., 2013), and that individuals may be entirely 
unaware of having been influenced (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). With this in mind, in 
addition to assessing explicit endorsement of particular conspiracy theories, it may 
prove useful to examine participants‘ implicit attitudes towards conspiracies or the 
alleged perpetrators of conspiracies. It may be the case that even individuals who do 
not explicitly endorse a conspiracy theory are subtly influenced by its claims. Such 
an influence may be evident in participants‘ implicit responses to the alleged 
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perpetrators or victims of the conspiracy, or in related behavioural intentions, such as 
intentions to vote for a political candidate, for example (see Bost, Prunier, & Piper, 
2010; Jolley & Douglas, 2013). 
Research has yet to broach the subject of how conspiracist beliefs may be 
effectively curtailed. The observation that a defining characteristic of conspiracy 
theories is the ability to accommodate disconfirming evidence (see Chapter 1), as 
well as the indication that conspiracist beliefs may be fuelled, in part, by 
sociocognitive biases, highlights the difficulties of combating these beliefs. 
However, the findings offer the possibility that conspiracist beliefs may be less likely 
to be adopted if the influence of these biases can be suppressed. One recent study 
(Leman & Cinnirella, 2013) took the approach of experimentally manipulating the 
need for cognitive closure (NFCC). Under normal conditions, participants tended to 
base judgements concerning a novel conspiracy theory primarily on their prior level 
of conspiracist ideation. However, when NFCC was decreased (by leading 
participants to believe they would have to defend their attitudes in front of a peer 
group), participants were more likely to be influenced by the available evidence 
relating to the potential conspiracy. Future research may take a similar approach to 
examine whether the influence of representativeness biases on conspiracism can be 
ameliorated by lowering NFCC or through other experimental manipulations (e.g. 
Agnoli & Krantz, 1989). 
A more general point that must be considered as research progresses is that a 
solely psychological approach may be insufficient to fully understand conspiracism. 
This thesis, together with other psychological research, suggests that conspiracy 
theories may owe a degree of plausibility to the ways in which conspiracy theories 
mesh with low-level psychological biases, and the effects of certain personality traits 
or situational factors. Yet conspiracy theories are not merely isolated beliefs held by 
individuals. Conspiracy theories are ultimately shared beliefs; conspiracy theorising 
is a global, social, political, and historical phenomenon (see Byford, 2011). While the 
genesis of a conspiracist belief lies within each individual, in practice, conspiracy 
theories may take on new properties and functions. To date, pockets of research have 
emerged from within several disciplines – including philosophy (Coady, 2006; 
Graumann & Moscovici, 1987), sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies (e.g. 
Bratich, 2008; Knight, 2000, 2002; Pipes, 1998), history (e.g. Coward & Swann, 
2004; Knight, 2003; Roisman, 2006; Walker, 2013), and psychology – yet there has 
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been little attempt to integrate the various insights. This is perhaps understandable, 
given that these efforts represent the first tentative steps towards understanding 
conspiracism. Research may not have yet reached the point where insights are 
developed enough to begin integrating different perspectives. Yet it seems fair to say 
that the phenomenon of conspiracy theories may be best understood by following an 
interdisciplinary approach informed by culture, politics, and history. 
 
Conclusion  
In sum, the present thesis has produced a novel measure of conspiracist 
ideation, broadly showing that assessing generic conspiracism is a valid approach 
towards the measurement of conspiracist ideation. In addition, the research shows 
conspiracist ideation to be, in part, a product of representativeness biases – 
specifically, susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and a bias towards inferences of 
intentionality. It appears that individuals prone to these biases see conspiracist claims 
as more representative, and thus more plausible, than their nonconspiracist 
counterparts. In total, the findings suggest that, like other anomalistic beliefs, 
conspiracy theories may be in part a byproduct of normal cognitive processes. 
However, further research is necessary to establish the causal mechanisms 
underlying these relationships. Given the cultural relevance and potential harmful 
behavioural consequences of belief in conspiracy theories, both for individual 
believers and for the wider population, the factors underlying the formation, 
maintenance, and transmission of conspiracy theories are deserving of further 
scientific scrutiny. To date, conspiracy theories have been a largely overlooked by 
psychologists. However, given the increasing number of publications on the topic in 
recent years, it appears that conspiracist ideation is at last receiving the attention it 
warrants. 
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Appendix 2.1. Item-loadings for the alternative 6-factor solution in Study 1. 
Appendix 2.1. Continued.  
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.     The government has employed people in secret to assassinate 
others 
.83 .07 -.10 .03 -.20 -.04 
48.   Government agencies have been secretly involved in the 
assassination of their own citizens 
..82 -.03 .01 .08 -.19 .02 
61.   The deaths of certain high-profile public figures have been 
the result of covert, government-sanctioned operations 
.78 .04 .07 .03 -.21 .09 
20.   Certain world leading political figures who died untimely 
deaths were in fact ―taken out‖ by government operatives 
.76 .05 .01 .02 -.11 .04 
55.   Some of the people thought to be responsible for acts of 
terrorism were actually set up by those responsible 
.74 -.03 .13 -.18 .14 -.08 
19.    For strategic reasons, the government permits certain 
terrorist activities to occur which could otherwise be 
prevented 
.70 .01 -.05 -.10 .21 .04 
69.    Some acts of terrorism, which have resulted in the deaths of 
many civilians, have been secretly directed by government 
operatives 
.67 -.11 .11 -.08 .05 .15 
57.   High-level politicians have had certain people killed in order 
to prevent embarrassing events from becoming publicly 
known 
.60 -.03 .01 .07 -.08 .18 
38.   Government agencies secretly keep certain outspoken 
celebrities and citizens under constant surveillance  
.60 .06 .02 .16 -.03 -.17 
9.     Some individuals thought to be responsible for the 
assassination of public figures were set up by the group 
responsible 
.60 .06 .06 -.06 .20 -.09 
15.   The government lies about their knowledge of terrorist 
activities 
.55 -.04 -.15 .26 .27 -.16 
34.   The government keeps many important secrets from the 
public 
.55 .09 -.06 .27 -.07 -.12 
22.   There are ongoing, hidden efforts to marginalise, control or 
destroy certain groups of people through the use of political 
policies 
.48 -.11 .11 .29 .03 .02 
39.   The government deliberately permits certain terrorist 
activities to occur to keep the public in a state of fear 
.47 -.02 .16 -.11 .33 .08 
1.     Certain celebrities and/or public figures actually faked their 
own deaths in order to escape the spotlight 
.43 .06 -.17 -.06 .13 .10 
4.     The government has staged important societal events in order 
to manipulate voters 
.39 -.04 .10 .14 -.07 .03 
27.   Viruses and/or diseases have been deliberately disseminated 
to infect certain populations 
.37 .02 -.03 .24 .06 .57 
12.   The government fakes evidence relating to significant world 
events to deceive citizens 
.33 .01 .12 .23 .16 .03 
66.   Drugs are deliberately supplied to certain communities in 
order to marginalise or destroy them 
.28 -.01 .25 .03 .17 .08 
30.   Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public .04 .95 -.05 .10 .01 -.16 
53.   Evidence of alien presence on earth is being covered up .02 .94 -.03 .06 -.03 -.04 
25.   Secret organisations communicate with extra-terrestrials, but 
keep this fact from the public 
..08 .90 -.06 -.03 -.07 .07 
29.   Some UFO sightings and rumours are planned or staged in 
order to distract the public from real alien contact 
.09 .78 -.02 .03 .02 .01 
10.   Some existing technologies are the result of reverse 
engineering alien technology 
-.03 .76 .02 .03 -.04 .13 
37.   Space missions are deliberately sabotaged so that the public 
does not learn of existing alien activity in the solar system 
.00 .61 -.05 -.17 .17 .16 
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Appendix 2.1. Continued.  
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
58.   Movies and TV shows featuring aliens are a way of 
preparing the population for the news that aliens are real and 
have visited earth 
-.13 .57 .30 -.06 .07 .06 
59.    The power held by heads of state is second to that of small 
unknown groups who really control world politics 
.10 -.03 .94 -.02 -.03 -.09 
42.   A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all 
major world decisions, such as going to war 
-.09 -.01 .91 .01 .09 -.05 
70.   Certain significant world events have been the result of the 
activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world 
politics 
.17 -.04 .91 .02 -.22 .04 
11.   A small, secret group of people is actually in control of the 
world economy 
-.11 .05 .88 .06 -.02 .01 
68.   Members of a secret group have infiltrated governments and 
powerful organisations in order to one day bring their group 
to the point of global control 
.04 .04 .80 .00 -.06 .04 
64.   Many well-known celebrities, politicians and wealthy people 
are members of a secret society which has control over our 
lives 
-.08 .07 .70 -.02 .04 .08 
14.   Large, influential industries are in fact tightly controlled by a 
small, secret group of people 
.08 -.02 .66 .15 -.01 -.03 
44.   Small groups of people are in possession of secret 
knowledge which would change our understanding of the 
world, and are deliberately keeping it hidden 
.09 .16 .39 .26 .02 .07 
40.   Secret organisations have access to large amounts of 
personal data on every citizen and sell it to the government 
.21 .04 .30 .14 .21 -.13 
52.   New and better technology is suppressed by those whose 
current business would be disrupted by it  
.23 .04 .11 .54 .02 -.08 
28.   New and advanced technology which would harm current 
industry is being suppressed 
.20 .08 .01 .53 .05 -.02 
65.   Groups of scientists ensure that only evidence which 
supports a pre-determined conclusion is made known to the 
public 
-.17 .02 .11 .52 .11 .23 
21.   Government funded scientists manipulate evidence in order 
to support existing government policy 
.13 -.04 -.04 .51 .04 .27 
72.   Technology is being concealed which is far in advance of 
what is known to the general public 
.06 .13 -.03 .48 .18 .09 
71.   Certain groups of scientists fabricate data in support of a 
particular scientific theory out of self-interest 
.15 -.11 -.09 .47 -.11 .39 
74.   The media ensures that only certain information is made 
known to the public 
.20 -.07 .08 .36 .23 -.05 
17.   The government has a large amount of confidential data on 
every citizen without their knowledge or permission 
.10 .03 .19 .30 .10 -.11 
60.   Family planning policies are part of a plot to control and 
limit certain populations 
.05 .00 .15 .19 .16 .18 
18.   Cures for certain deadly and common diseases exist, but are 
being deliberately withheld 
-.09 .05 -.04 .15 .87 -.07 
24.   A lot of information about diseases and treatments is 
withheld from the public 
-.02 -.10 -.05 .27 .84 -.07 
8.      The government withholds a lot of information about 
diseases and their treatments from the public 
.02 .05 -.02 .15 .68 -.03 
54.   Progress towards a cure for cancer, AIDS and other diseases 
is deliberately being hindered 
-.10 .09 .15 .16 .66 -.11 
41.   The pharmaceutical industry administers harmful treatments 
without people‘s consent in order to keep people sick and 
boost drug sales 
.04 .13 .17 -.14 .45 .17 
 184 
Appendix 2.1. Continued.  
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
50.   The rapid spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the 
result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some 
organisation 
.14 .06 .02 -.07 .42 .27 
51.   Some viruses and/or diseases which many people are 
infected with were created in laboratories as bio-weapons 
.15 .09 .07 .06 .34 .11 
33.   Certain chemicals are put in the water supply in order to 
control the people 
-.12 .18 .28 -.09 .33 .22 
23.   Technology with mind-control capacities exists and is 
currently being used on people without their knowledge 
-.06 .10 .02 .10 -.10 .85 
13.   Technology with mind-control capacities is tested on people 
without their knowledge or consent 
.05 .12 .10 .13 -.20 .73 
46.   Experiments involving  advanced technologies are carried 
out on the general public without their knowledge or consent 
.07 .06 .09 .09 .07 .51 
36.   Experiments involving new drugs are carried out on the 
general public without their knowledge or consent 
-.03 .02 .09 .07 .29 .44 
62.   Advanced technology is secretly used to placate the people 
and suppress dissent 
.06 .02 .22 .08 .11 .44 
3.     Groups of scientists deliberately attempt to create panic 
about future risks because it is in their interests to do so 
.06 -.04 -.17 .31 .22 .40 
7.     Certain natural disasters have in fact been the result of secret 
testing of powerful and advanced technology with unknown 
capabilities 
.10 .18 -.06 -.07 .26 .36 
       
Unrotated Eigenvalues 27.5 3.43 1.33 1.25 1.04 0.73 
% of variance accounted for following rotation 21.1 15.8 22.1 14.5 21.8 19.5 
Note. N = 473.  
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Appendix 2.2. GCB scale instructions and item wording. 
 
 
Beliefs About the World 
There is often debate about whether or not the public is told the whole 
truth about various important issues. This brief survey is designed to 
assess your beliefs about some of these subjects. Please indicate the 
degree to which you believe each statement is likely to be true on the 
following scale: Definitely not true; Probably not true; Not sure / cannot 
decide; Probably true; Definitely true. 
1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens 
and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret 
2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown 
groups who really control world politics 
3. Secret organisations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep 
this fact from the public 
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the 
deliberate, concealed efforts of some organisation 
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in 
order to deceive the public 
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own 
soil, disguising its involvement 
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major 
world decisions, such as going to war 
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public 
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on people without 
their knowledge 
10. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry 
is being suppressed 
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in 
criminal activity 
12. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a 
small group who secretly manipulate world events 
13. Some UFO sightings and rumours are planned or staged in order to 
distract the public from real alien contact 
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely 
carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent 
15. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the 
public out of self-interest 
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Appendix 3.1. Proportionality bias instructions and vignette wording. 
 
Instructions 
Imagine that the following text has been transcribed from a real newspaper article. 
Some names and locations have been obscured. Please read the information carefully 
and use it to answer the questions which follow over the page. 
 
 
Version 1: Small-magnitude condition 
A large bomb exploded yesterday morning in the parking garage underneath the 
XXXXXXXXXXXX building, a skyscraper in the financial district of 
XXXXXXXX.  Nobody was killed in the blast. Forensic investigators claim that the 
bomb was hidden inside a vehicle left in the parking garage and detonated remotely. 
Officials expressed relief that, despite the extensive damage caused by the explosion, 
by pure luck no lives were lost. Tenants of the 82-story office building mainly 
include multi-national financial firms and government agencies. So far police have 
revealed few details of their investigation into the bombing, but it is believed that a 
35 year-old man, detained shortly after the explosion and suspected to be a 
religiously motivated terrorist, is currently being held in custody. 
 
Version 2: Intermediate-magnitude condition 
A large bomb exploded yesterday morning in the parking garage underneath the 
XXXXXXXXXXXX building, a skyscraper in the financial district of 
XXXXXXXX.  6 people were killed in the blast. Forensic investigators claim that 
the bomb was hidden inside a vehicle left in the parking garage and detonated 
remotely. The city is mourning the lives lost, however officials have expressed relief 
that more people were not harmed in the explosion. Tenants of the 82-story office 
building mainly include multi-national financial firms, as well as government 
agencies. So far police have revealed few details of their investigation into the 
bombing, but it is believed that a 35 year-old man, detained shortly after the 
explosion and suspected to be a religiously motivated terrorist, is currently being 
held in custody. 
 
Version 3: Large-magnitude condition 
A large bomb exploded yesterday morning in the parking garage underneath the 
XXXXXXXXXXXX building, a skyscraper in the financial district of 
XXXXXXXX.  600 people were killed in the blast. Forensic investigators claim that 
the bomb was hidden inside a vehicle left in the parking garage and detonated 
remotely. The loss of life makes this the most destructive terrorist act on XXXXXXX 
soil. Tenants of the 82-story office building mainly include multi-national financial 
firms, as well as government agencies. So far police have revealed few details of 
their investigation into the bombing, but it is believed that a 35 year-old man, 
detained shortly after the explosion and suspected to be a religiously motivated 
terrorist, is currently being held in custody. 
 
 
Note. Wording intended to manipulate the magnitude of the event has been italicised. 
Italics were not included in materials presented to participants. 
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Appendix 3.2. Wording of novel conspiracy-themed conjunction items. 
 
Jane suffers from a chronic illness. She asks her G.P. to prescribe her a particular 
medication which has recently been promoted by its manufacturer as a safe and 
effective treatment for her condition, though some scientists say the drug has serious 
side-effects. 
a) Jane starts to experience severe headaches. 
b) The manufacturer withdraws the medication from the market. 
c) Jane starts to experience severe headaches and the manufacturer 
withdraws the medication from the market. 
 
Elaine has been having an affair with a high ranking politician. During an argument 
she threatened to reveal details of their affair to the media. A few days later Elaine is 
found dead, seemingly of a self-administered drug overdose. 
a) Details of the affair never get revealed to the public. 
b) The results of Elaine‘s autopsy mysteriously go missing. 
c) Details of the affair never get revealed to the public and the 
results of Elaine‘s autopsy mysteriously go missing. 
 
Patrick works for a pharmaceutical company testing the efficacy and side-effects of 
the vaccines they manufacture. He discovers that one of their vaccines is associated 
with an increased risk of developmental disorders in children. 
a) Patrick‘s data get lost after an I.T. failure affecting his computer. 
b) Patrick is taken off the project. 
c) Patrick‘s data get lost after an I.T. failure affecting his computer 
and Patrick is taken off the project. 
 
Ron is a well-known investigative journalist. While researching a story he finds 
evidence that various well-known politicians and celebrities are members of a secret 
society, and plans to reveal the information in a newspaper article. 
a) Several members of the secret society know about Ron‘s 
intentions to reveal his findings. 
b) Ron is fired from his job at the newspaper before publishing the 
article. 
c) Several members of the secret society know about Ron‘s 
intentions to reveal his findings and Ron is fired from his job at 
the newspaper before publishing the article. 
 
Simon was travelling around rural America when he saw a strange light formation in 
the sky. Simon photographed the formation as it seemed to move in complex patterns 
for several minutes before appearing to vanish into the distance at extreme speed. 
a) There is a secret military base nearby. 
b) Shortly after seeing the lights Simon is approached by heavily 
armed military personnel and his camera is confiscated. 
c) There is a secret military base nearby and shortly after seeing the 
lights Simon is approached by heavily armed military personnel 
and his camera is confiscated. 
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Josh has a doctorate in engineering and has been inventing products and gadgets in 
his spare time for several years. After patenting a few unsuccessful products, Josh is 
now on the verge of perfecting a device which will increase the fuel efficiency of any 
car by 500%. 
a) The CEOs of several major petrol companies hold a meeting in 
which they discuss the implications of Josh‘s invention. 
b) Josh is found dead in his home before patenting the invention. 
c) The CEOs of several major petrol companies hold a meeting in 
which they discuss the implications of Josh‘s invention and Josh 
is found dead in his home before patenting the invention. 
 
Jack is a scientist working on finding a cure for a highly infectious disease. Currently 
the only available treatment is a medication to manage the symptoms which must be 
taken daily; Jack‘s cure would make this medication obsolete.  
a) The existing medication is sold for a large profit. 
b) The laboratory where Jack works is destroyed in a fire. 
c) The existing medication is sold for a large profit and the 
laboratory where Jack works is destroyed in a fire. 
 
Dave has been an administrator with a large company for five years. His job includes 
tracking other employees‘ email and internet usage. The company is promoting from 
within for a senior administration position. Dave is scheduled to have a meeting with 
his bosses to discuss whether he will get the position. 
a) Dave notices a lot of emails between a co-worker who shares his 
office and their bosses the day before his meeting. 
b) Dave does not get the promotion. 
c) Dave notices a lot of emails between a co-worker who shares his 
office and their bosses the day before his meeting and Dave does 
not get the promotion. 
